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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the decisions made by people or households about how much to save 
out of income. The literature survey examines and criticises the life cycle savings literature 
and summarises some of the alternative approaches to decision making that have been 
proposed. Then, a theory of savings behaviour is developed which makes more realistic 
assumptions about how people take savings decisions than the conventional models. The 
basis of this theory is Simon's concept of "Bounded Rationality". The simulation of this 
theory shows that it can generate some observed behaviour that is not explained by the 
conventional models; in particular, there is a high level of saving early on in the life cycle. 
Then an experiment is described which examines behaviour. Subjects solved a savings 
problem and performed trials of savings strategies using a calculation facility. Various 
different ways of thinking about the problem (or decision strategies) were identified. The 
experiment was then developed to examine the effects of parameter variations in the 
problem and the possibility that subjects used the method of backward induction to solve 
the savings problem. These experiments demonstrated the existence of a simplified decision 
strategy, named a "rolling strategy". There was little evidence of the use of backward 
induction. Simulations of various decision strategies were then performed for the types of 
income stream and discount rate used in the experiments. It was found that for most 
parameter values, in particular those used in the experiment, the rolling strategy performed 
nearly as well as the optimal strategy. 
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1 Introduction 
The main objective of this research was to investigate the psychology of economic decision 
makers. From my previous studies in economics it had become clear that, although there has 
been a considerable intellectual effort dedicated to the analysis of the production and 
exchange of goods and the attendant interactions between people, the science of economics 
has only reached a limited understanding. While the theoretical properties of markets and 
interactions between perfectly optimising economic agents are (I suggest) well understood, 
the actual decisions and decision making processes are much less clear. This is not 
surprising. Since every individual has their own unique personality, they also have their own 
unique desires and their own unique ways of deciding how to achieve those desires. There 
is only a hazy knowledge of the details of these cognitive processes, which implies that it 
is not practical or indeed possible to include a complete, accurate specification of people's 
behaviour in economic models. Economic theory has tended to the other extreme: it is often 
assumed that economic agents optimise perfectly, given the environment in which they find 
themselves. Given the modern trend of basing macroeconomics on microeconomic 
foundations, this is even more influential than before. The Experimental work in economics 
has shown that this is often a poor approximation to actual behaviour and this means that 
the results of the models themselves must be suspect. Econometric testing has, in general, 
given mixed evidence partly due to the need for more detailed data, but also due to problems 
of aggregation given the differences between individuals. Therefore, there seems to be a 
possibility for a slightly more realistic specification of behaviour to try and explain the 
anomalies between the theory and the empirical data. This has long been known among 
decision theorists and many alternative models have been proposed, especially in the field 
of risk and uncertainty (see e. g. Camerer and Weber 1992 for a survey). 
The area of savings decisions was chosen because of the particularly appropriate 
characteristics of these decisions for a study of human decision making under uncertainty. 
Decisions about how much to consume or save are made by everybody and are perceived 
to be important. A corollary of this is that in general people try to behave rationally, in the 
sense that they try to direct their resources to achieve their consumption goals. At the same 
time, such decisions are characterised by massive uncertainty because of the intertemporal 
nature of the decision, especially the need to plan over the whole of a lifetime. As the person 
looks further into the future, their estimates of income, interest rates and even their own 
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preferences become more and more vague. Hence a perfectly optimal decision which takes 
into account the various distributions of the parameters becomes impractical. If perfect 
optimisation is impractical, people must in some (relatively) consistent way simplify the 
problem to be able to take these decisions: the question is, how? 
This thesis investigates this question. In chapter 2 various strands of the literature are 
identified, firstly the current state of the `conventional' literature and the empirical evidence, 
and the development of non-expected utility theories and what has been called `near rational 
behaviour'. These are still grounded in the idea of optimising economic agents. Then the 
issue of the definition of rationality is examined. The psychology literature is considered 
next, leading into studies of the cognitive process. Theories of motivation, both general and 
with specific application to savings behaviour are considered and then the contribution from 
economic psychology is surveyed. The contribution of consumer research to consumption 
decisions is identified and finally the ideas of G. L. S. Shackle are summarised. 
From these diverse areas, chapter 3 tries to combine some of the more important ideas in 
a new theory of life cycle consumption. The idea of bounded rationality from Herbert Simon 
is applied and the utility function of the conventional model is developed to include 
additional contributions to utility as well as the act of consumption. The main ideas are that 
there is a utility associated with a wealth stock per se and also with the act of saving; a 
bequest motive is also included. The decision process allows for habit formation and, 
following the direction of Pemberton (1993), the problem is simplified into a trade-off 
between two variables, current utility and a measure of future utility. The trade-off is 
between levels of utility, rather than the first order condition or marginal utilities. Also, two 
different classes of savings instrument are incorporated, a typical instrument as used in the 
conventional theory with a certain rate of interest and a pension instrument. Chapter 4 
contains a simulation of the theory and presents the results. It is found that agents build up 
a stock of wealth early on and that the level of consumption is strongly influenced by current 
income. Bequests are also significant. 
Chapters 5 and 6 describe two savings experiments. The first study at EXEC, University of 
York, in which various decision strategies were identified is described in chapter 5. Chapter 
6 proceeds to the experiment carried out at CentER, University of Tilburg in which 
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parameter variations were tried and the possible use of backward induction was investigated. 
The most significant result of these experiments is that a new decision making strategy, 
which has been named a `rolling' strategy, was identified. In this strategy, subjects limit the 
amount of information that they consider by only looking a few periods ahead. They act as 
if life is going to continue, for sure, for a fixed number of periods - and continue to act in 
this way. They repeat their calculations every period or two periods so that as they proceed 
through the periods in the experiment, they gradually cover all periods in the experiment. 
Chapter 7 performs a simulation to investigate the theoretical performance of this type of 
strategy against the optimal strategy for the income distributions used in the experiment. It 
is found that for the parameters used in the experiment, a rolling strategy performs worse, 
but not much worse than the optimal strategy. Chapter 8 draws conclusions and suggests 
directions for further research. 
9 
2A Selective Survey of The Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
This section will explain the reasoning that has led to the particular form of literature 
survey that has emerged. It is intended to act as an introduction to the main body of the 
literature survey and provide the motivation for the diverse nature of the reading I have 
undertaken. My objective in undertaking this survey is to scan the different literatures so 
that I can discover the current state of knowledge about savings behaviour. At this stage 
of the thesis, I will not be describing models in detail. Since I wish to construct a 
model of the savings behaviour of economic agents, not only savings behaviour will be 
examined but also ideas about the determinants of economic behaviour in relation to 
economic choices in general. The final section of the survey will summarize the 
arguments, in order to provide a basis for the development of a model of savings behaviour. 
The first question to be answered is: why are savings of interest in economic analysis? 
There are three points to be made. Savings can be defined as consumption foregone 
at the present time, to increase consumption in the future. As such, it is one of the 
main factors in determining consumption and hence demand. Personal savings are a 
significant part of economic decision making for many people. This type of decision is 
readily seen as being one in which it might be possible to make a 'rational' decision i. e. one 
based on expected future returns, assessment of risk, etc. Savings provide the funds for 
investment and government borrowing, both of which are important variables in 
determining the path that the economy takes. Firms and government have savings as 
well as individuals or households, but this work concentrates attention on the personal 
sector. 
This view of the importance of savings, as a determinant of economic performance, has 
motivated an interest in predicting savings behaviour at the macroeconomic level of 
aggregation. This requires an understanding of consumers behaviour that can not be 
obtained by econometric analysis alone. This is because even the most sophisticated 
statistical analysis, leading to a convincing identification of the significant variables 
in the consumption function is based on a limited amount of data. Even with modern micro 
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panels, the different situations and motivations of each individual or household generate 
variability that makes it difficult to include all the variables that may conceivably be 
significant and then identify those that actually are significant. 
Therefore, it is necessary to select variables for inclusion in the analysis. I see the 
process of selection as the task of theory, which should provide an internally 
consistent and plausible explanation of observed data. Of course, there are often many 
different theories that explain the same regularities in the data and it is then the task of 
empirical analysis to identify those theories that best explain the observations. In order to 
allow consideration different theoretical approaches, this thesis is based on the viewpoint 
that there are no normative grounds for preferring one theory over another e. g. a theory 
that is based on the axioms underlying expected utility theory versus a theory of 
'irrational' behaviour. Consequently, many different types of theory in addition to the solely 
economic theories of behaviour have been considered. 
It is also necessary to select the level of aggregation for analysis. This thesis follows 
thinking that sees aggregate movements as the result of the behaviour of many individual 
agents, whose actions combine in some way to produce the overall effect. It could be 
assumed that things cancel out, but this is a restrictive and arbitrary assumption. Hence it 
is necessary to understand microeconomic factors and also the process by which 
individuals actions aggregate to the macroeconomic level. In accordance with these ideas, 
the aim is to identify a theory that explains individual agent's observed savings behaviour. 
Deaton (1992) provides a very good and up-to-date survey of the state of economists 
thinking about savings and consumption. What might be called conventional theoretical 
economic analysis starts from a treatment of consumption as an intertemporal 
optimization problem, where an economic agent chooses consumption levels through 
their lifetime, given an income flow and a set of preferences. In this context, the 
preferences map the utility of a given level of consumption now compared with that 
level of consumption at different times in the future. 
This approach contains (as special cases) the two theories that were predominant in the 
literature until approximately 1980, the life cycle model (LCM) of through-life 
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consumption and the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). Early versions of the LCM show 
that, given a constant income distribution etc., an optimal consumption pattern over an 
agent's lifetime will keep consumption levels constant (see Deaton (1992) fig 2.1) for a 
plot of a typical result). Agents will save during their working life and dissave during 
retirement. Since income tends to increase with age until retirement, the amount saved 
per time period may well increase. In particular, the LCM predicts that accumulated 
wealth will increase until retirement and decrease thereafter. It also predicts that 
consumption is decoupled from income during the lifetime, while assuming that total 
lifetime consumption equals the sum of inherited assets and through life income - the 
lifetime budget constraint. The theory implicitly assumes that people can borrow as much 
as they want and, in the earlier versions, that intergenerational transfers are not 
significant. The PIH proposes that consumption is equal to an agent's permanent 
income, the income received from the agent's stock of wealth. This implies that the 
change in consumption from period to period depends on the interest rate. 
Together, the LCM and the PIH predict that agents smooth consumption profiles over 
their lifetimes compared to their income profiles. The theories were often used to predict 
macroeconomic behaviour by the method of assuming that an economy could be 
treated as if there was one 'representative' consumer, whose behaviour could be 
multiplied by the population level to find the overall consumption path for the economy. 
The applications of these theories took no account of uncertainty in the analysis, since 
the theory of behaviour under uncertainty was not sufficiently developed at that time. 
These theories have been found not to be consistent with empirical evidence. Deaton 
summarizes both the micro and macroeconomic data'. At the micro level, surveys of 
households are now more widely available over a time period long enough to make time 
series analysis feasible and cohort data of individuals expenditure at differing ages can 
also be obtained: some cohort series are now available and pseudo cohorts can also be 
constructed. Consumption has been found to track income over agent's lifetimes - 
people do not smooth their consumption profiles - indeed, many households have little 
or no wealth, retired people often save rather than dissave and savings are not substitutes 
A recent paper Kim (1996) shows that consumption in the USA has deviated by only 4% 
from the PIH over the period 1953-1993. 
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for other forms of wealth, e. g. housing asset values. It is also intuitively obvious that 
uncertainty is a significant factor in peoples economic decisions, particularly in an 
intertemporal context and it is at least plausible that some agents (e. g. the unemployed) do 
face limits on the amount they can borrow. 
Macroeconomic analysis also provides important evidence against these versions of the 
LCM. It is well known that there has been a fall in savings ratios, in particular in the 
last decade or so. Modigliani (1990) presents statistics that show that savings ratios have 
declined in many different countries in the period 1961-87 and Kenally (1985) 
presents typical evidence for the U. K. Bosworth et. al. (1991) perform a 
microeconomic analysis of the drop in savings ratios in the U. S., Canada and Japan in the 
1980s and conclude that the underlying factors are macroeconomic. Carroll & 
Summers (1991) demonstrate that, if consumption depends on lifetime resources, the 
distribution of consumption in countries with higher rates of growth is more heavily 
weighted towards young people. This turns out not to be true, both for first and third 
world countries. The LCM does not explain these macroeconomic changes within 
countries e. g. the drop in the saving rate in the U. S. is not a result of a redistribution of 
aggregate income towards the old, but an increase in consumption over all ages. Neither 
does the LCM provide an explanation for the variations in savings ratio across countries. 
The values of the ratios differ considerably and perhaps the differences are due only to 
national variations in preferences, but the theory does not explain why these values all 
change in the same direction simultaneously. 
The theoretical approach which involves the least change of the economic behaviour 
assumed by the theories is to remove some of the restrictions on the intertemporal 
optimization problem implied by the LCM and the PIH. The predictions from the LCM 
come to a large extent from the (often implicit) form of the utility function and from 
the assumption of certainty. Modigliani called this the stripped down life cycle model, 
with a quadratic or Cobb-Douglas utility function, which have an intertemporal elasticity 
of unity. Less restrictive forms of the utility function, such as iso-elastic forms 
incorporating uncertainty by means of the expectation operator, enable precautionary 
saving to be modelled and the presence of liquidity constraints and a bequest motive 
for saving have been incorporated into the analysis. The results of the developments in 
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expected utility theory have provided a method for modelling uncertainty. These 
extensions to the theory enable many of the empirical results to be explained and allow for 
a wide range of savings behaviour. Savings can be made to track income, several of these 
models show that it is possible for people to continue saving in their retirement and 
savings increase with an increase in uncertainty about future income levels. 
However, some serious problems remain with this approach, as some important empirical 
observations remain unexplained. Carroll (1992) found that the expectation of future 
income has no effect on current consumption above that of current income and the 
modifications do not address the aggregate level observations discussed previously. 
Furthermore, there is a large and growing body of evidence that people do not behave as 
expected utility maximizers in the face of uncertainty. The axioms of rational behaviour 
underlying expected utility theory have been tested under laboratory conditions and it has 
been found that a significant proportion of subjects do not obey these axioms. Hey (1991) 
ch. 6 gives a summary of the evidence. The behaviour associated with Investment 
Retirement Accounts has also left some unanswered questions. The introduction of these 
accounts in the U. S. increased the overall level of savings, rather than just diverting 
funds from other savings accounts. Carroll & Summers (1987) report similar behaviour in 
Canada. Contributions dropped considerably when the tax deductability was removed, 
even though tax levels were probably lower than they would reasonably be expected to be 
in the future. Also, contributions to these accounts were often made just before the tax 
filing deadline and not as early as possible, as would be optimal if the reason for 
contributing was the maximization of the return on a high return investment. 
There are also problems with the methodology adopted for these developments. The 
concern is that they include only the value of consumption bundle in the utility function. 
This leaves out any behavioural variables outside the desire to purchase consumption 
goods. From the study of econometrics, we know that the omission of relevant variables 
leads to bias in all the estimators for the coefficients. Consequently, it is necessary to 
work from a general model and eliminate insignificant variables. By arguing for the 
continued emphasis on the life cycle model with the minimum of modification, Deaton 
is overlooking this consideration. Even given the lack of empirical data discussed above, 
it should be possible to include a few more variables in the analysis of current data, or 
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generate new data to test alternative models. 
An experimental test of life cycle theory was performed by Hey & Dardanoni (1988a, b). 
This experiment will be described in some detail, as it forms the basis for the experiments 
in chs. 5 and 6. The experiment tested Hall's stochastic Euler equation for optimal 
consumption under uncertainty (Hall (1978)). This was achieved by implementing a 
problem with the same structure as the life cycle consumption problem. The experiment 
consisted of a random number of periods. In each period, subjects received an income in 
`tokens', which were added to tokens accumulated from previous periods. This income 
stream was stochastic, being drawn from a normal distribution in each period2. Subjects 
then chose how many tokens to convert to money3. Borrowing was not permitted. The 
payoff was the money converted from tokens in the final period; any money from 
conversion in previous periods was lost. After the experiment, subjects were given a 
questionnaire, asking them to state age, sex, income, the maximum they would be prepared 
to pay then and there for the chance of winning £10 on the toss of a coin, their strategy, how 
they took the rate of return in to account and how they took the income distribution into 
account. In order to compare subjects' choices to the optimum, it was necessary to estimate 
the subjects' utility functions. They were assumed to have CARA form functions, so it was 
only necessary to estimate the one risk aversion parameter. This was done in two ways. The 
gamble question in the questionnaire provided one point estimate and at the end of the 
experiment, without advance warning, the computer offered the subject the chance to play 
a gamble with their earnings. The response to this offer provided another point estimate. 
Behaviour was found to be significantly time dependent, contradicting the theory, but the 
comparative static implications of actual behaviour agreed in qualitative terms with those 
of optimal behaviour. 
There are a wide variety of approaches which have been used to tackle these problems. The 
evidence of non-expected utility maximizing behaviour under uncertainty has been 
2 Subjects could use the computer to find out the income distribution, but only a very few 
subjects did so. 
3 The conversion function had the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) form 
Money = 30(1-e-0. °" '4T) T= tokens converted. 
Tokens saved received interest at 12% per period. 
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addressed by Epstein and Zin. They use recursive utility functions to maintain dynamic 
consistency with non-expected utility maximizing utility functions. Machina (1989) shows 
that non-EU preferences can be dynamically consistent, if individuals take past uncertainty 
into account in a manner consistent with their original preferences4. 
Problems such as those found with the behaviour of people with regard to Investment 
Retirement Accounts have led to the behavioural life cycle hypothesis proposed by 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988). 
Others have begun to investigate the implications of non-optimal behaviour e. g. Cochrane 
(1989). This direction might be called near rational behaviour, as it looks at topics such 
as the utility loss of deviations from the optimal through-life consumption path. 
Pemberton (1993) also looks at non-optimal behaviour, but using optimization as a solution 
method. The unifying idea behind these papers is that people wish to behave as rational 
economic agents, but do not perform constrained optimization calculations in the way 
assumed by conventional microeconomic analysis. This may be due to agents having 
insufficient cognitive capability or perhaps to the lack of knowledge about the future 
which is an inevitable aspect of intertemporal choice. It is also possible that people have 
a different concept of what the 'best' choice is compared with microeconomists. 
The limitations on people's ability to behave rationally were considered by Simon, who 
developed the concept of bounded rationality. Given the emphasis that economists place 
on the assertion that people can and do act rationally, it is useful to look at the debate 
about what is rational behaviour. This has been the subject of fierce debate, especially 
among workers on the boundaries of economics with other disciplines - in particular 
psychology. Lea, Tarpy & Webley (1987) argues that the debate is sterile, but I wish to 
argue that consideration of what constitutes rationality may provide insights into 
peoples behaviour. 'Rational' behaviour has a normative appeal for many people outside 
economics. Indeed, the idea of a'scientific' approach is based on what is thought to be 
rational (or logical) analysis and this includes many mental processes besides constrained 
optimization problems. This must surely imply that people have a view of what constitutes 
` Another approach to utility is to regard preferences as fuzzy, enabling the mathematical 
apparatus of fuzzy sets to be used. See Billot (1991) for an introduction to fuzzy sets in utility theory. 
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rational decision making and how this ought to be applied to economic choices. 
Consequently, a careful definition of rational behaviour might provide insights into what 
people are trying to do when they make economic decisions. 
Seen in broad terms, the logical development of the above argument is to study people's 
decision making processes. It would then be possible to move in to the decision theory 
literature, but I suspect that this literature does not address the issues I have raised. This 
literature is intended to provide assistance to people taking decisions and given the 
prevalence of the rationality paradigm, takes statistical theory and optimization as its 
fundamental assumptions. The question of how people actually make decisions is not 
relevant to this literature and is not discussed within it, since it is not trying to explain or 
predict behaviour but is trying to improve it. 
A desire for an understanding of how people think when they are making decisions leads 
to the discipline of psychology - the study of behaviour - and its theories of human 
thought processes. Unlike economics with constrained optimization, psychology has not 
developed a single dominant paradigm. In addition, Lea, Tarpy & Webley (1987) points out 
that psychologists as a group see their discipline as empirically grounded. This means 
that they see their science as starting from the collection of empirical data. This can then 
be examined for regularities which can be used as the foundations for theorizing. The 
contrast with economics is that economists have a widely accepted theory of behaviour, 
which is then utilized to provide predictions of what economic agents do. These predictions 
can then be tested against empirical data. The consequence is that psychology appears 
to be a very fragmented discipline. However, there have been trends in thinking with a 
perceptible direction over the last two decades. The movement has been from psychology 
as a science of cognition, seeing behaviour as a product of the introspective process 
and hence determined by the structure of the brain system to what is termed the 
behaviourist paradigm, which places less emphasis on the thought process and 
considers the main determinant of behaviour to be the environment in which organisms 
find themselves. Skinner (1985) serves as an introduction to the debate. 
The study of cognition has taken computer software methods as a fruitful analogy for the 
problem solving process. The usefulness of this analogy has advanced significantly with 
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the development of the field of artificial intelligence. Thinking about these issues might 
provide understanding of peoples decision making processes and hence the behaviour 
that results. There are also some careful empirical analyses of cognitive processes e. g. 
Grunert (1989). 
Behaviour in response to external factors is determined by motivation, i. e. motivation 
identifies the goals and hence the appropriate behavioural response to a particular set of 
circumstances. The study of cognition has not yet provided a satisfactory 
conceptualization of how the external factors are taken as inputs and operated upon to 
determine behaviour that tries to satisfy the needs suggested by motivation theory. 
Therefore, environmental and motivational factors will be treated together. There are 
several motivational theories, summarized in Lea, Tarpy & Webley (1987) of which 
Maslow's hierarchy of needs is probably the best known. Some empirical work has been 
undertaken by psychologists on savings behaviour and attitudes towards saving e. g. Lunt 
& Livingstone (1991). Economists have also considered motives for saving, as these 
have an obvious influence on how people save. I have already mentioned precautionary 
and bequest motives in the above discussion from Deaton (1992). Keynes (1936) 
wrote down a list of motivations as a part of his analysis of saving and consumption. 
As economics is a social science, it is of necessity a science of human behaviour and a 
model of behaviour is the basis for all economic theory. Consequently, there is a common 
interest with psychology and recently a discipline of economic psychology has emerged. 
This has set itself the objective of using the methods of psychology to address economic 
problems. Lea, Tarpy & Webley(1987) gives an introduction to the field, including ideas 
about savings behaviour. The boundaries between economic psychology and behavioural 
economics are, unsurprisingly, very blurred. 
An alternative route within the overlap between economics and psychology is the consumer 
choice literature. The literature has grown as an adjunct to marketing science, which has 
a tradition of using the methods of psychology in the analysis of economic decisions e. g. 
advertising. Consumer research has produced working theories of how people make 
decisions in economic situations and there has been a lot of empirical work to test 
these theories. Because of the marketing orientation of this branch of economics it has 
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concentrated on discrete choice problems, particularly with regard to choices between 
different consumer products with more than one attribute or dimension of comparison. 
Foxall (1986) relates this literature to the movements within psychological theory. In my 
view, the strength of this literature lies in its firm empirical base, grounded in the 
function of the discipline as an aid to marketing decisions. 
Finally, Shackle's view of the decision process, described in Shackle (1979), has been 
applied to consumer choice. His theory emphasizes the nature of choice as an act of 
imagining different futures and hence a decision is a choice between these imagined 
futures. Ford (1987) uses Shackle's ideas to develop a new theory of choice under 
uncertainty. Earl (1983) combines Shackle's theory with lexicographic discrete choice 
theory to explain choice decisions. He also incorporates a theory of motivation from 
Kelly. 
2.2 Conventional Economic Models 
Following the structure of the Introduction, I shall start by considering the 'conventional' 
literature. A standard exposition of consumer theory is Deaton and Muellbauer (1989), 
which gives a comprehensive account of intertemporal optimization, including an 
analysis of uncertainty using expected utility theory. Increased uncertainty may increase 
rather than decrease current consumption, since increased saving reduces risk, but the 
benefits of intertemporal optimization are reduced. The econometric evidence from 
tests on the LCM and PIH are presented - it is described as "mixed" - and the issue of 
aggregation is discussed. Increased uncertainty about unemployment prospects will mainly 
affect poorer consumers and so will decrease consumption by more than would be 
anticipated from the decline in aggregate wealth alone. In contrast, increased uncertainty 
about e. g. tax on high incomes may increase rather than decrease aggregate consumption. 
Deaton (1992) brings the theory up to date and gives a critical appraisal of the available 
evidence. In his exposition of the LCM, he indicates that convexity of marginal utility 
provides a rationale for precautionary saving, which is excluded by constant consumption 
models that are grounded in quadratic utility functions. Also, if preferences are 
not intertemporally additive, a wider range of consumption profiles can be generated. 
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Inclusion of aggregation in a model is necessary to allow for differing information 
between consumers and population changes over time. The empirical evidence suggests 
that there is a link between consumption and income over a shorter period than the 
complete life and that aggregation is significant, which implies that the rate of interest 
may not be as important as the LCM indicates. The PIH is also contradicted by most 
empirical data (c. f. Kim (1996) - the changes in non-durable goods and services are 
30-40% of changes in current income. Representative agent models are criticized in the 
following way: if consumers cannot distinguish idiosyncratic from aggregate shocks, 
they will make small mistakes and if the correct part of their response is largely 
idiosyncratic, aggregation can lead to a representative agent who makes large mistakes 
and responds very slowly to innovations in aggregate income. Muellbauer (1994) also 
provides a summary of the limitations of the life cycle model. 
Models incorporating precautionary saving, bequests and liquidity constraints can explain 
much more of the data than the older models, especially once certainty equivalence is 
abandoned, but it is difficult to distinguish between them econometrically. Kimball 
(1990) introduces an analysis of precautionary saving, using Pratt (1964) as an analogy. 
The mathematical theory of risk aversion developed by Arrow and Pratt is reinterpreted 
for a utility function with an additional independent choice variable, giving non-zero third 
derivatives. This can be simplified to a form for precautionary saving such that the 
Arrow-Pratt results apply. He defines prudence and relative prudence as mathematically 
analogous concepts to risk aversion and relative risk aversion, where prudence 'is "the 
propensity to prepare and forearm oneself in the face of uncertainty". From this he defines 
the precautionary saving motive as "risk aversion of the negative of marginal utility". An 
index of prudence is introduced and some predictions for behaviour are derived. If absolute 
prudence is decreasing, labour income uncertainty will raise the marginal propensity to 
consume and adjustment of risky security holdings as wealth varies tends to reduce the 
marginal propensity to consumes. 
2.3 Empirical Evidence 
S Roy also introduced a model of 'Safety First' behaviour (Roy (1952)), where the upper bound 
of the chances of a disastrous event are minimised. Expected utility is maximised, assuming the utility 
function takes only two values e. g. =1 if the disaster does not occur, =0 if it does. 
20 
There has been a large amount of work on aggregate consumption functions; so much so 
that Deaton (1992) argues that the data has been exhausted and research should now 
concentrate on the micro level data that are becoming available. Kennally (1985) looks at 
the evidence from the U. K. for savings behaviour. There was a decline in the savings ratio 
from more than 15% to 11.5% in the period 1973-1984. Much of household saving is 
committed; discretionary saving is much smaller and more variable than committed saving. 
From 1980, there was a 40% increase in housing debt and a 45% increase in consumer 
debt, which coincided with an easing of credit controls. It is possible that the relaxation 
was followed by a change in the equilibrium stock of durables. He makes the proposition 
that if restraints are lifted, behaviour is more sensitive to changes in prices and interest 
rates. His conclusions are that the fall in the savings ratio was due mainly to changes 
in household sector discretionary saving and that the change from a high level of saving to 
dissaving was financed largely by borrowing, especially through the'mortgage leak' and 
consumer credit. The data are consistent with a period of stock adjustment following 
the easing of borrowing restrictions. 
Bosworth, Burtless & Sabelhaus (1991) analyse a similar pattern of behaviour in the U. S., 
Canada and Japan. They find that savings ratios moved together over virtually all age 
and income groups and there was no support for the idea that the reduction in savings was 
concentrated among holders of financial assets. However, there was a big decline among 
homeowners relative to renters, so capital gains on housing may have displaced saving. 
Since the change happened among all groups of the population, macro factors must be the 
cause. The commentators suggest that people may have had less to worry about, e. g. LH 
Summers draws attention to Slemrod (1986) who relates saving to the fear of nuclear 
war, which together with increases in medical insurance, social security and private 
pension plans would reduce precautionary saving. They point out that better capital and 
credit markets will ease liquidity constraints and reduce target borrowing. The change may 
be partly an artifact of data definitions; if income increased from sales of assets, this 
would not be treated as a change in income in the accounts. 
2.4 Non-expected Utility Models 
Epstein (1990) describes recent developments in this area. The method adopted is to apply 
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non-expected utility models within a dynamic, intertemporally consistent framework. The 
problem of dynamic consistency is discussed by Machina (1989). A criticism of non-EU 
models has been that they may be dynamically inconsistent, as they imply that when 
facing an intertemporal problem, non-EU agents will make initial plans, but may 
change their decisions when they arrive at the actual point of decision. Machina shows 
that this argument depends on the assumption that decisions are independent of previous 
events or outcomes. In Epstein & Zin, dynamic consistency is achieved by the use of 
recursive utility functions. So far, these have only been applied in the complete markets 
case with constant tastes. Two papers by Epstein and Zin (1989,1991) describe the theory 
and the econometric application. This theoretical approach brings several advances: it 
enables risk aversion to be separated from the degree of intertemporal 
substitutability, it puts atemporal non-expected utility theories into a temporal framework 
and succeeds in generating testable implications for the temporal behaviour of 
consumption and asset returns. Different specifications for the recursive utility 
functions are examined: expected utility, Kreps/Porteus (Kreps & Porteus (1978)) and 
Chew/Dekel (Dekel (1986)). In the empirical tests, expected utility was not consistent 
with the data, but there was no conclusive evidence for choosing between the 
non-EU theories. Non-EU dynamics emphasizes the importance of the structure of 
the representation of decision problems, as the results obtained from non-EU optimization 
vary if the method of structuring (or thinking about) the problem changes. 
2.5 The Behavioural Life Cycle Hypothesis 
This theory is an attempt to provide a more sophisticated psychological model than the 
conventional economic model of behaviour, with which optimization methods can then be 
used. The ideas arose from the realization that a large quantity of evidence, both 
statistical and anecdotal, contradicts the LCM6. Cardes (1990) discusses these anomalies, 
in particular the idea of bequests. If bequests are included in a savings model, the factors 
entering the utility function will need to be changed. There are various views of bequests: 
parents and children may share the risk that parents will live longer than expected or 
6 One important psychological effect is the frame in which decisions are taken (see e. g. Puto 
(1987)) for a discussion and experimental investigation of these effects). 
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parents may use bequests to extract services from children, in which case bequests give 
services during retirement. If, however, bequests are altruistic, the childrens' utility 
enters into the parents utility function. Given considerations such as these, savings will 
be dependent on the family structure. This is supported by a comparison of Japan with the 
U. S. Japan has a higher savings rate while 80% of elderly live with their children, 
compared to 10% in the U. S. 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) is a description of the behavioural life cycle hypothesis, which 
explains many of the anomalies in the evidence. Thaler (1990) details some of the 
behavioural implications of the hypothesis. The idea is that money is not fungible i. e. 
money from one source is not regarded in the same way as money from other sources. 
They suggest that people have three mental accounts: a current income account, an asset 
account and a future income account and that these accounts have different marginal 
propensities to consume. The MPC for current income is 1, for assets is 0 and for future 
income is between these two extremes. Also, people have two contradictory elements in 
their utility: a desire to consume now ("impatience") and a desire to save for the future 
(which is also true for conventional models that model assign utility to current and 
future consumption). Impatience, combined with differing MPCs implies that people will 
act as if their temporal discount rate exceeds the interest rate. At the same time, their 
desire to save causes them to regret their lack of self-control; they are, in fact, 
dynamically inconsistent. They therefore overcome this lack by making savings decisions 
that are difficult to reverse e. g. joining pension plans. In this way, they voluntarily constrain 
future choices and try to remove or reduce the effect of their dynamic inconsistency. It 
is also suggested that people adopt heuristics for saving. They do not borrow from 
assets or future income to finance current consumption except in emergencies such as 
unemployment and even then consumption is cut as far as possible. This means that 
consumption tracks income. People engage in precautionary saving, which means that the 
asset account is kept small and they save for retirement in ways that require little self 
control, which implies that most retirement saving will be non-discretionary. 
A similar philosophy addressing a different aspect of economic behaviour is Akerlof and 
Dickens (1982), who also developed a behavioural theory to explain apparent anomalies 
in peoples economic decisions. They took the idea of cognitive dissonance from 
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psychology, which proposes that people have preferences over their own beliefs about the 
state of the world as well as over the different states and that people can manipulate their 
own beliefs by selecting sources of information likely to confirm desired beliefs. 
Furthermore, once acquired, beliefs persist over time. Thus people may have and maintain 
beliefs which are not an accurate view of the state of the world. An implication of this 
theory is that people, if left alone, may purchase too little old age insurance if they prefer 
not to contemplate a time when they are old. This is a justification for social security 
legislation. 
2.6 Near Rational Behaviour 
This literature takes the conventional models described by Deaton (1992) as the point of 
departure and looks at small deviations from 'optimal' behaviour. There are several 
strands of thinking in this area. Campbell & Mankiw (1991) have a model where some 
fraction of aggregate income is received by agents who follow the simple rule of thumb 
of consuming their current income and the remainder is received by forward looking 
optimizing agents. They show that the utility loss relative to an all optimizing economy 
is quite small if all agents have an equal share of consumption, but much larger if some 
agents are consuming the current aggregate income while others consume aggregate 
permanent income. They find that variables that predict income growth also predict 
consumption growth. There is no evidence that real interest rates or changes in nominal 
interest rates have direct effects on consumption growth once the effects of current income 
are taken into account and also error correction terms do not improve the model if current 
income is included. There is no evidence that the fraction of optimizing agents has 
changed in the period 1970-1988. 
In his comments on this paper, Cochrane (1991) makes an important point: showing that 
a decision rule is optimal isolates the invariant aspect of behaviour, but showing that it 
is near rational does not, as there are many near optimal rules. He proposes that research 
should proceed using the Euler equation. This has the advantage that the Euler equation 
describes a partial equilibrium that is independent of the underlying production 
technology and can therefore be studied to yield information about preferences 
without having to fully specify a general equilibrium model. However, Muellbauer (1994) 
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exposes the limitations of the Euler equation approach. 
Cochrane (1989) investigates the utility lost by not quite following an optimal 
consumption path, using various decision rules. He finds that the cost of setting 
consumption equal to income rather than following the PIH is only between $0 and $1 per 
quarter, for a non-durable consumption of $3,500 per year. He tests a simple upper bound 
on consumption changes, the cost of excess sensitivity and smoothness of the 
consumption path, tolerating predictable errors in the Euler conditions and the cost of 
following a moving average process rather than meeting the Euler conditions. The 
largest loss he finds is $1.65 per quarter. He points out that since these costs are so small, 
behaviour may be dramatically changed by other factors e. g. costs of acquiring 
information. He also argues that it is impractical to allow for these simply by adding a 
few extra costs, as that would be an endless task. 
Pemberton (1993) sets out a proposal for near rational behaviour. He accepts Hey's 
(1983) argument that people cannot perform the backward induction solution to their 
through life consumption problem because most people cannot solve the mathematical 
problem and also because of the large degree of uncertainty involved. As an alternative, 
they have forward looking models instead and he develops a relatively simple forward 
looking model. The model has two periods, the present and the future and various random 
income processes are examined. The consumption path is found to depend significantly 
on the nature of the income process. 
UNIT YORK 
2.7 The Issue of Rational Behaviour 
Of 
The concept of rationality is at the core of most economic analysis. A good example of an 
economists view of rationality is the group of axioms underlying the EU model of 
choice under uncertainty, which enable behaviour to be modelled in an analytically 
tractable and consistent manner. Generally, the principle is that agents maximize the 
benefit to themselves of their actions in a consistent manner i. e. consumers maximize 
utility in all their decisions and their utility functions are fixed, at least for some 
significant length of time. Given that economics is a study of how to allocate scarce 
resources this is a very sensible position to take. A broader definition is given by 
Harsanyi (1986): rationality means that human behaviour is goal directed in some 
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consistent manner. 
a 
Lea, Tarpy & Webley (1987) considers the status of economic rationality. 
Psychological experiments demonstrate that the principles of rationality on which most 
economics is grounded (constrained optimization and the axioms underlying EU theory) 
are untrue. Unfortunately, the implications of these experiments for real economic 
behaviour are unclear and the framework of rationality can always be maintained by 
making additional assumptions. Consequently, they consider that asking the question 
"do people behave rationally? " will not provide any useful insights and that work 
should concentrate on the content of behaviour. They identify two senses of rationality 
- 'sensible' behaviour and conscious reasoning. Alternatives to rational behaviour are 
random behaviour, learning/habit and satisficing. Rationality may vary, depending upon 
the importance of the decision. 
Schoemaker (1991) discusses the use of the optimality paradigm. An essential feature 
is that it involves mathematical as well as empirical content. It can be misleadingly clear, 
since any behaviour can be modelled as optimal, given sufficient degrees of freedom. 
People cannot objectively perceive the whole of reality, so everyone has his or her own 
reality and consequently there is no single idea of what is rational. Optimality 
principles may be postulated that do not add up to a coherent whole. He contrasts 
purposive (teleological) things to which intention is ascribed, with non-teleological 
things, which have causal explanations. His worries about the use of the concept are 
expressed as possible biases: if the data fits optimality, this does not necessarily mean that 
the agent is optimizing, researchers may look harder for confirming than disconfirming 
evidence, there may be a tendency to rationalize away anomalies and the use of the 
paradigm may create an illusion of understanding by describing rather than explaining. 
A most acerbic comment comes from Bookstein (1991); optimality principles are only 
mathematical reformulations of the postulate. 
Sugden (1991) reminds us that rational choice theory describes certain regularities in 
human behaviour and that these choices are consistent, but only from the perspective of 
a particular theory. He argues that Savage's axioms of choice under uncertainty are much 
stronger than can be justified merely by an appeal to an instrumental conception of 
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rationality and that, in a game context, rational choice theory is self-defeating - 
individuals who are known to be rational in the conventional sense may be less 
successful than they would have been if they were known to be less rational. 
Simon's views on economic rationality are summarized in Simon (1987). Psychology 
and economics both accept that people are rational in the sense of having reasons for what 
they do. However, neo-classical economics differs from other social sciences by not 
stating the goals and values, by postulating global consistency and by postulating that 
behaviour is objectively rational in relation to its total environment. 
March (1978) identifies different concepts of rationality. The most important is limited 
rationality: people simplify problems as they are incapable of anticipating and 
considering all possibilities and information. Instead, they develop 'reasonable' 
responses: rules that are not optimal but do solve the problem. These may be manifest as 
step-function tastes, simple search rules, organizational slack, 'incrementalism' and 
'muddling through' and uncertainty avoidance. He defines process rationality where 
decisions are reasonable in terms of the decision process rather than the outcomes. System 
rationality occurs where knowledge is formed over time within a system so that optimal 
action is taken by agents without a full comprehension of its justification. Adaptive 
rationality captures the idea that learning from experience is retained in a large memory 
store, but experiences are not explicitly retrievable so that current reasons may be 
separated from current actions. Rules of behaviour may come from not from 
calculations, but from survival and growth of social institutions where' the rules are 
followed. Choice is then dominated by standard operating procedures and social 
regulation of social roles. This is Selected rationality. Posterior rationality is a process 
whereby actions are exogenous. These lead to experience, which is then evaluated in 
terms of preferences. These preferences are generated by the actions and consequences 
themselves and the choices are justified by posterior consistency with goals 
developed through a critical interpretation of the choice. 
The idea that people choose how rational to be is taken up by Devinney (1989). 
Originally formulated by Etzioni (1988), the concept is that rational behaviour is 
difficult and therefore costly. Rationality can be thought of as a variable determined by the 
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cognitive work required, personality and societal foundations and the maintenance and 
adaption of the level of rationality over time. Personality and society are exogenous, but 
cognitive work and maintenance can be chosen. By including a cost of effort function in 
an expression for expected utility, Devinney derives a first order condition for the 
optimal level of rationality. 
The idea of limitations on people's rationality finds its most clear and comprehensive 
exposition in the work of Simon. A summary of the basic idea is given in Simon (1983). 
Rationality involves axioms and rules of inference, brought together in a theory to 
reach conclusions. Since normative outputs cannot be obtained from descriptive inputs, 
our view of reason and hence tests for rational behaviour necessarily rest on value 
judgments. The implication of this is that we cannot claim that a theory is better because 
it describes rational behaviour, but can only say that it fits the data. Furthermore, any 
theory of rational behaviour embodies its judgments. He disagrees with the judgments 
incorporated in subjective expected utility, claiming that humans do not have the facts, 
reasoning powers or the consistent structure of values assumed by SEU theory. 
His alternative is bounded rationality. Peoples decisions are about specific matters, 
assumed to be independent of other areas of life. They do not work out a complete 
probability distribution over all possibilities, but have a general idea with a few 
contingencies worked out. Attention is focused on one immediate issue, with values and 
aspects of that issue. Different decision domains evoke particular values and so 
inconsistencies in choice may result from fluctuating attention. A large part of the effort in 
making a decision is devoted to gathering facts; the actual choice may take little time. In 
accordance with this view, one of the principal functions of emotions is to focus 
attention on e. g. physiological needs. People have mechanisms to generate alternatives and 
a capability to acquire facts, together with a modest ability to draw inferences. The 
consequences are that bounded rationality does not optimize and it does not guarantee 
consistency - choices may often depend on the order in which attention is drawn to them. 
In order to model decision making, we need to find the givens of the decision making 
situation, the focus of attention, the way in which the problem is represented and the 
process used to specify alternatives, estimate consequences and choose among 
possibilities (Simon(1987)). 
28 
2.8 The View from Psychology 
Psychologists have, to a limited extent, considered problems of economic behaviour. 
Because of its nature as the science of behaviour, it has inevitably tended to question 
and often challenge the relatively simple concepts of behaviour that are often used in 
economics. An introduction to the discipline of psychology, written for economists, is 
chapter 1 of Lea, Tarpy & Webley (1987). The conclusions from this overview were 
described in the introduction. The different paradigms that have been prevalent in 
psychology are contrasted in Skinner (1985). These are cognitive science and 
behaviourism. Cognitive science postulates that the causes of behaviour come from within 
the organism - people think and then act. Behaviourists, stress the role of antecedent events 
in the environment and the environmental histories of the species and the individual i. e. 
the environment selects behaviour. In cognitive science, the direction of the causal link 
is from the individual to the environment, but in behaviourism this is reversed. He also 
analyses subjective expected utility theory from a psychologists viewpoint. In behavioural 
terms, people act according to rules that describe contingencies under which behaviour 
is reinforced. People do most often those things which have been abundantly reinforced 
without making subjective estimates of the probabilities of enforcement and these 
reinforcers are real, not expected. Because contingencies are more effective than the rules 
derived from them, violations of the axioms of SEU are unsurprising. However, people are 
still 'rational' in the sense that contingencies of reinforcement are effective. A corollary 
of this is that the description of contingencies and actions based on the description can 
obscure the effect of the contingencies themselves. 
Foxall (1986) describes this debate from consumer psychologist's outlook. The idea 
underlying cognitive processing is that a change in behaviour cannot be conceived 
without previous, intrapersonal change. As such, the process depends on personality 
traits. This sequence of cognition - affect - conation has been shown not to be the most 
accurate way of describing the consumer choice process. Behaviourists explain behaviour 
with reference to extrapersonal events alone; the radical behaviouralist paradigm being 
the study of behaviour in the context of other behaviour. Following this paradigm, an 
important determinant of behaviour is the resulting effects on the environment. 
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2.9 Studies of the Cognitive Process 
A description of the brain for application to AI is given in Marris (1992). His general 
conclusion is that economic systems are networks of organizations, which are 
networks of brains and the brain itself is a neural supernet so that the brain (and 
perhaps economies) can be modelled as parallel networks. He also gives a description 
of features of the brain. There is a deep memory, which is a large network, whose access 
works from addressing content and from then association. It is inaccurate, but able to work 
from incomplete or inaccurate instructions and has an almost infinite capacity. In contrast 
to this deep memory, the brain has a sequential mode for logical operations and what is 
called 'thinking' generally. When the sequential mode is active, we are in the conscious 
state and the short term memory does logical work, interacting with the long term (deep) 
memory. Processing uses both sequential and parallel modes. The short term processor is 
severely limited. Access is addressed by content and is accurate so that logical 
operations can be performed, but they are constrained by the capacity limitation. Marris's 
model of learning 
is of a change in the deep memory, in particular the mental models that are stored there. 
The processes of learning do not always pass through the short term memory. 
Preferences are mostly learned, with a few primitive desires being equivalent to a random 
access memory. They are stored in the deep memory and are activated when the mind 
is conscious. Marris's definition of rationality is behaving in accordance with one's 
preferences, which leads him to the conclusion that although processing capacity is 
bounded, if the brain has methods of converging to consistency with preferences in the 
deep memory, bounded rationality may be less significant than is often assumed. Against 
this, given that the deep memory has no internal requirement for consistency and the 
limitations of conscious logic mean that consistency cannot be imposed, the idea of 
rationality is called into question. 
Another facet of this model of memory is the brain's ability to make decisions in 
seemingly new situations. The whole of the memory can be applied to any one problem 
to some extent so that the brain can find analogies in apparently remote areas, using both 
qualitative and quantitative information. This comes from the network structure of the deep 
memory. The formation of expectations is dependent on this ability. 
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Macro-expectations are the product of a social net of brains and since expectations of 
an individual can be very fragile, overall expectations will be subject to epidemics. 
These may occur without any statistical basis, but as a result of just one or two events, 
often without any clear previous parallels. 
The possible potential of the computer analogy is illustrated by Fox et. al. (1990). While 
considering a way of integrating classical decision theory and qualitative reasoning, they 
suggest a list of elements that may be necessary for decision making. These are: initializing 
and terminating conditions, relevant theories, relations for the generation of options, 
associations, input and output parameters and subprocedures. 
Moss (1992) describes processes for Al inductive learning. The two directions are 
generalization and specialization. He describes experience as incremental improvements 
in understanding the relations between actions and outcomes, leading to a better general 
understanding of the environment. When a set of initial conditions becomes familiar, 
the specialized appropriate actions become routine and the action rule is relied upon 
without using the full decision-making process. 
Nilsson (1979) proposes a system for problem solving behaviour with the aim of 
providing methods for Al. He takes goal-seeking as a basic attribute of the human brain. 
This involves a model of the world, constructed of propositional statements that use 
predicate calculus and a hierarchy of routines to elicit behaviour. The top level routine 
specifies actions for each proposition and state of the world. A behaviour interpreter 
checks each proposition in turn until it finds one that is true, when it executes an action 
(which may itself be a routine) and starts from the top again. The scheme lacks flexibility 
to allow for changes in states and going back to the top each time can be wasteful. 
Planning is required, in which possible chains of events are simulated and he has 
a concept of hierarchical planning with reasoning proceeding in different levels to 
reduce the number of combinations that have to be considered. Deductions are 'if .. then' 
statements with certainty, while inferences are similar statements with probabilities. 
Inferences involve propositional knowledge and ways of making inferences in an 
inference net, starting from certain premises and using deduction rules whose 
conclusions are uncertain. 
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2.10 The Human Decision-making Process 
Following on from computing analogies to the brain, I will now consider descriptions 
of human problem solving and decision making. A description of problem solving is given 
in Bench-Capon (1990). Problems are decomposed into a sequence of sub-problems 
which may be further decomposed. There is a search for patterns, so that familiar patterns, 
to which the response is known, can be identified. Humans use rules of thumb: actions that 
are often, but not always successful in certain circumstances. This is similar to pattern 
seeking, but is applied opportunistically and is known to be fallible. Rules of thumb are 
used in an effort to discern a familiar pattern if these cannot be seen. 
Hogarth (1987) gives a relatively comprehensive account of the human decision 
making process and discusses methods for decision-making. He describes the bases of 
judgment emphasizing the influence of peoples limited information processing capacity, 
which means that their perception of information is selective, not comprehensive. An aspect 
of this is that anticipations play a large part in what is seen. Processing is sequential and 
people use heuristics rather than optimizing calculations to reduce mental effort. People 
have limited memory which works by an active process of reconstruction, so that memory 
can change depending on which association is used. People attach meaning to information 
which will change with context. Most judgments are the outcome of a number of 
comparisons with points of reference. 
Although the world may be deterministic, people's imperfect knowledge makes it 
uncertain to them. They have emotional difficulty accepting uncertainty and therefore tend 
to deny it. This is manifest as a tendency to seek patterns where none exist and to 
make unjustified causal attributions. People do not accept statistical independence and 
believe that observed data are a true reflection of the data generating process. They also 
have problems combining information. Inconsistent and disconfirming data are not sought 
and if found are downplayed, prior probabilities are not assessed and when updating beliefs 
they do not evaluate new evidence against all other alternatives simultaneously. This 
means that, in contrast to probability theory, absence of an alternative does not imply 
strong belief. Frequency is judged by the number of instances experienced, without 
allowing for sample size and the order of presentation influences the weight attached to 
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data. Either the most recent or the first data to be received may be over-weighted. 
There are costs and benefits of mental effort. The benefits are: it assists in controlling 
actions, helps clarify goals and preferences, creates the habit of thinking and may 
identify actions that are not immediately obvious. The costs are: uncertainty is 
highlighted, trade-offs are made explicit and demands are made on limited cognitive 
resources. 
The limitations of information processing capacity mean that strategies have to be 
adopted to simplify judgment and choice, otherwise information overload will prevent 
people from discerning the significant variables. These strategies are often effective, but 
can lead to systematic biases. Various strategies for choice are listed, divided into 
compensatory (linear, additive difference, ideal point) and non-compensatory 
(conjunctive, disjunctive, lexicographic, elimination-by-aspects) methods. Payne found 
that when little information was available, all the information was used and the more 
comprehensive compensatory strategies were adopted and in more complex situations 
people selected information and there was more variation in search strategies with more 
intra-dimensional processing. 
The structure of memory causes bias in judgment, in particular the way in which recall 
functions. People use ease of recall as a cue for frequency and information working on 
several senses is easier to recall. Emotional associations also aid memory. There is 
hindsight bias, where decisions are judged relative to the outcome and not the initial 
information, so that people are not as surprised by outcomes as they should be. Another 
source of bias is that knowledge of outcomes may unduly influence explanations of the 
past, so that necessary (but not sufficient explanations) are accepted too easily. These 
beliefs are then difficult to modify from feedback. Hogarth concludes that the most 
important information processing bias is an unwillingness to use mental energy to imagine 
different possible outcomes i. e. uncertainties that accompany such thought trials 
outweigh the 
benefits. 
The consumer choice literature has also made suggestions about the nature of the human 
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decision process, often arguing from empirical observation of consumption choices. 
Olshavsky & Granbois (1979) makes the proposal that purchase decisions may not be 
preceded by a decision process, but may be just an expression of predetermined 
needs/tastes so that there is no evaluation. 
Johnson & Formell (1987) argue that consumers representations of a product choice will 
depend on the attributes of the choice. More abstract attributes are likely to resemble 
continuous dimensions, for which dimensional analysis can be used and more concrete 
attributes will resemble discrete features, where feature-based methods are more 
appropriate. 
An alternative to maximizing called matching is discussed in Miller, Heiner & Manning 
(1987). The idea is that in equilibrium subjects divide their behaviour so that the 
distribution of responses matches the distribution of the reinforcement produced by the 
responses. Whereas maximizing assumes agents have a single scale of value on which all 
activities can be found, matching postulates that there are many scales and agents are trying 
to equalize the value on each scale. Agents might also choose a combination of 
maximizing and matching, trying to extract the largest possible value out of different 
activities. 
2.11 Empirical Analyses of Cognitive Processes 
Bettman & Sujen (1987) tested the effects of framing on consumption decisions made 
by students. They found that framing influenced the decisions for expert and novice 
consumers when alternatives were non-comparable and novices when alternatives were 
comparable. They suggest that the fundamental distinction between sets of 
comparable and non-comparable alternatives may be the availability of criteria, as 
opposed to the need to construct them and not any inherent difference. 
An experiment to investigate links in the cognitive process was performed by Grunert 
(1989). He has a model of the cognitive processing structure of the brain as a network of 
uses, alternatives and knowledge in which there are two types of cognitive process: 
automatic (largely unconscious) and strategic (conscious; altered at will). External 
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stimuli and internal motivation result in various parts of the network being activated and 
the activation spreads rapidly through the network along associative links. In spreading 
along these links, some activation is lost in inverse proportion to the strength of the link. 
If, as a result of the spreading process, activation reaches a threshold value the process 
becomes conscious. The activation level thus governs information retrieval and the level 
is used as a heuristic for the importance of the aspect for the problem so that the 
association strength gives hints on what to do with the information. Familiarity 
depends on the total extent of links to the rest of the network. The strength of the links 
relating a product category to an attribute category determines the probability that an 
attribute or an attribute value comes to mind when a product category is activated. The 
weight of an attribute in an evaluation is based on the strength of the link between an 
attribute/value category and a use category. 
Analysing the transcripts of interviews with consumers who had made a complex 
choice (selection of central heating), he found that the number of concepts that become 
activated through the spreading process at any one time is 5-10, because of the limited 
capacity of working memory. Retrieval of additional concepts requires a new spreading 
pattern, based on a different start activation pattern, so that categories become conscious 
in clusters of 5-10. Within a cluster, categories are highly associated, but this is not always 
the case across clusters. 
Payne et. al. (1990) performed a Monte-Carlo simulation of the relative performance of 
different solution methods to a multi-attribute choice problem. They divided each 
solution method into steps (such as read a value into working memory or compare two 
values in working memory) and used the number of steps for a solution as a measure of 
the effort required. The performance of each procedure was measured in the range of a 
full weighted additive method to random choice. The comparisons were made for an 
unlimited and a limited number of steps to simulate stress/time pressure. The following 
procedures were considered: equal weight method (EQM) in which attributes are not 
weighted, elimination by aspects (EBA) where the most important attribute (or the state 
of the world with the highest probability) is found, a cutoff value for that attribute 
is retrieved, options below the cutoff are eliminated and the process is repeated in order 
of importance of attributes until only one option remains, satisficing (SAT) where 
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alternatives are considered one at a time until an option is found that has no attribute 
values below the cutoff levels, lexicographic (LEX) in which the most important attribute 
is found and the option with the highest value of that attribute is selected and if there is a 
tie, the next most important attribute is compared and the majority of confirming 
decisions (MCD) where pairs of options are compared and the option with the largest 
number of higher attribute values is retained and compared to the next alternative. 
Simple decisions enable people to use more comprehensive and consistent methods, 
where all attributes are considered simultaneously. Complicated or limited duration 
problems force simpler methods with selective use of the available information. When 
there was no time pressure, it was found that the LEX had 90% accuracy vs. the weighted 
additive method for 40% of the effort and EQM 89% accuracy for 30% effort. The most 
efficient heuristic varied with the number of options and attributes. With processing 
limitations, the results were more variable, with LEX and EBA best overall. It is worth 
noting that LEX may be intransitive. 
2.12 Motivational Factors 
This section brings together a series of suggestions for psychological factors that 
influence peoples savings decisions. This level of analysis is of a more general nature than 
the cognitive theories and analogies just discussed and the limited understanding of the 
structure of human thought processes inevitably means that the contributions to this 
literature are very disparate, often dealing with parts of the problem. The basic ideas of 
motivation theory are surveyed in Lea, Tarpy & Webley (1987), grounded in activation 
and drive theory in which basic drives combine with knowledge or habit to produce 
responses. Drive motivation is learned from stimuli (positive or negative) and 
organisms are motivated to maintain an optimum level of activation, rather than trying to 
reduce a drive (or need) to the lowest possible level. The most famous theory of needs 
was developed by Maslow (1943). He postulated five levels of need that are ordered in 
a hierarchy in which needs of a level only affect behaviour when the needs of the lower 
levels have been satisfied. The levels are: physiological, safety, love affection and 
acceptance, social status and esteem and self-fulfilment. Deprivation of a need leads to 
dominance of that need until it is gratified, when the next higher level is activated. 
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Herzberg et. al. (1959) divided needs into hygiene (e. g. pay, recognition) and motivator 
(e. g. achievement, responsibility, exercise of skill) needs. If hygiene needs are not met, 
dissatisfaction is felt, but they cannot provide positive satisfaction and this is only provided 
by satisfying the motivator needs. In contrast to Maslow, they argue that hygiene needs are 
insatiable, so that if positive satisfaction is to be found, both categories of need must be 
satisfied simultaneously. A useful theory of motivation cannot be static; it must allow 
variation with circumstances. 
At various times economists have also considered motivation in order to appreciate the 
factors that determine economic behaviour. They have not tended to develop theories 
of motivational structures, but have concentrated on direct consideration of the drives 
that activate behaviour. 
In the General Theory, Keynes (1936) listed factors affecting his propensity to 
consume. The objective factors are: changes in the real wage, changes in the difference 
between net and gross income (though he dismisses this as not practically significant), 
windfall changes in capital values, the rate of time discounting, fiscal policy and 
expectations of the relation of present and future income. Subjective factors are: 
precaution, foresight - provision for an anticipated change in the relation between income 
and need, to enjoy interest and appreciation i. e. a preference for larger real consumption 
in the future rather than a smaller current consumption, to gratify an instinct to look 
forward to a gradually improving standard of living (even though the capacity for 
enjoyment may be diminishing), independence, for entrepreneurship, pride - to bequeath 
a fortune and avarice - unreasonable but insistent dislike of expenditure as such. 
Among economists, Etzioni has been a strong proponent of considering psychological 
motivations for economic actions. In Etzioni (1988) he argues that individuals are 
governed by normative commitments and affective (i. e. emotional) involvements, both 
in choosing goods and the ways in which the goods are obtained. Normative/affective 
factors such as conforming to socially acceptable behaviour can exclude logical/empirical 
considerations and can even make an actor perceive only one course of action. These 
factors also colour interpretations of facts and the weight attached to information. They 
may also disrupt sequential logical thinking, causing steps in the logical process to be 
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skipped or terminated while incomplete, e. g. collecting a lot of facts, but then jumping 
to a conclusion. High stress levels increase random behaviour, the error rate and there 
is a regression to simpler responses, culminating in rigidity. Normative/affective factors 
shape the inner self, defining specific areas as demanding a decision on logical/empirical 
grounds. There is an emotional commitment to decisions once they are made. 
From Pieters and van Raaij (1988), Etzioni discussed four functions of affect. It interprets 
and organizes information, influences the mobilization of a person's physical and mental 
resources, will control sensation seeking or avoiding to reach optimal arousal (e. g. 
boredom vs. stress) and is part of the process of communication. 
Van Witteloostuijn (1988) argues that the major result of the behaviouralist framework 
is the introduction of routinised behaviour - as long as aspiration levels are satisfied, 
routines are maintained. In proposing that maximizing and satisficing are effectively 
equivalent, he claims that for the individual, chance and aspiration levels influence the 
comparability of results between maximizing and satisficing decision making. 
Kagel & Green (1987) discuss intertemporal inconsistencies, such as the phenomenon 
of preference reversal, found in experiments with animals as well as humans. They 
consider the problem of self-control and suggest that this behaviour in animals will be 
caused by evolutionary pressures in their natural habitat. 
The idea that savings behaviour in humans can be seen as analogous to hoarding 
behaviour in animals is explored in Lea & Tarpy (1990). They find that the economics 
literature agrees with Logue's synthesis (Logue (1988)) in its rejection of any simple 
statement about tendencies for impulsiveness vs. self-control. 
Warneryd (1989) surveys various economists approaches to savings behaviour. Fisher 
claimed that society can affect the general level of 'impatience' and that if this goes up, 
interest rates will rise. Katona identified three classifications of saving: contractual, 
discretionary and residual (saving by default), all of which are affected by habit lags. He 
also developed a methodology which combined savings /consumption as a function of 
disposable income (statistics) with surveys to determine the willingness to save. 
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Consumer confidence is stressed by van Raaij & Gianotten (1990). Confidence is affected 
by expectations of the household's financial situation and by expectations of the general 
economic situation. Actual saving is largely determined by the evaluation of the household 
financial situation. Credit is seen as a luxury service, so that households with favourable 
income developments tend to borrow more. 
Slemrod (1986) performed an analysis that demonstrated that saving was affected by 
peoples feeling of security. In the U. S. fear of nuclear war reduced savings rates. Fethke 
(1989) pointed out that marriage dissolution may decrease a family's savings rate, cause 
shifts in the portfolio to assets with lower interest rates and destroy or deplete assets. 
One of the few empirical analyses of general factors that affect savings behaviour is Lunt 
& Livingstone (1991). They surveyed 279 subjects and performed two OLS regressions 
with recurrent and total savings as the dependent variables. Recurrent saving was measured 
as recurrent commitments to discretionary savings and total saving was measured as 
liquid assets in banks and building societies. The results are shown in table 1. The figures 
in the table are the coefficients of the explanatory variables that were found to be 
significant. Spending on clothes (a form of durable goods) is associated behaviour to 
saving, whereas pursuit of enjoyment involves consumption and the loss of ability to save. 
A saver does not spend to enjoy, but to possess goods of value at home and in the bank. 
Older people may have more total savings from redundancy payments, retirement, lump 
sum insurance payments and because they are more likely to have inherited money from 
the previous generation. In total saving, economic variables accounted for 42% of 
variance, demographic variables 11% and psychological variables 5%. For recurrent 
saving, demographic variables were insignificant and psychological variables 
accounted for 17%. 
Dahlback (1991) tested the hypothesis that risk preferences affect saving. Cautious 
subjects tended to have a lower level of debt and more money in bank accounts, while 
there was no relationship between the propensity to take risks and total net capital or 
subjects ability to manage sudden extra expenditures. Furnham (1987) investigated peoples 
attitudes to saving as a part of their structure of economic beliefs. In order of importance, 
the significant attitudes to saving were: the pointlessness of saving, saving being 
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beneficial, saving leading to wealth, saving as denial, importance of investments in 
determining the best way to save. He analysed people along two dimensions: tough/tender 
minded and collectivist/individualist and associated attitudes with points in this space. 
Benefits and 
Table 1 
Regression analysis results from Lunt & Livingstone (1991) 
Dependent variable - Recurrent Saving 
Explanatory variable 
disposable income 
spending on clothes 
total savings 
value of enjoyment 
spending on food 
attitude to debt as 
bad management 
argue with partner 
discuss with friends 
use 'for sale' columns 
shop for best buy 
No. of observations = 92 
coefficient 
0.29 
0.74 
0.22 
-0.23 
-0.26 
0.18 
0.22 
0.20 
-0.20 
0.15 
R2 = 0.86 total variance explained = 65% 
Dependent variable - Total Saving 
Explanatory variable coefficient 
age 0.22 
sex (male +) 0.14 
no. of children -0.24 
disposable income 0.22 
total investments 0.54 
spending on insurance 0.16 
value of achievement 0.13 
attribution of financial 
problems to luck -0.19 
attribution of financial 
problems to unexpected repairs 0.15 
No. of observations = 193 R2 = 0.78 total variance explained = 57% 
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saving through investment were associated with tough individualists, saving leading to 
wealth with tough collectivists and saving as denial with tough mindedness. 
2.13 Economic Psychology 
This strand of the literature is self-consciously multi-disciplinary, stemming from a 
belief that the understanding of economic behaviour can be improved by tackling some of 
the behavioural issues raised by psychologists and by applying some of the methods used 
in that science to economic problems. In their introduction to this discipline, Lea, Tarpy 
& Webley (1987) describe both economics and psychology from which economic 
psychology arises as a synthesis of the two. In the section on attitudes and behaviour, they 
point out that attitudes must be at the same level of generality as behaviour if they are to 
predict behaviour, in combination with personality and situational factors. Social 
comparisons are important; people use the behaviour of others to interpret or define an 
ambiguous situation and have a notion of equity in which they try to keep their net rewards 
proportional to their inputs. They state that most behaviour, including economic 
behaviour, is learned. Learning may be classical/Pavlovian in which the meaning of a 
stimulus is acquired from its relationship to an already meaningful stimulus, learning of 
responses to affect outcomes, or imitative. 
They also consider the psychology of saving. Laymen have a different definition of 
saving to economists; for most people, durable purchases and repayment of loans are not 
savings. In western society, there is a perceived morality of thrift. Katona noted that 
people plan to save more than they actually do, although conspicuous consumption 
confers status. They contend that the moral status of saving comes from the puritan culture 
and the realization in society that saving is difficult. This issue is emphasized by 
experimental results that find that people tend to choose a small reward now, rather than 
a larger reward later. Duesenberry (1949) argued that consumption depends on consumers 
relative income, so that preferences are interrelated, not independent. Saving up to buy a 
particular good is discussed; although few people regard this as an important motivation 
for saving, it accounts for about 1/3 of all saving. This form of saving will result in 
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irregularly alternating saving/dissaving behaviour over a relatively short time frame 
compared to the life cycle. 
Considering the factors that affect saving, psychological data suggest that interest 
payments are too small and remote for the rate of interest to much affect savings 
behaviour, which is consistent with the idea of impatience. Higher inflation leads to 
higher saving in contradiction to typical economic analysis, usually at the expense of 
durable expenditure. Durables purchase is associated with striving after social status; 
which is consistent with Maslow's hierarchy of needs, but can also be seen as illiquid 
saving, so that shifts to bank deposits in times of difficulty are a move to liquidity, rather 
than a reduction in savings. However, durables purchase has different psychological 
properties to saving; people typically buy more durables than they predict but save less, 
although both increase disproportionately in response to windfalls and tend to have 
positive income elasticities. Possible explanations for saving among the elderly are an 
increased interest in bequests, or possibly a shift in tastes with higher risk aversion. 
Children are also observed to save a lot, although results of laboratory experiments show 
children being unable to save. 
In their concluding chapter, a new paradigm of dual causation is proposed. Individuals 
display economic behaviour, which should be predictable to some extent by psychologists. 
Individuals behaviour combines to determine aggregate behaviour. At the same time, 
the economy in general is an important influence on individuals behaviour. They see 
attitudes as intervening variables in this process which may be the root cause and best 
predictive level of behaviour, even if some attitudes may be predictable from economic 
variables. 
2.14 Consumer Research 
In the context of this study, the usefulness of the consumer choice literature is its study 
of how consumers make decisions and as such, this section is related to the earlier section 
on decision making. However, it is also a field in applied psychology since it is 
undertaken to enable consumer's behaviour to be manipulated. Both the distribution and 
level of consumption may be affected. 
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One recent theory is that of Lehmann & Moore (1991). This is a combination of the Luce 
choice model (Luce (1959)) and hierarchical models, as suggested by Tversky & Sattath 
(Tversky & Sattath (1979)). There is a tree structure of attributes, with a value function 
similar in form to the Luce model including differentiation by physical attributes and by 
product image. The model nests the tree-structure and the Luce simply scalable models 
and so is a combination of hierarchical and brand based choice. 
Haines & Ratchford (1987) propose a model allowing for intransitivity. They suggest four 
factors that affect consumer choice: commodities, wants, the want satisfying powers of 
the commodities and consumer knowledge. They define a preference function as a 
difference between the attributes of two products, defined as a weighted sum of the 
perceived instrumentality of the attributes, where the weights are the value importance of 
the attributes. Variations in the weights and instrumentality values can produce 
intransitivity. They suggest that the attributes could be grouped into subsets. 
There is an extensive literature devoted to empirical studies of consumer choice. Puto 
(1987) studied the way in which frames of reference changed in a two stage buyers 
experiment. Expectations, the buyer's objective and the sales message were controlled and 
the initial and final frames of reference were measured. The frames were defined as the 
focus that the buyer had on the problem when they made the choice of purchase contract. 
The experiment demonstrates that experiments can suggest the frames that people will 
use in making decisions and how available information affects the frame. 
Walker & Olsen (1991) performed a means/ends analysis. Means represent product 
knowledge/attributes and the ends represent aspects of the consumers self-knowledge 
that may vary with the context. Content analysis of a survey of card purchases showed 
that a thinking-of-you situation activated receiver related goals while a wedding situation 
activated goals related to self-expression. An analysis of the means-ends linkages 
indicated that differences in activated goals affected the meaning of the attributes to which 
the goals were connected. Values are only related to behaviour when those aspects of 
self represented by the values are activated in a given situation. 
Navon (1987) studied effects on performance of doing two tasks simultaneously. 
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Subjects tend to adjust the level of performance of a task to the level being required, 
without affecting the performance of the concurrent task. If performance of the concurrent 
task is being maximized, it will be kept high regardless of how well the other task is 
being performed. This suggests that processing resources are not necessarily limited. 
Solomon & Buchanan (1991) surveyed 1197 'yuppies' and found that there was a 
correlation between products purchased in terms of a symbolic relation rather than a 
functional relation e. g. gourmet ice-cream and foreign cars in the U. S. 
Hutchinson & Alba (1991) used stereo choices to study the use of irrelevant information. 
Three attributes were used, of which only one was relevant. It is possible that learning of 
simple relationships may frequently fail in multiple aspect decisions. Increases in 
memory load will inhibit and intentional processing goals enhance analytic processing. 
They found that attention tended to be directed to a single attribute, which was only 
sometimes the relevant one. The choice of focus depended on the context. They conclude 
that beliefs are significantly affected by irrelevant data that should be ignored, such as 
advertising, packaging or brand loyalties. There was evidence that information was 
unequally weighted: non-analytic subjects were found to rely heavily on a limited 
amount of salient attribute information. 
Javalgi (1988) made a comparison of a hierarchical choice model (based on a threshold 
concept) to a multinomial logit model (based on utility maximization). He used data 
on farmers choices of retail outlets to measure the models predictive performance and 
found that the hierarchical model was less affected by the number of attributes in the 
decisions. The logit model assumed simultaneous evaluation of all attributes. 
2.15 Choice As Imaginative Creation - the Ideas of GLS Shackle 
Shackle is known for his distinctive views on the nature of the decision making process. 
His ideas are presented in Shackle (1979). Direct experience is the transience of thought 
which is the basic meaning of time. Choice is the choice of thought of actions and as 
thought, choice is also a transient. There are two possible philosophies of choice: 
determinism/inevitability and decisionism. Shackle follows the latter. He sees the 
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thinking, imaginative being as a "continuous originator of history". If choice is 
effective its results are uncertain: what can happen may be bounded but not prescribed, if 
not there is no real choice and purpose is passive and illusory. The imagination of 
different possibilities determines the choice set and this is a process of original thought. 
"The question of choice is not: Which of these given, listed things shall we do? but: What 
shall exist? What history shall be made in the world? " Shackle (1979 p. 92). The act of 
choosing results in a private moral commitment to take some form of action. 
Ford (1987) bases his new theory of choice under uncertainty on Shackle's ideas. Shackle 
sees probability as an inappropriate measure of uncertainty78, as many decisions are 
non-repeatable so that probability theory is not relevant and the subjective assessment of 
the chances of the imagined possibilities occurring may not sum to 1. An agent may 
think of a new situation, but not have changing beliefs about other possibilities. Shackle 
introduced the concept of potential surprise: a measure of how surprised an agent will be 
if an event happens. This has a lower bound of 0 and an upper bound depending on 
temperament. A degree is assigned to each imagined outcome and is separate for gains 
and losses. These levels assume an ascendancy in the mind; they maximize an 
ascendancy function. Only monetary outcomes are compared, ranked by an indifference 
map of gains/losses vs. the potential surprise variable. The process of choice collapses 
potential surprise value to a monetary value, thus losing a degree of freedom. 
In Ford's perspective theory, the axiomatic foundations are stochastic dominance, risk 
aversion in such a way that choices are evaluated by weighing up gains against losses, 
there is no expectation principle since people are imagining the expectational elements 
of choice actions and a new measure of belief that does not just act as a weighting in 
some form of averaging process. There are four postulates: gains and losses are 
segregated, outcomes are assigned an ascendancy value, whose function has monetary 
Carter (1972) also discusses measures of uncertainty. 
" Arrow and Hurwicz have also contributed to these ideas. In Arrow & Hurwicz (1972) they 
show that "a plausible set of desirable properties for a rational criterion of choice under complete 
ignorance" leads to a special case of Shackle's theory (Shackle (1949)) in which " the standardized 
focus gain and focus loss become simply the maximum and minimum payoff to a given action". 
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outcomes and an uncertainty variable as its arguments, the perspective index P of a choice 
action is a balancing of the best on the gain side vs the worst on the loss side and P is 
evaluated for each prospect. This is intended to highlight extreme outcomes. The 
uncertainty variable is an alternative to probability called a degree of belief. It has a range 
form 0 to some positive number 0, which may differ between individuals. The degrees of 
belief of potentially competing hypotheses sum to 0 and for at least one hypothesis, 0 is 
greater than 0. 
Earl (1983) also develops a theory of choice based on Shackle's rejection of probabilities. 
He argues that observed economic systems function because of the bounds imposed by 
imperfections of knowledge, rather than despite them. He uses Lancaster's proposition 
that people buy goods for the sake of their characteristics rather than commodities. 
Commodities can be thought of as bundles of characteristics and preference maps can be 
drawn over characteristics rather than goods. Instead of continuous preferences, there are 
hierarchical priority systems. There are two alternatives for the choice process: 
compensatory methods, where the number of product attributes is restricted so that they can 
be considered for all options simultaneously or lexicographically, where attributes are 
evaluated sequentially, allowing more attributes to be considered, but eliminating 
trade-offs between attributes. Attributes can be ranked in importance, so the option that 
dominates on the most important attribute receives the highest rating. Also, target levels 
are set for each attribute, and an attempt is made to independently satisfy as many of the 
target levels as possible. 
The evaluation process uses Shackle's potential surprise curves, with a dual filter. There 
is a neutral aspiration level, where the choice does not seem hazardous. If the person can 
conceive of an outcome lower than the neutral level, the chooser is taking a gamble and 
must have the possibility of a gain to make the gamble worthwhile. Each attribute is 
examined in order of importance to see if the potential surprise curve is acceptable. All 
schemes that are not acceptable are eliminated and the next attribute is then considered. 
If more than one scheme satisfies all levels, the most neutral scheme is selected. Gains 
are separated from losses. He uses Kelly's theory of motivation (Kelly (1969)) and 
considers possible biases that people may have in the evaluation process. The shape of the 
potential surprise curves may be fudged to favour the option that already has the best rating 
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or if attainment levels are threatened and attributes with ambiguous priorities are given 
priorities such that no compromises are necessary. For example, the distant future may not 
be traded off against the present, but given a lower priority in the hierarchy. 
This school of thought also considered the limiting of the number of states of nature 
considered in the decision process. Carter (1972) made one proposal for simplifying 
decision problems in which nearly all the possible combinations of surrounding 
circumstances are ignored by restricting the number of factors taken into account and by 
restricting the number of values for each factor or alternative. 
One final point is that behaviour is social and consequently so is choice. Hence there are 
social pressures on choice e. g. to conform. 
2.16 Summary 
This section will recap the main themes that I have covered. Conventional models of 
intertemporal optimization with liquidity constraints, precautionary saving and 
bequests can explain much, but not all of the data. Non-EU models allow for non-EU 
behaviour, maintaining dynamic consistency by using recursive utility functions. The 
behavioural life cycle model, with different marginal propensities to consume for different 
mental accounts can also explain many of the empirical anomalies of the older versions 
of the life cycle model. The near-rational literature finds that deviations from the optimal 
consumption path may have negligible utility penalties, even for very different 
behaviour. 
There are many different ideas of rationality, among which Simon's bounded rationality 
stands out as a clear account of the limitations of the human brain. Analogies from 
computing of the human brain have led to useful descriptions of how the brain works, 
contrasting the limited access, but nearly unlimited capacity and parallel processing 
capability of the deep memory with the sequential logic, limited capacity short term 
memory. Descriptive analyses of human decision-making such as Hogarth emphasize the 
differences between peoples actual decision processes to the rational theoretical models. 
Factors such as an emotional fear of uncertainty and the structure of memory cause 
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systematic biases in peoples decisions. 
The consideration of motivational factors is a necessary tool in constructing a model 
of behaviour, suggesting arguments for a more general utility function than is normally 
analysed. Economic psychology suggests ways in which more comprehensive behavioural 
models can be developed and analysed, so that the more comprehensive ideas about human 
behaviour can be fruitfully applied to economic problems. 
Consumer research provides many useful insights into human behaviour in economic 
situations and has developed empirical methods for analysis of the choice process. 
The school of thought originated by Shackle has generated some interesting alternatives to 
conventional theory. Alternatives to probability measures such as Ford's degree of belief 
and Shackle's potential surprise curves have been developed. Ford's theory also allows for 
differences between attitudes to gains and losses and highlights extreme outcomes. Earl's 
theory combines potential surprise curves with a lexicographic choice system to make 
choices based on the characteristics of a good, rather than the bundle of characteristics 
represented by a whole good. 
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3A Theory of Saving with Bounded Rationality 
3.1 Introduction 
The following two chapters develop a theory of life cycle saving incorporating the idea of 
bounded rationality. This chapter contains the theoretical development and chapter 4 contains 
the computer simulation of the theory. An important result of Cochrane (1989) is that wide 
deviations from the optimal savings/consumption path through life do not lead to large losses 
in utility, when analysed using a conventional life-cycle model. Therefore, it is important to 
understand the decision-making process; if the penalties for deviating from optimal 
behaviour are negligible and people do not optimize, then a very wide range of behaviours is 
possible which will generate different savings patterns. Thus, the observed savings patterns 
will depend on the decision-making process. Therefore, the objective of this theoretical 
work is to develop a model of savings with ä more realistic psychological specification than 
"conventional" models. The methodology to be followed in these two chapters consists of the 
following steps: 
Chapter 3 
i) State the 'stylised facts' that the model should explain. 
ii) Write down a description of how people take savings decisions. 
iii) Translate the descriptive model into a mathematical model. 
Chapter 4 
iv) Test the model by means of a computer simulation. 
v) Compare the results of the simulation to the `stylised facts' and generate new predictions of 
the theory which can then be tested. 
Section 2 sets out the stylised facts that the theory will try to explain, section 3 describes the 
main concepts incorporated in the model which are developed in section 4 into a descriptive 
theory and section 5 translates this description into a formal model. 
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3.2 Stylized Facts 
These are divided into two groups: facts about savings inferred from empirical analysis 
and facts about how people take decisions. 
3.2.1 Stylized Facts About Savings9 
In contrast with the predictions of the simpler versions of the life-cycle model, 
consumption tracks income over people's lifetime (Deaton 1992). Young people save more in 
countries with higher growth rates (Carroll & Summers (1991)). There is no clear evidence 
that people dissave during retirement, indeed some people increase savings in this part of 
their life and people often have a significant level of savings when they die, which are 
bequeathed to the next generation (Deaton 1992). It is known that there are significant levels 
of residual and committed savings (Katona 1975). Further, there are constraints on the amount 
that most people can borrow. 
3.2.2 Stylized Facts about Decision-Making 
First, some general points about people's decision making. People have reasons for what they 
do, derived from goal-oriented behaviour (Simon 1983) and behaviour is dependent upon 
previous experience of the overall environment, not just the cognitive decision-making 
process (Skinner 1985). In contrast to the assumptions of life-cycle savings theory, people are 
not capable of performing backward induction (Simon 1983, March 1978), a corollary of 
which is that people do not act as Expected Utility maximizers when they are taking decisions 
with uncertain outcomes (for evidence, see Hey 1991). They do not take account of all the 
relevant information when taking complex decisions, but instead act in a 'bounded rational' 
manner (Schoemaker 1991, March 1978, Simon 1983). In general, people use simple rules of 
9 Cyclical and trend factors such as the ratchet effect (Duesenberry 1949)) may also be significant 
but, to assist comparison with conventional models, these will be left for future investigation. 
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thumb to guide behaviour e. g. targets against which achievement can be measured (March 
1978). Another simplification of the decision process is that people exhibit habitual behaviour 
(Lea et. al. 1987). However, people do trade off expenditures on different goods, taking 
into account their financial resources. One important motive for saving is to reduce the 
downwards variability of future consumption (the precautionary motive) which implies a utility 
function of consumption with a positive 3rd derivative. 
3.3 Main Concepts Incorporated in the Model 
The Problem 
The person's objective is to try and ensure an* adequate standard of living now and in the 
future, allowing for predicted changes in circumstances and the financial resources 
available. 
The particular features of this problem are its perceived importance and people's belief that 
this type of decision should be taken 'rationally'. Also, these decisions are characterised by a 
large element of uncertainty because people are often looking forward over the whole of 
their possible lifetimes. 
3.3.1 Rationality of Savings Decisions 
Savings decisions are regarded as important, so that when they are being taken, the full 
capability of the person will be utilised and they may take advice from others. This perceived 
importance implies that people believe that financial decisions should be taken rationally, to 
obtain the greatest possible benefit from their limited resources. This rationality is manifest 
as taking into consideration as much information as is feasible given their mental capacity 
and allocating savings in accordance with the goal stated above. 
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Bounded Rationality 
However, as Pemberton 1993 points out, people's mental capacity is far too limited for them 
to behave in accordance with the assumptions of economic models such as the life cycle 
hypothesis. As a more reasonable alternative Simon's idea of 'bounded rationality', 
summarised in Simon 1983, is utilised. Attention is focused on one single issue at a time, 
which is assumed to be independent of all other aspects of a person's life. Not only does this 
lead to habitual behaviour, but it is proposed that this also means that particular savings 
decisions are taken independently of other savings decisions. Furthermore, once the 
particular decision to be taken is identified, people do not trade off by an exact process of 
optimization, but (as is implied by the statement of the problem above) they exhibit 
satisficing behaviour; they try and achieve satisfactory levels of savings and consumption. A 
further simplification is that people do not consider a continuum of future states of the 
world10, they only evaluate two or three different situations e. g. staying in employment or 
being made redundant. The model also uses the concept of 'rules of thumb', as detailed in 
Bench-Capon (1990). These are implemented as simple decision rules that are not expected to 
generate a completely accurate answer, but provide an estimate that is considered 
reasonable without requiring an involved calculation procedure. 
Habitual Behaviour 
Because savings decisions are viewed as important by many people, they have considerable 
mental effort associated with them. Since people's mental capacity is limited, they 
concentrate attention on one issue (e. g. savings) at a time, rather than considering all 
10 The Shackle school has made several suggestions about how decisions are based on only a few 
possible states of nature. Shackle (1969) has a chapter on the theory of Ascendancy in which the decision 
maker focuses on the best and worst outcomes. Levi (1966) argues that "In attempting to make predictions 
about the future via induction, investigators do not, as a rule, attempt to forecast the future condition in as 
complete detail as the evidence might warrant". This makes inductive conclusions dependant on the 
evidence used. He has a notion of caution dependence where some hypotheses of a discrete set are 
rejected, depending on that exogenous value of a behavioural parameter. See also section 2.15 p46 on 
Carter (1972). 
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case under consideration, the rate of savings) is maintained until attention is drawn to this 
particular aspect of behaviour". It is proposed that people monitor their financial situation 
and their expenditures until they perceive a significant change in their financial situation. 
The change draws attention to a particular aspect of (saving) behaviour. They examine their 
decision and make changes that they feel are both feasible and desirable. They then stop 
paying attention to their (savings) decisions until their attention is again drawn to this aspect 
of their life. The implication of this is that there is no continuous decision process; a savings 
decision is followed by a period of constant behaviour, whose length is determined by the 
person's perception of their environment. 
3.3.2 The Fuzziness of the Future 
The way in which people save is heavily influenced by uncertainty about the future. My 
hypothesis is that, from a point in time at which a savings decision is taken, there is a short 
period of time over which fairly precise predictions can be made about the future. The 
length of time being considered will be dependent on the particular purpose of the saving. 
This means that precise levels of desirable savings can be identified. As the length of time 
into the future being considered increases the future becomes much vaguer; precise plans 
become irrelevant because people have little idea of what their situation will be and so the 
process of taking savings decisions also becomes less exact (Hey 1983 quoted in 
Pemberton 1993). However, there are two situations where the distant future can be 
considered in detail: retirement and death. These situations give rise once more to definite 
plans for the future and closely determined patterns of saving. 
3.3.3 Taxonomy of Savings 
Katona (e. g. Katona 1975)'s categorisation of savings into committed, discretionary and 
residual savings will be used. Committed and discretionary instruments are employed as is felt 
The incorporation of habit implies a departure from the now established tradition of economic 
theory e. g. life cycle theory of Modigliani (1980), in which the consumption, savings and asset-liability 
portfolio is chosen simultaneously. This is not, however, a process of recursive choice. 
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appropriate by the person in the context of the particular decision being taken. 
Commitment 
It is important to differentiate between committed and discretionary savings because they 
reflect different aspects of savings behaviour and generate different allocations of resources 
among the available savings instruments. People do not enter into contracts for 
committed savings simply because they will receive a slightly higher rate of interest. 
Committed savings impose an increased cost of intertemporal inconsistency. People are 
aware that their preferences may exhibit intertemporal inconsistency. Often, this 
inconsistency may only be present for a short period of time: e. g. when someone is drunk, 
they may spend all the money they have available, although they will not have enough money 
for food the next day and will then wish that they had not spent all their money. 
Preferences may change, but current preferences, including the current view of preferences in 
the future have priority. People commit to ensure that future behaviour will reflect their 
current view of their preferences through their life; they pay in terms of reduced flexibility 
of current behaviour to prevent loss of utility from undesirable future behaviour, viewed 
from the perspective of the current preference structure. 
The various forms of committed savings also enable people to simplify their savings decisions 
by reducing the number of options readily available; they know that they are saving through 
their pension scheme, life insurance etc. and they can then concentrate on 'fine tuning' their 
future versus their current consumption through their discretionary savings decision. 
Also, there are advantages to financial institutions and the government from committed 
savings, as these are more predictable, thus allowing for better financial planning. 
Therefore, there are financial incentives offered for committed savings. 
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Residual Savings 
Two aspects of this model will lead to residual, or unplanned savings. There may be 
changes in the financial situation of the person which are not perceived to be important 
enough for the savings decisions to be retaken e. g. form errors in the predictions of values 
used to take the decisions or slight changes in preferences from e. g. advertising. The 
trade-off process may incorporate errors from approximation to reduce the cognitive effort 
involved in taking the decision. 
3.4 A Description of the Model 
3.4.1 Overall Structure 
The model can be divided into two aspects: monitoring and savings decisions. Most of 
the time, savings behaviour is constant. The individuals continuously monitor their financial 
situation, predictions and preferences to check that the current behaviour is adequate, given 
their consumption goals. When the situation is perceived to significantly change, the savings 
decision is brought to the attention of the person and the pattern of savings is reexamined. 
The nature of the perceived change will determine which decisions are reconsidered. The 
model has been abstracted from a 'realistic' savings decision situation by reducing the number 
of savings instruments available to two: a general discretionary savings instrument through 
which a wealth stock is built up and a pensions instrument which gives a flow of income in 
retirement. The pensions instrument contains an element of commitment in that there is a 
much reduced rate of return if contributions are reduced. 
The savings decisions are drastically simplified in comparison with constrained optimizing 
life-cycle models with uncertainty. Attention is concentrated on one form of savings, other 
behaviour being assumed to be exogenous to the current decision i. e. constant. The actual 
process by which decisions are taken will be satisficing rather than optimizing. The influence 
of the fuzziness of the future discussed in section 3.3.3 above is reflected by the operation of 
the two different savings instruments. The discretionary savings instrument is used for 
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relatively short term saving in which future values of variables are either assumed to be 
similar to current variables or change in a predictable way. The pension instrument is used for 
long term smoothing of consumption between work and retirement. 
Consideration of uncertainty is simplified by only considering a few cases that are perceived 
to be important e. g. for precautionary saving a worst-case scenario might be considered, 
along with the predicted scenario if the worst case cannot be dealt with. If more than one 
future state of the world is examined, the predicted utilities in each future state will be 
combined in some simple way. 
Preferences are assumed to be such that current consumption is more heavily weighted 
that future consumption (noting that some people do not save at all). Committed savings are 
assigned priority over discretionary savings within the monitoring process. 
A further simplification is that only one type of decision is taken in a single time period. 
However, since all types of saving are monitored, if a decision for one instrument implies 
that the saving through another instrument becomes different from the rate desired, the 
behaviour can be corrected in the next period. 
3.4.2 The Monitoring Process 
The monitoring takes place as follows: 
Economic variables that the person considers significant are monitored. The monitoring can 
be assumed to be effectively continuous. When one or more variables are perceived to have 
changed significantly, the savings decision is retaken. This is modelled by having a 
threshold for the difference of each continuous variable, beyond which the change is regarded 
as significant. The (subjective) difference is found as the realisation of a normally distributed 
random variable, with a mean of the objective difference and variance taken as a 
parameter of the model. Savings behaviour may also be changed by the occurrence of a 
discrete event, which the person assumes will affect the decision process e. g. a change of 
job, a child being born, etc. 
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Implications of the Monitoring Process 
The monitoring and consequent intermittent nature of the decision process have important 
implications for the decision procedure itself. Both now and at the point in the future being 
considered, the periods subsequent to those under consideration are assumed to be the same 
in all respects. Individuals further assume that if a satisfactory outcome is attained at the 
times under consideration, subsequent periods will also be satisfactory. The corollary of this 
is that it is assumed to be possible to take a decision that will hold for an indefinite period of 
time. However, if the individuals situations change they know that they can retake the 
decision. Therefore, they do not have to worry about not taking accurately into account 
the complete future; they can use ad hoc simplistic assumptions such as 'the situation will not 
change' and can concentrate on the aspect that has been brought to their attention. 
Cues for Taking a Decision 
The first set of factors are those that determine the person's preference structure i. e. the 
values of parameters in the utility functions and desired levels of saving and consumption. 
Changes in the financial parameters such as interest rates or new instruments (which for 
the current analysis will be modelled as changes in the interest rates for discretionary or 
committed savings) could also be significant, although this is not a particularly strong 
effect (Lea, Tarpy & Webley 1987). Any new information that changes the predicted values of 
decision variables in the future may cause a change in behaviour. Events in the life of the 
person may affect any of these categories, but since there are innumerable individual events 
that may occur, each of which may have a different effect, it is not useful at this stage to try 
and map all the different feasible events onto parameter or variable changes in the model. 
The final cue is the person's budget constraint. What this means is that individuals know how 
much they are spending and how much they want to save. If they find that they do not have 
enough money to do both, or that they have (much) more money than they thought they 
would have, they may also recheck their savings behaviour. 
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3.4.3 The Saver's View of Life 
This is the situation at a point in time at which a decision is being taken: 
there is a fixed past, a fairly certain immediate future, a vague distant future but definite ideas 
about what will happen during retirement and at death. Retirement can be seen as an 
environmental change which will affect all other savings decisions via a change in the budget 
constraint as labour income and pensions contributions disappear and pensions payments start. 
As the person gets older, the certain and vague periods will maintain their relative times to the 
person's present; they move later in time. When retirement approaches, the certain and vague 
futures still exist, but the budget constraint may change during the period of saving being 
considered. The probable point of death, in contrast, approaches. If individuals become very 
old, but not terminally ill, their prediction of how long they will probably live might mean 
that they base their plans on dying soon (e. g. concentrating on bequests rather than 
precautionary savings for the distant, vague future), although they will perhaps also consider 
what will happen if they live on for the foreseeable future. Thus the near & distinct vs. distant 
& vague separation may break down, since the motivation to consider the distant future will 
be weaker. 
3.4.4. The Decision Process 
Once someone departs from rigorous through-life optimization, there are lots of different ways 
of trading off that are possible. The suggestions that are made here are not intended to be a 
definitive statement of how people behave, but only a set of rules that seem plausible given 
the cognitive limitations of the human brain. Discovering the actual rules that people use is a 
matter for empirical investigation. 
There are some general comments that can be made. The nature of the decision process 
depends on how precisely the goal of savings can be defined by the person. It is proposed 
that it will be satisficing (rather than maximizing) and will take into account the financial 
resources available. There are several reasons why people may not exhibit full optimizing 
behaviour. They may be unsure of their preferences. They may also feel that the large level 
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of effort to reach an optimum (involving many recalculations) is not worth the small 
gain in utility (this follows from Cochrane 1989). They may be incapable of performing 
the optimization calculation, even in its simplified form or they may not have sufficient 
patience to complete a complex decision process (Etzioni 1988). 
A similar cognitive decision process is assumed for both short term and retirement saving. 
The trading-off process is along the lines proposed in Pemberton 1993. It is proposed that the 
person simplifies the problem until there are only two variables, which are then traded off 
against each other. Other financial expenditures and incomes are assumed to be constant for 
the length of time being considered. This can be justified because individuals know that, if their 
assumptions are significantly wrong, they will usually be able to replan. The utility over the 
current time period associated with a given behaviour is traded off against a representative 
time period at a selected point in the future, a few years hence for short term saving and the 
first year of retirement for pensions. There is no summation of utilities over time, because 
the large amount of uncertainty involved about the lengths of time over which saving and 
retirement will take place and the large possible changes in the values of variables in the 
future make the extra calculation meaningless for practical purposes. The implicit assumption 
is made that if these typical time periods are financially satisfactory, other periods in the 
same region will also be adequate. Individuals believe that if they changes their opinion at 
some point, the process of monitoring will enable them to identify a significant change and 
they can then retake the decision. 
The trade-off process that is used is a form of 'matching'; saving is adjusted until the utility 
of the current period is equal to the predicted utility in the future period multiplied by some 
subjective discount factor. The idea of matching is discussed in Miller et. at. (1987). It is 
considered that the concept of thinking about how satisfied one is with (say) a particular 
consumption rate now compared to (say) a rate of consumption in the future has considerable 
intuitive appeal. The typical CARA or CRRA functional forms incorporate diminishing 
returns to scale, thus allowing for the idea of an 'adequate' rate by having very low levels of 
utility for low values of the argument. 
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The discount factor is dependent on the length of time into the future being considered. It 
can be assumed to be a linear function of time for small changes in the time period, but 
this will not hold for larger changes. In the current case, consumption in retirement might 
reasonably be assumed to be discounted to a lesser degree that short term saving, even 
though the short term discount function is a linear or exponential function of the length of 
time. This is an instance of a rule of thumb being applied; although retirement is a long 
way off, individuals may well feel that provision for retirement income is important because 
by then their earning potential will very probably be much reduced. They will not be able 
to reverse their pensions decisions during retirement so not saving is a form of commitment to 
current consumption. 
The limitation on the person's resources is modelled by including a liquidity restraint: no 
borrowing is permitted. There is an obvious requirement for there to be some constraint and 
it is unnecessary to make the strong psychological assumption that people see borrowing 
simply as negative consumption. Borrowing may introduce different psychological factors 
and motivations which can only be adequately addressed in a separate decision process. 
The restriction is incorporated through the budget identity, which is described in detail in 
the next section. 
Expectations Formation 
In this problem, the household has to make estimates of several variables in the future e. g. 
wages, rates of return, their own utilities etc. How are these expectations formed? One method 
often used is adaptive expectations, which is a weighted extrapolation of the outcome in the 
previous period. A more general version of this idea is that of the distributive lag model, often 
used in time series econometrics. This can be viewed as a distribution of the variable, with 
weights being probabilities derived from observations in previous periods. There is no 
consideration of any predictable changes in the future. Rational expectations is the idea that 
predictions made by individuals use all relevant information, both economic theory and 
available data. This is, however, too complex for most people to use in their personal decision 
making. Another consideration might be the ratchet effect, mentioned in Duesenberry (1949), 
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which indicates the direction of the general economic trend. This is information about the 
macro economy and is therefore difficult to translate into a method for microeconomic 
decisions. 
There are probably rules of thumb that people use to generate expectations, such as 
extrapolating the current trend. i. e. a subjective OLS estimation. An appealing idea is that 
people assume either that they will stay in the same job, with a known structure of pay 
increases. Given peoples' tendency to imagine trends where there is no real justification and 
to concentrate on actual outcomes rather than the distribution of possible states of the world 
(Hogarth 1987), some form of extrapolation based on the recent outcomes of a variable seems 
to be a reasonable assumption. It is also considered that people do not have a continuous 
probability distribution over all possible future outcomes. Instead, they will look at a few 
cases only and generate some subjective measure of the likelihood of the different cases. 
Different possible states of the world will be accounted for by using the expectation of utility 
in the future. 
3.4.5 GeneraUPrecautionary Saving 
This form of saving is intended to generate a stock of wealth over the short to medium 
term. A simple savings instrument is assumed with a constant interest rate, no risk and 
perfect liquidity i. e. savers can withdraw as much of their wealth stock without delay or loss 
of interest income. An illustrative time period for the decision of 5 years has been chosen 
i. e. the decision process will assume that the rate of saving will be maintained for 5 years, after 
which the decision will be retaken. In accordance with the matching principle described above, 
the utility in the current period is equated to the discounted utility 5 years hence, the person 
trading off within the limitations imposed by the liquidity constraint. Other savings 
(retirement savings) are assumed to held constant at the same rate as in the previous time 
period. It is further assumed that the person's situation will remain constant over the time 
period being considered i. e. wage income, wealth innovations, the interest rate, 
subjective parameters of the person's preferences and the savings rate once decided will remain 
61 
unchanged for 5 years. It is then assumed that the situation may change after the fifth year, 
so that the saving is an allowance for possible changes at the point in the future being 
considered. 
Utility will incorporate the benefits both of consumption and the act of saving itself. 
The Utility of Wealth 
Wealth cannot only be considered as generating consumption. It provides security and the 
ability to leave bequests as well. Therefore, the utility of a given wealth stock might 
incorporate other psychological effects in addition to the discounted flow of consumption 
that the wealth stock can generate. Wealth can provide utility through giving security. 
Security is provided by increasing the most likely predicted level and reducing the 
downwards variability of future consumption possibilities, since some future wealth stock can 
be made to be virtually certain. This is what is known as precautionary saving in the 
literature, where a non-zero 3rd derivative of the utility function allows the 
consumption/savings choice to affect the variance of the future utility stream, given income 
uncertainty. 
Given the strong cultural bias of western society towards thrift associated with work as 
responsible and morally laudable behaviour (Weber 1930), there is a strong bias towards 
building up a stock of wealth. People who succeed in building up large stocks of wealth are 
considered to be successful. Etzioni emphasized the influence of social norms on peoples 
behaviour (Etzioni 1988). A further consequence of this work ethic is the avoidance of debt if 
at all possible, which suggests that the constraints that people see themselves as facing exclude 
borrowing possibilities, except in the very short term (e. g. the tendency to completely pay off 
credit card bills before they are due). 
A further effect is discussed in Loewenstein 1987. This is the possible utility from the 
anticipation of expenditure, which he sees as a possible justification for Moore's proposal that 
people do get utility from wealth (Moore 1978). Other subjective factors mentioned by 
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Keynes 1936 are: independence, avarice and pride (as an explanation for bequests). 
These considerations mean that the utility associated with a wealth stock will not only depend 
on the future consumption flow attainable from that stock, but will also be affected by these 
other psychological effects. 
The Components of the Utility of a Stock of Wealth 
The psychological effects associated with saving will now be detailed. These effects are: 
1) The consumption flow that can be generated by a stock of wealth. 
2) The increase in expected future consumption, allowing for uncertainty (the precautionary 
motive). 
3) Feelings of achievement and identity: wealth may give a sense of having achieved 
something and possibly a certain status in society therefore contributing to a sense of 
self-worth. 
4) Independence and control: wealth gives people freedom to act as they wish, without 
dependence on others and enables people to exercise power over others. 
5) Entrepreneurship: wealth can be used as a capital stock to found and develop businesses. 
6) Avarice: people may just enjoy having a stock of money entirely for it's own sake, without 
considering the uses of money. 
7) The Protestant work ethic and associated social approbation of saving may give utility 
through other people's approval. 
8) Anticipation: people may gain utility from imagining the benefits that they expect to get in 
the future from saving. 
9) Health: the guarantee of affording health care in old age (a form of precautionary saving) 
10) Leisure: the ability to work less for a given consumption flow as a stock of wealth builds 
up. Since the consumption/leisure/income choice is not being specifically considered here, 
leisure effects will be subsumed in the utility of consumption. 
11) Bequests: the ability to contribute to other people's consumption when one dies. 
The timing of these effects and the relevant variable(s) for each effect can now be identified. 
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The immediate choice is between current consumption c, and future wealth wf , which given 
the assumption of constant behaviour determines w, +l. This assumption implies that the 
difference between w, .1 and wf 
is arbitrary in the sense that the length of time period is chosen 
arbitrarily i. e. one could be written as the other if the length of each time period is changed. 
Consumption gives utility at the time at which it is effected. Precaution can be incorporated in 
the utility function of consumption at the time of the associated consumption. Achievement, 
independence, entrepreneurship, avarice and bequests all give utility through having a stock of 
wealth available. This implies that these effects give utility when the money has been saved. 
They are all a function of wealth w, with a subjective probability of death weighting the utility 
of bequests. The simplest way that bequests can be incorporated into this model is to follow 
Cardes, Deaton 1992 etc. and incorporate the predicted wealth stock at the predicted time of 
death in the utility of savings. However, this implies that there is a (conscious) division of 
the wealth stock into wealth allocated to bequests and wealth allocated to other purposes. 
Since the same instruments will be used for both, this division is entirely notional and can be 
changed at any time without affecting observable behaviour. It is proposed instead to treat 
bequests in the same way as other benefits of a wealth stock; the ability to leave bequests will 
contribute to the utility of wealth. The utility derived from social approval of thrift comes from 
the act of saving rather than the holding of a wealth stock, so this gives utility as soon as the 
person starts saving (at time t). Since the utility comes from saving, it is consistent to make 
this a function of the rate of saving. Defining the rate of saving as the change in wealth/unit 
time, this model measures the rate as w, +, - w, . Finally, anticipation gives utility at t, 
dependent on the predicted level of wealth in the future wf . The utility from the anticipation 
of consumption will not be separately considered in this model, since it is difficult to 
distinguish between the consideration of utility in the future and the psychological satisfaction 
of anticipating utility in the future. Eliminating anticipation means also that it is not necessary 
to predict the anticipation in the future from saving in the future, which preserves the idea of 
comparing a single present period with a single future period. 
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3.4.6 Saving for Retirement 
This type of saving has several unique features. Firstly, it is viewed as very important, indeed 
some people may view it as more important than current consumption, implying a negative 
discount rate. Since consumption now is traded off against consumption in retirement they 
can be assumed to have similar utility functions. The period in the future being considered may 
well be many years away when the decision is being taken. This means that the decision 
spans the fuzzy future described in section 3.3.2. It does not, therefore, make sense to take 
detailed account of the length of time being considered, either for current consumption or for 
the length of retirement, which is even more vague. Utility functions with rates of 
consumption as their arguments will be used. 
It will be assumed that there is a single pension instrument available to a person. It will have 
the features typical of a British contributory pension: there is a regular rate of deduction 
from the person's salary which provides an income in perpetuity on retirement. The pension 
will depend on the savings rate and the length of time over which contributions are made. 
There is also an element of commitment in this instrument; if contributions are reduced at 
any stage, the return on contributions is significantly decreased. However, the psychology of 
commitment is not considered in detail at this stage. 
The utility of consumption in the current period is traded off using the matching procedure 
against predicted discounted utility of consumption in the first period of retirement. As in the 
general savings decision, it is assumed that both external factors such as income and interest 
rates etc. and subjective parameters remain constant until the future period, when the new 
situation is assessed. It is also assumed that wealth will be held constant during retirement. 
3.4.7 General Applicability of the Model 
This model has been developed specifically to address one particular set of economic decisions 
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made by households12. However, some of the concepts introduced here may be useful in 
analysing other personal economic decisions. The defining characteristics of savings decisions 
that can be observed when individuals take these decisions are: 
i) the possible courses of action are quantifiable 
ii) the decisions involve a large degree of uncertainty 
iii) there are many different possible courses of action 
iv) there is a massive amount of information available that is relevant to the decision 
v) people often believe that they should behave rationally 
These characteristics combine to make these decisions very complex, but people do try and 
tackle them in an organised manner. They do this by treating the problem as one of 
constrained optimization, but they simplify the decision so that they can bring this process to 
bear. They edit the information flow and only change their decision when they think the 
situation has changed. They only consider one part of their decision at a time and impose a 
structure on the problem to enable them to decide which part to concentrate on. Finally, they 
group different periods together, assuming that periods within the groups are the same. By 
these means, a decision is only taken occasionally and when it is taken, it is simplified to a 
trade-off between just two variables. 
This approach can be applied to other decisions that also have some of the above 
characteristics. In particular, complex decisions where people are trying to be rational may 
be subject to a similar process of simplification. Possible areas could be personal 
investment portfolio choice, insurance, durables purchase, labour supply decision, firms' 
investment decisions, firms' factor choice etc. etc. 
12 Models of switching with inertia have been used in the monetary economics literature, see e. g. 
Akerlof & Yellen (1985). 
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3.5 The Formal Model 
3.5.1 The Monitoring Procedure 
Firstly, if either savings instrument has not been examined for a long time, then whatever the 
situation that savings decision is reexamined. 
Then, the change in various variables is examined to see whether they have changed 
significantly from the last period. This difference (DIFF) is thus the signal for retaking a 
savings decision. The general rule for deciding whether a variable or parameter of the model 
has changed significantly is to check the change from the previous period to generate a 
difference. The value of DIFF is determined as follows: if the order of magnitude of the 
value last period is the same in the current period, 
DIFF = (value, - value, _, 
)/valuet_1 
otherwise if the order of magnitude last period is smaller 
DIFF = valuer -value, -, 
3.1 
This prevents a value that changes to zero or nearly zero from an already small value from 
generating an infinite or very large value of DIFF. 
To allow for the possibility that people may not observe DIFF accurately, or may not act on 
what might be considered by the individual to be a significant level of DIFF, the change in a 
variable perceived by the person is assumed to be normally distributed about a mean of DIFF. 
If the magnitude of the subjective difference is greater than the threshold at which the 
person believes that a change is significant, the relevant decision is reexamined. This threshold 
value is an exogenous behavioural parameter in the model, in the same way as the parameters 
of the utility functions are exogenous. The value of DIFF is taken as an instantaneous value 
and is independently determined in each period. 
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Information relevant to pension saving is checked before general/precautionary saving. The 
anticipated return on pensions is checked and then changes in wage income are examined. 
If wages significantly increase and retirement saving is a small proportion of general saving 
or if wages decrease and retirement saving is a large proportion of retirement saving, then the 
pensions decision is retaken. For general saving, the liquidity constraint applied to wealth next 
period (w>O V t), the savings rate assuming constant behaviour and the parameters of the 
utility functions are checked. 
The result of this monitoring process is either that one of the two savings decisions is 
considered or behaviour (i. e. consumption and pension contributions) is simply continued 
from the previous period with the same values. 
3.5.2 GeneralPrecautionary Saving 
The decision rule selected for this model is that utility now (at time t) is set equal to 
discounted predicted future utility (at time f). This matching procedure allows for the 
possibility that utility in the future might be measured on a different psychological scale to 
current utility. So from section 3.4.5 above, the matching equation for general saving can 
be written as: 
E[utility at t] = E[utility at f]D 3.2 
The components of utility are assumed to be additively separable to assist comparisons with 
conventional models with bequests such as Cardes (1990), where additive separability is also 
assumed. It is intended to concentrate on the structure of the savings decision, rather than 
the form of the utility function and it is not practicable to incorporate all the alternative 
forms surveyed in ch. 2. For the same reasons, the expected utility form is used to allow for 
two possible states of nature. The subjective probability of death by the end of the period is 
used to weight the two states at the end of the time period - living (with probability 1-p) and 
consuming and saving or dying (with probability p) and having utility for offspring from the 
bequests. Writing the components of the utility functions explicitly: 
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(1-p) { U(c, ) + TH(s, ) + V(w, ) }+ pB(w, ) = 
{(1-p)(E[U(cf)] + E[TH(sf )] + E[V(wf )]) + pE[B(wf)] }D 3.3 
where 
U(. ) is the utility of consumption 
TH(. ) is the utility of social approval of thrift 
V(. ) is the utility of achievement, independence, avarice and entrepreneurship 
B(. ) is the utility of bequests 
p is the subjective probability of death, assumed not to change between t and f 
D= D(S, f-t)is the discount factor looking from time t to time f 
E is the expectation operator 
The equation can be solved for c, by using the budget identity (explained in section 3.5.4 
below) to relate c, to saving and hence to the wealth stock at a specified time in the future. 
All values and subjective parameters are assumed to remain constant for the number of 
time periods over which the saving takes place, but values at time fin the future may vary. 
3.5.3 Saving for Retirement 
The matching rule for retirement saving is rather more simple. The utility of the current 
rate of consumption is compared to the discounted utility of the rate of consumption in the 
first period of retirement. The difference in the two situations is that current income is wage 
income N whereas income in retirement i,,, is dependent on pension contributions spt. So, 
the matching rule is: 
U(c, ) = U(c,, ,, 
)D 3.4 
where the symbols are defined in the previous section and 8 has the same form. sp, maps 
onto iret, i. e. iret = i(sp) and c,,, can be found from iret by applying the budget identity. 
3.5.4 The Budget Identity 
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The budget (accounting) identity can be used to relate the different variables i. e. s, cf 
and wf to c, The budget identity for some time period t is: 
wt+1= (w, + g, + h, - c, - sp) (I+r) 3.5 
where 
g= an exogenous wealth innovation 
h= wage income 
sp = pensions contributions 
r= interest rate 
In contrast to some other savings/consumption models, saving is then defined 
as the rate of change of wealth: 
S =Wt+1-Wt 3.6 
The form of this budget identity is dependent on the assumptions made about the sequence of 
events in any one period. At the start of a period, w, is known and is a consequence of the 
decisions made in the previous period. The wage income and any wealth innovations are 
then received. The monitoring and decision process is then undertaken, identifying spt and c, 
wt+l is then found as the wealth stock at the end of the current time period t. 
wf is the predicted level of wealth that will result from a particular rate of consumption and 
therefore saving; it is the sum of the geometric progression of the constant savings rate s, 
over the planned number of periods and the current wealth stock, so wf and s, can be 
calculated from each other. st can be < 0, if wt is relatively large, depending upon tastes, 
of course. The rate of return, r has to be estimated, as it is an expected rate over the length of 
time being planned for. wf can be found by summing the budget identities over the planned 
period of saving (f-t): 
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Wf = (w, + g, )(l+r)8 ý° + (h1- c, - sPt)GPEf, 3.7 
where 
GPEft is the geometric sum multiplier from 1 to f-t 
This equation also assumes a constant income h, no wealth innovations g, 41... gf, a 
constant rate of pension contributions spt and a constant interest rate r over the period of 
saving. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has developed a theory of savings behaviour using the idea of bounded 
rationality. A form of the utility function has been proposed that incorporates contributions 
to utility from factors in addition to current and (discounted) future consumption. A 
simplified decision process, compared to conventional life cycle models, has been suggested 
and two types of savings instrument, a general savings instrument and a pension instrument 
incorporating an element of commitment are included. 
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4 Simulation 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the details of the solution of the model, the simulation of the theory and 
the results obtained. The general method and overall structure of the simulation program is 
introduced and in section 2 the monitoring procedure is described. Sections 3 provide details 
for the general and retirement savings solutions and section 4 contains the results. Section 5 
contains the discussion and conclusions. 
The point that the details of the decision rules that are set out here are not the most important 
part of the theory should be emphasized. Not only do people use different rules under different 
circumstances, but that different people will use different rules under the same circumstances. 
Finding a set of rules that usefully approximate a wide range of people's behaviour while 
being concise and plausible; in short, that obey the tenets of economic methodology is a 
matter for empirical investigation. The particular rules that are detailed are essentially 
illustrative. The important ideas that form the basis of the model have been set out in section 
3.3 above. 
The model was tested by writing a computer program to generate results for a range of 
parameters. There were two objectives of the simulation: first, to investigate whether the 
model generates consumption/savings paths that are consistent with the stylised facts set out 
in section 3.2.1. In particular, does saving track income over the life cycle and is there a 
significant level of bequests? Second, does the model generate predictions that are testable 
versus conventional models i. e. are consumption/savings paths generated that are significantly 
different to those predicted by conventional models? 
The operation and combination of the various elements of the model can be explained with 
reference to the flow chart for the simulation program SIMUL7, figure 1. The program 
structure is the same as that of the model. Initially, the data for the parameters of the 
individual's decision process and for the income process are read in. Then the program loops 
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Figure 1 FORTRAN 77 program SIMUL7 
Flow chart for overall structure 
START 
READ IN DATA 
INITIALISE VARIABLES 
>----------------I 
LAST TIME PERIOD? -------YES--------STOP 
NO 
FIRST TIME PERIOD--------YES--------SET INCOME = PENSION 
OF RETIREMENT? FOR REST OF LIFE 
NO 
l< ---------------------------------------- 
I 
CALL SUBROUTINE 
MONITOR 
i 
NO DECISION 
TO REEXAMINE 
SAVINGS 
i 
CHECK GENERAL/ 
PRECAUTIONARY 
SAVINGS 
CALL GENERAL 
SAVINGS 
SUBROUTINE 
c(t), s(t) 
------------------------------------ 
CALCULATE WEALTH 
CALCULATE PENSION 
i 
CHECK 
RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS 
CALL RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS SUBROUTINE 
c(t), sp(t) 
-----<-------------------------------<----------------- 
through all the periods for which there is data (i. e. until the individual dies). Note that the 
model assumes that the individual does not know how long they will live. In each period, the 
savings decisions (general and pension savings) are initially set equal to the values from the last 
period. This is the default, the application of the idea of habitual behaviour. Next, the income 
for the period is generated using a random number generator. There are three subroutines 
which form the decision process. Subroutine MONITOR checks whether a savings decision 
will be taken in the current period. The details of the subroutine are given in section 4.2 below. 
If no savings decisions are to be taken, the program moves to the next period and the default 
savings values used to calculate the consumption and savings paths. If MONITOR indicates 
that general savings should be considered, the subroutine GENPRE generates the new level of 
general saving, with pension saving set equal to the default value. The equations used are 
explained in section 4.3 below. If MONITOR indicates that pension savings should be 
considered, the subroutine RETIRE generates the new level of pension saving, with general 
saving set equal to the default value. The equations used are explained in section 4.4 below. 
In order to generate a solution of the model, it was necessary to specify functional forms for 
the various utility functions. The CRRA form was used in all cases, because it is commonly 
used in consumer economics and has diminishing returns to scale with a marginal utility 
tending to infinity at zero consumption. Also, it has non-zero 2nd and 3rd derivatives, thus 
allowing for precautionary saving. Blanchard and Fischer(1989) argue that the CRRA function 
is more plausible than CARA because it prevents consumption from falling below zero along 
the optimal path. 
The form of the discounting function for utility predicted to be enjoyed in the future was 
exponential, but altered from the normal function to account for the effects of matching as 
opposed to maximising. In particular the function should have a value greater than 1.0 to 
indicate a lower weight applied to utility in the future. 
The function used was: 
D(S, f-t) = 2.0 - e-(1-8)(f-t) 4.1 
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The program is structured in the same way as the formal model. (see flow chart fig. 1). In 
each time period from the beginning of the person's (financial decision-making) life to 
death, the main routine calls the monitoring sub-routine, which determines which decision, 
if any, will be examined. The main decisions are incorporated in separate sub-routines. For 
details of the program, see the listing at Appendix 1. The program is written in FORTRAN77. 
4.2 The Monitoring Procedure 
See the flow chart for the subroutine MONITOR (Appendix 1) for details of the order in 
which different variables and parameters are checked. Firstly, if pensions have not been 
checked in the last ten periods (years), the pensions decision is retaken. Then, if general 
savings have not been checked in the last five years, the general savings decision is 
retaken. This is done to reflect the fact that people occasionally examine their affairs for 
various reasons. Next, possible triggers for the pension decision are checked. The return on 
pensions is examined and the size of pension contributions relative to general savings are 
also considered. The liquidity constraint is checked by looking at the wealth at t+l, given 
constant behaviour and the current values of exogenous variables. If it is predicted that the 
liquidity constraint will be violated i. e. w1+, < 0, then the general savings decision is retaken. 
Also, the current rate of savings is compared to the rate of savings last period. Finally, the 
values of the subjective parameters of the utility functions are checked to see if they have 
changed significantly from the last period. 
4.3 The General Savings Solution 
From equation (3.3), 
U(c) + TH(s) + V(w, )+ P/(1-P)B(w) = 
{E[U(cf)] + E[TH(sf)] + E[V(wf)] + p/(1-p)E[B(wf)] )D 4.2 
The CRRA functions for utility are: 
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U(c) = (1/(1-a))c'-" 4.3 
V(w) = (1/(1-ß))w '-a w>0 
= (1/(1-ß))(-w)t a w<0 4.4 
TH(s) = (1/(1-y))s1 ' s>0 
= (1/(1-y))(-s)''7 s<0 4.5 
B(w) = (1/(1-ý))w''ý` w>0 
= (1/(1-X))(-w)''ý w<0 4.6 
where a, ß, y and X are the parameters of the utility functions. 
To solve this part of the model, an expression for c, is found using eqn. (4.2). Some further 
assumptions are made in order to find a solution. Saving at the point in the future f is 
assumed to be zero. This implies: 
Wf+1 = Wf 4.7 
This avoids consideration of the general savings decision at time f, which would immediately 
require consideration of more than the two time periods t and f. It is also assumed that 
there will be no exogenous wealth innovations: 
gt+iq gt+2'**, *"gf =0 4.8 
and that wage income h and the interest rate r will remain at their current level and pensions 
contributions sp will remain at their previously decided level. From eqn. 4.7 and using the 
budget identity (eqn. 3.5), 
cf=w1{r/1+r)+hf-spf 4.9 
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Rules of thumb are required to generate the values of variables at the future time f. wf 
can now be found as a function of ct. Note that wf is deterministic, being determined by 
current savings and consumption, both of which are assumed to be constant. Uncertainty 
is introduced in the form of uncertainty of future income. For the purposes of this simulation, 
it is assumed that the person considers up to 3 possible future incomes and associates a 
subjective probability to each possible income. Writing 
a=wf{r/1+r)-spf 4.10 
The expected utility of future consumption is: 
E[U(cf)] _ (1-ph-p, )*U(a+hf) + p,, *U(a+h,, ) + p, *U(a+h, ) 4.11 
where 
hh is the highest possible future income 
hl is the lowest possible future income 
hf is the most likely future income 
ph is the subjective probability of receiving hh 
p, is the subjective probability of receiving h, 
From eqn. 3.6 and the budget identity, 
s, = (wt + gt + ht - c, - spt) * (1 +r) - wt 
= (gý + h, - c, - spt)*(l+r) + rw, 4.12 
So in eqn. (4.2), wf and hence cf and s, can be found from c1, while w, is already known. 
Eqn. (4.2) can be rearranged to form a transcendental equation of the form: 
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f(ct, st, w) - D(S, f-t)*f(Cflwf) =04.13 
which is the form suitable for use in the solution routine to generate a value of c, to 
satisfy the matching condition. 
The solution routine used is the modified linear interpolation routine detailed on p11. of 
Gerald and Wheatley (1989). 
4.4 The Retirement Savings Solution 
The decision rule is given by eqn. (3.4) with the discount factor for predicted utility in the 
future given by egn. (4.1). Since other decision variables are kept constant, the savings rate 
is assumed constant at the same rate as in the last period: 
St = Sß_1 4.14 
Wealth innovations (g) are assumed to be zero and wage income (h) and the pension return 
factor (rp) and the interest rate (r) on any wealth stock are assumed to remain constant during 
the period of pension contributions. Again, this is not proposed as assumptions that are 
expected to be fulfilled, they just enable the calculation to be performed in the 
knowledge that if they prove to be incorrect, the decision can be retaken. 
From the budget identity (eqn. 3.5): 
w, +s, =wt+1=(wt+gt+h, -c, -sp, )(1+r) 4.15 
sp, = wt + ht - c, - (w, + s1)/(l+r) 4.16 
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for notational convenience, write: 
c 11 = w, + h, - (w1+s, ) /(l+r) 4.17 
so 
sp, =c 11 - ct 4.18 
It is assumed that the pension income in the first period of retirement i,,, is a linear factor of 
the total pension contributions up to retirement. Assuming a constant rate of contributions, 
iý, c = h,,,, /(tp*h, )*sp, *(ret-l-t) 4.19 
Typically, a rate of contribution of 5% of salary for n years will give n 80ths of salary on 
retirement i. e. rp = 4. 
write 
iret =c 10*sp1* (ret- l -t) 4.20 
To find hret_, the same expectations rule as for generating future values of variables in the 
general savings decision is used. It is necessary to allow for withdrawal from the committed 
pensions saving scheme. This was done by freezing the pension scheme if contributions are 
not maintained. If individuals decide to reduce the rate of contribution, they terminate their 
scheme and the pension from previous contributions is calculated at the lower rate of return. 
The person retains the pension income from this previous scheme which is paid out in 
retirement. The person then starts a new scheme with the new rate of contribution which 
will receive the higher rate of return unless this new scheme is also stopped before 
retirement. A record is kept of the pension income of all old schemes. Thus the predicted 
pension income pmt will be: 
Prei = Thold + EsPo)d +L4.21 
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where 
Eio, d is the sum of pensions from old schemes 
Espo, d is the pension income from previous contributions to the current scheme 
Consumption in retirement is found by applying the budget constraint. 
Wret+i = (Wret + gam, + P,,, - c,, t)(l+r ) 4.19 
A further rule of thumb is used to guess at w, Wret is assumed to be some linear multiple 
of wt. As for general saving, it is assumed that the rate of saving in the future and wealth 
innovations will be zero and sp will be zero in retirement, so: 
Crec = Pmt + caret*rj(I+r) 4.22 
write 
Cret = c13 - c10*(ret-l-t)*ct 4.23 
From the matching equation (eqn. 3.4), 
U(c) = U(c,,, )*D 3.4 
(1/(1-a))c, '-' = (1/(1-a))(c13 - c10*(ret-l-t)*c, l-")*D 4.24 
from egn. 4.1 write 
D'ýý' = [2.0 - exp(-(1-8)*(ret-t))] "('-«) = c12 4.25 
so 
c, = c13*c12/(1+c10*(ret-l-t)*c12 4.26 
which gives a direct solution for ct and hence for sp. 
80 
4.5 Results 
First, the general pattern of the results will be described, then the stability and sensitivity of the 
results to changes in parameter values will be examined and the comparative statics analysed. 
Some typical results are at figure 213. These curves are averages of realisations over 1000 lifetime 
simulations for an income distribution with 3 possible outcomes in each time period. Reading time 
in years, the curves run from an age of 20 to 90 years with retirement at 65. It can be seen that the 
consumption path is significantly different to conventional life-cycle models, even those with 
precautionary saving or liquidity constraints where saving tracks consumption. Until retirement, the 
consumption path is determined mainly by the level of income, but the path is also significantly 
affected by the pattern of savings. There is a short initial time span up to period 4 where pension 
savings are initiated, as pensions are checked first in the monitoring process. As the expectation of 
future income rises and the income trend is detected, general savings are started. The consequence 
of this is that in the initial 4 periods the changes in the two different savings instruments cancel out 
so that the amount of total saving is constant and changes in consumption follow the movement of 
income almost exactly. Consumption then declines sharply until period 10 as general saving takes 
over and a wealth stock is built up. From this relatively low level consumption then increases 
steadily and at a greater rate than income until period 40; after period 23 consumption is greater 
than income. At period 40, the sharp reduction in income due to retirement is taken into account 
(remember that the general savings decision looks forward for 5 periods only) and consumption 
13 The various utilities incorporated in the utility functions (equation 4 for general savings and equation 6 for 
retirement saving) were all of the CRRA form 
U(c) = (1/(1-a))*c'ý`, RN(s) = V(w) = (1/(1-)))*w'-T, B(w) 
In figure 2, a=0.8, ß=0.05, y=0.05, X=0.05, r (rate of interest on general savings) = 5%, rp (return parameter 
for pension contributions) =10.0. The subjective probability of death p increased form 0.05 at period 1 to 0.5 at 
period 70. The income distribution was initially 0.1 with probability 0.3,1.0 with probability 0.7,1.5 with 
probability 0.1, increasing to 0.14 with probability 0.3,1.4 with probability 0.7,2.1 with probability 0.1 at 
retirement. After retirement, there was a certain exogenous (state) pension of 0.1 in addition to any private pension 
resulting from contributions before retirement. 
These values of the parameters were also used as the baseline for the comparative statics analysis. 
See Appendix 2 for a data listing for the simulation results of figure 2. 
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reduces to renew the buildup of wealth. During retirement, consumption is roughly constant, being 
financed partly by dissaving and the state pension but also by a considerable private pension (0.53 
or half the average income at retirement). Consumption can thus be seen to approximately track 
income, but there is smoothing between the working life and retirement and a development of a 
large wealth stock which results in a steeper rise in consumption than in income over time before 
retirement. It should also be noted that over the very short term once a trend in saving has been 
established, the movements in consumption follow the movements in income from period to period 
very closely, unless there is another reason to change savings behaviour. 
The savings behaviour reflects this consumption pattern. At no point is the liquidity constraint 
binding; in all periods the wealth stock is greater than 0. There is an initial period of high (up to 
30% of income) general saving in order to generate a wealth stock. As the level of wealth 
increases, saving is reduced and eventually (at period 36) becomes negative (dissaving), but as 
retirement is approached, general savings start again to allow for the decrease in income after 
retirement. The wealth saved up is considerable, reaching a local maximum of 4.5 (about 3*annual 
income at that period) in period 35. Then there is a further increase as retirement with a lower 
income becomes a factor in the general savings decision to attain the overall maximum of 5.2 (about 
3*annual income at retirement) just after retirement at period 50; there is some saving from the 
pension income for a few periods. Pension saving starts off higher than general saving but is then 
reduced as general saving takes priority. Due to the exponential discounting of the first period of 
retirement in the pension decision, pension saving accelerates gradually as retirement comes nearer 
and the discount factor of consumption in retirement reduces. At period 30, as general saving 
becomes small, pension saving becomes greater than general saving and this remains the case until 
retirement. There are thus two aspects of this savings behaviour which are in contrast to a 
conventional life-cycle model. Firstly, there is extensive short to medium term saving when young 
and secondly there is a small `boom' in saving, both general and pension, as retirement approaches. 
The path of the wealth stock following from the savings behaviour is also somewhat unusual. 
Wealth increases steadily and quite rapidly until a high wealth stock is reached, when dissaving 
occurs. As retirement approaches, the wealth stock is increased still further to a maximum just after 
retirement and then the wealth stock is gradually run down. However, this process is quite slow and 
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there is still considerable wealth left in the final period. This is to be expected, partly due to the 
bequest motive, but also from the assumption that the person may live, on (for at least another 5 
years in this simulation). 
Habit forming and the monitoring process play a minor part in the results. The priority of pension 
saving over general saving causes pension contributions in the first 4 periods to be higher than 
general saving and habit forming can be seen clearly after retirement, where there are changes in 
behaviour every 5 years after period 53. This means that as the situation is constant, the decisions 
are not retaken until the decisions are rechecked simply because a long time has passed since the 
level of savings was checked. Before retirement, the variability in the income process ensures that 
savings are checked regularly. 
Turning to the stability of the results, it will be seen in the comparative statics analysis that the 
patterns of behaviour shown in fig. 2 are maintained for moderate variations in all the main 
parameters of the model. This is to be expected, since variations in interest rates and income 
distribution have simple effects on the savings/consumption possibilities. A more severe test is the 
sensitivity of the results to the form of the utility function. In fig. 3 the parameter a of the CRRA 
utility function for consumption U (c) = (1/(1-a))*c` is varied and the resulting consumption and 
general savings paths plotted. a was varied from 0.05 (virtually a straight line) to 0.9, where the 
curvature is extreme. The forms of the consumption and savings paths are seen to be stable 
throughout this range, with only the magnitude of the values varying. Thus it can be seen that the 
general nature of the results is independent of the specific parameter values used; the saving in early 
periods and the saving before retirement, together with the form of the through-life consumption 
path are generally valid. 
The comparative statics of general and pension savings and consumption as the interest rate on 
general saving varies are shown in fig. 4. Consumption increases with increasing interest rate, as the 
consumption/saving frontier is opened out. The effect on general saving is the opposite to that on 
consumption. As the interest rate increases, less is saved early on when the stock of wealth is 
developed, as it is easier to build up an adequate level of wealth with a higher interest rate. Later on, 
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the dissaving and then the burst of saving before retirement, as well as the dissaving after retirement 
are all more pronounced with lower interest rates, again to compensate for the reduced 
effectiveness of saving. Pension saving increases as the general savings interest rate decreases, as 
pension saving becomes more attractive relative to general saving. The effect of changes in rp, the 
return parameter for pension contributions, as shown in fig. 5 is not very strong14. This is because 
pension saving takes place slowly over a long period of time so that small changes in consumption 
and hence pension saving can allow for large changes in the return parameter. 
Finally, variations in the income distribution are considered. Fig. 6 shows the variation in 
consumption and general saving as the income distribution before retirement is shifted. The baseline 
initial median value of income (h0) is 1.0 (as in fig. 2) and curves for initial median values of 0.5 and 
1.5 are plotted. In these curves, the low income and high income levels change proportionately, as 
does the increase in the income over time. The rates of consumption and saving increase as the 
resources available increase with increased income. In fig. 7 the changes in behaviour with a 
changing probability of the low value of income being received are shown. The influence of the 
precautionary motive is seen to be strong, which is to be expected with a value of the curvature 
parameter in the utility function for consumption of 0.8. A higher probability of the low income (pl) 
means that the early saving to build up a stock of wealth is emphasised and increased to 
compensate for the increased probability, even though the average income decreases, so that a 
larger wealth stock is generated relative to lower pl. This high level of assets reduces the necessity 
for the pre-retirement saving and it can be seen that after retirement, the larger wealth stock causes 
a higher rate of dissaving. Pension saving is seen to increase as pl decreases; there is not so much 
general saving and there is more income available on average allowing a higher level of pension 
saving as well as consumption. 
14 Note that, from eqn. 4.19, rp is an inverse parameter so the return on pension saving increases as rp 
decreases. 
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4.6 Summary and Conclusions 
A theory of saving and consumption over a life has been developed which has several new features, 
compared with previous life cycle models. The process of decision making is simplified in several 
ways. Firstly, only one `representative' period in the future is considered in the decision. This point 
is taken to be representative of further periods in the future. Savings and consumption from the 
present until this future period are assumed to be constant, so that there is a trade off between two 
periods only. Two forms of saving are incorporated, of which the pension saving instrument 
incorporates commitment. Separate utilities of wealth stocks, savings rates and bequests have been 
included which enable the holding of wealth stocks to be modelled in addition to the utility of 
deferred consumption. Habit formation has been included and a trade off of levels of utilities instead 
of marginal utilities was incorporated, although these features of the model did not significantly 
affect the results. The income path was variable enough so that savings were regularly rechecked 
and the trade off of levels did not change the nature of the results compared to a trade off of 
marginal utilities. 
The results show some new features, compared to conventional life cycle models. The results of 
the model are in accordance with the stylised facts about savings described in section 3.2. 
Consumption tracks income (Deaton (1992)) and there is a high level of wealth during retirement 
with an associated significant level of bequests (Deaton (1992)). Katona's committed savings 
(Katona (1975)) in the form of pensions play a significant role in generating a satisfactory retirement 
income. Most significantly, there are two humps in saving, one early on in life - an alternative 
explanation for Carroll & Summers (1991) result that the young may save more than the old - and 
the second as retirement approaches. Thus consumption is low early on in the life, but increases at 
a higher rate than income for most of the working life. Pension saving is enough to generate a 
considerable private pension and consumption in retirement is also increased by slowly running 
down a large wealth stock. There is a significant level of bequests, partly due to the utility of 
bequests incorporated in the decision process, but also because of the assumption that the person 
will continue to live for several years and therefore still wishes to enjoy an adequate level of 
consumption in the future. In the short term from one period to the next, consumption changes 
closely follow income changes and in general over the life cycle, consumption can be said to track 
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income quite closely. There are two important elements of actual savings behaviour which are not 
included in this model which make a very detailed comparison of the results with empirical data 
difficult. Firstly, there is no account taken of mortgage saving, so that the boost to available income 
in middle age when the mortgage is paid off, an important form of committed saving, is not allowed 
for. This means that data from the rental sector would have to be used, but in the U. K. the 
population that is wealthy enough to have significant savings are almost all home owners and they 
devote a large proportion of committed savings to mortgages. The model does attempt to allow for 
the institutional environment for savings, by including a pension instrument in addition to the 
savings instrument found in conventional life cycle models. The inclusion of mortgage saving was 
considered, but this would have caused several problems. Mortgages provide rental services in 
addition to the ability to change the time path of consumption. Therefore, the utility of consumption 
would have to be divided into housing and other goods. Also, there might be other arguments in the 
utility function (e. g. utility associated with the act of ownership) which would require another series 
of behavioural variables in the same way as was undertaken for saving. The inclusion of those 
effects would have made comparison with the results of conventional life cycle models, which do 
not allow for these institutional factors, very difficult. The main objective of the model and 
simulation was to compare the results with conventional models and so the inclusion of mortgages 
would be disadvantageous. Furthermore, mortgages are borrowing and the inclusion of borrowing 
for houses would be inconsistent with the liquidity constraint of no borrowing explained in section 
3.4.4. Also, there is no allowance for short term saving up for large purchases such as cars or 
holidays, so very short term behaviour over time spans of less than 1 year is not modelled. 
If some of the ideas about decision making incorporated in this theory can be confirmed by 
empirical evidence, it may have important implications for predictions about savings behaviour. 
Cochrane (1989) has shown that if the assumption of wholly optimising behaviour is dropped, very 
different patterns of savings can result in similar levels of utility. It is therefore necessary to examine 
the decision processes themselves to generate predictions about savings. Current versions of 
conventional life cycle models can be made to fit some empirical observations, but it is unlikely that 
theory based on unrealistic assumptions about the nature of the decision processes involved will be 
able to accurately predict detailed patterns of saving. The rest of this thesis begins this task, by 
looking experimentally at the cognitive processes that people use in taking savings decisions. 
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5 An Experimental Investigation of Savings Decision Making 
5.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of this experiment was to investigate the way in which people tackle 
dynamic decision -problems; using the savings decision as an illustration. In particular, the 
experiment looked at timing in people's thinking, comparing the hypothesis of chapter 3 
against the assumptions of conventional life cycle models of saving. These models assume 
that individuals consider the whole of their possible life, summing expected discounted 
utility from all future periods. In contrast to this, the hypothesis of chapter 3 is that people 
only look forward a little way for a few periods (apart from future events assumed to be 
known with certainty i. e. retirement). Do people use backward induction or do they use a 
forward-looking approach? 
The secondary aim was to investigate savings behaviour and compare it to the optimal 
strategy for the savings problem with income uncertainty and an unknown length of life. 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 describes the experiment, explaining the 
reasons for the particular features of the experiment and comparing the design to the savings 
experiment of Hey & Dardanoni (1988a). Section 5.3 describes problems that arose with 
the experimental design and section 5.4 contains the analysis of the results obtained from 
the trials data (to identify strategies) and the econometric analysis of the actual 
savings/conversion results. Section 5.5 summarises the results and draws conclusions. 
5.2 Description of the Experiment 
The concept of the experiment was to have subjects solve a savings problem, giving them 
a trial calculation facility with which subjects could try out different savings strategies. The 
trial facility was designed to provide information about people's decision processes: the trials 
that subjects performed could be examined to identify different patterns of thinking about 
savings with regard to the range of time considered, the consumption patterns tried and 
income streams assumed. The savings problem was arranged to have the same theoretical 
structure as a savings/consumption decision with one certain savings instrument and one 
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form of consumption (see Hey & Dardanoni 1988a for details). The savings decisions could 
then be analysed to identify the relationships between the experimental parameters and 
'consumption' decisions of subjects, including their performance compared to the optimum 
strategy. 
The experiment was run as follows (the details of the design are given in section 5.2.2 
below). Subjects were given an audio-visual presentation of the instructions (see Appendix 
3 for the instructions). The experiment was divided into periods. In each period the subjects 
received an income in tokens and they decided how much of their available resources 
(wealth accumulated from previous periods plus income in the current period) to convert 
to points. Subjects were told the income distribution, the (certain) interest rate on tokens 
saved and the (publicly constant) probability of the experiment finishing at the end of each 
period. They were also given a graph of the CARA conversion function from tokens to 
points. Before they input their consumption/savings choice, the subjects had a trial 
calculation facility with which they could try out different savings strategies (see section 
5.2.1.1 below for details). Subjects first played the experiment for two practice periods, 
which did not contribute to their payoff, to familiarise them with the running of the program, 
the calculations involved and the trial calculation facility. They then performed the 
experiment for money. 
The experiment itself was conducted in two parts: in the main experiment subjects used an 
interactive computer program to solve a savings problem and perform trials of different 
strategies and then it was necessary (see section 5.2.3) to include a separate payoff 
mechanism to control the incentives in the experiment. In the program, subjects played a 
savings game over a number of time periods in which they received income which could be 
converted to points using a CARA formula or saved for conversion in the future. The 
accumulated points were than used in the payoff mechanism to play a lottery between a high 
prize and a low prize. 
The experiment was performed at EXEC, University of York, with four groups of 10 
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subjects15 (two groups each day over two days) so that the laboratory was not too crowded: 
subjects could not see each others' problems and decisions. After the first two groups had 
performed the experiment, various problems came to light and to overcome some of these 
problems some changes were made to the experimental program and the parameters of the 
experiment (see section 5.3 for a discussion). 
Although the problem is greatly simplified in comparison to a real life savings problem for 
a 'representative' consumer, it should be noted that even this problem cannot be solved 
analytically for the optimal consumption strategy for a given income stream because of the 
presence of a liquidity constraint and the calculation must be performed using a numerical 
solution. 
5.2.1 The User Interface, Instructions and the Trial Calculation Facility 
Since the subjects were required to solve an analytically complex problem (if they used all 
the information available to them) and the experiment contained a complicated calculation 
facility, it was considered important to give the subjects every opportunity to learn and 
understand the rules of the game and the facilities provided by the experimental program. 
When subjects registered to take part in the experiment, they were given a set of instructions 
with examples of different strategies so that they could learn how to perform the experiment 
and think about the problem beforehand. At the start of the experiment, subjects were given 
a presentation about the experiment and a demonstration of the various facilities of the 
computer program. The presentation was based on the written instructions and the 
introduction was also repeated in the program. The importance of finding the best strategy 
was emphasised by means of examples. These examples were selected to emphasise the 
potential difference in possible strategies and the implications of stopping probabilities and 
15 Unlike Hey and Dardanoni's experiment, a questionnaire was not given to the subjects at the 
end of the experiment. It was felt that subjects would not concentrate on such a questionnaire after an 
hour of the experiment itself and also, the subjects were not drawn from a random population so it would 
not be possible to try and draw general conclusions about the relationship between subjects' 
characteristics and their decision processes. 
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the income distribution, without giving direct hints about the optimal strategy16. In order to 
make the presentation as clear as possible and to ensure that different groups of subjects 
received the same information in the same manner, the presentation was recorded on an 
audio cassette. This was played to the subjects, coordinated with viewgraphs and the 
relevant screens from the computer program The written instructions are in appendix 3. The 
subjects then went through a short practice run of the program, so that they could get used 
to the various screens and facilities and than went on to the main run of the program. 
The program repeated the instructions (without the examples) and then proceeded to the 
first period. In each period, there was first a screen to say which period had been reached, 
with the subject responding to continue. This was included to avoid confusion about which 
period had been reached and to ensure that the subject realised that a new period was being 
started. Then there was a screen to emphasise the random and variable nature of the income 
stream. This had a rapidly changing number displayed, the numbers being those of the 
income distribution and finally showed the income for the period. The program next 
displayed an information screen, giving details of the current situation (see appendix 3 for 
details of the "current information screen"). At the bottom of this screen the subject was 
invited to try out some savings strategies. For the first 20 subjects, the subjects were given 
a choice of performing a trial or choosing their conversion, but most of these subjects 
ignored the trial so on the second day the program was modified to take them 
automatically to the trial facility when they had finished reading their current situation (see 
section 5.3). 
5.2.1.1 The Trial Calculation Facility 
Subjects could try out different strategies in each period of the savings problem. They 
selected the period in which their calculation would start and then highlighted the range of 
periods that they wished to examine on a'range screen', illustrated in fig. 8. This displayed 
the periods and scrolled forwards and backwards automatically as the subject varied the 
range. The subject chose an assumed initial wealth and an income stream and then entered 
16 The patterns of saving/conversion in the examples were: spending all income as soon as it is 
received, saving all income and spending all the accumulated wealth in 1 period, having the same income 
and conversion paths over two different numbers of periods (see instructions in appendix 3 for the 
examples). 
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a conversion stream. The program displayed the resulting levels of wealth and the total 
number of points that the subject would have at the end of the range of periods used for the 
trial. The subject's actual level of wealth was displayed as a default value for the current 
period and values used in a trial could be retained for further trials if desired if the range of 
periods for the calculation was the same. The consequences of changes to a previous trial 
could then be immediately displayed, without having to reenter the values from the previous 
trial. It was possible to quit from any stage of the trial. 
Figure 8 Range screen in the savings experiment 
period 789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
income 0 20 10 2 20 10 2 20 0 0 0 0 0 
convert tokens 074 10 14 17 15 35 0 0 0 0 0 
wealth 10.0 25.3 34.4 29.1 38.6 34.7 23.9 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Input the number of tokens you wish to convert in 
period 12 and press ENTER 
Press the spacebar to keep the same value from previous trials 
Press Q to quit 
The range of time periods you highlighted was 8 to 14 
You would have 46 points if the game ended in period 14 
(not including any points you had before this range starts) 
You would have 9.8 tokens remaining that you had not converted 
When the subjects had finished their trials, the information screen was displayed again and 
the subjects chose how much to of their current wealth (wealth from the previous period + 
income) to convert. If the subjects tried to convert more than their current wealth, the 
computer gave an error message and they had to input a permissible value. They next had 
the opportunity to change their decision. The program then had a screen to emphasise the 
uncertainty of continuing to another period. The phrase 'checking to see if the experiment 
continues' was printed and underneath this a rapidly changing number, finally showing a 
number less than the stopping probability. 
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If the experiment continued, the program then moved to the next period and the procedure 
was repeated. After the last period, a screen was displayed showing the amount of points 
that had been earned. The subject then performed the payoff mechanism. 
5.2.2 The Specification of the Savings Problem 
The savings experiment ran in discrete time. Subjects started off with zero wealth in the first 
period and received a randomly drawn income in tokens. They then decided how much of 
their income to convert 17 to points in the period, performing trial calculations if they wished. 
After they had input the number of tokens to be converted, the wealth at the beginning of 
the next period was calculated (the interest rate was 2% per period) and then the experiment 
proceeded to the next period. They were informed of their income in the new period and 
then the decision process was repeated until the end of the final period. Points from each 
period were added up at the end of the final period, for use in the payoff mechanism. This 
is different to Hey & Dardanoni (1988b), where subjects accumulated saved tokens, but only 
the tokens converted in the final period counted as points for the payoff. This meant that 
there was an increased incentive to spend all the available tokens compared to the current 
experiment where all conversion decisions contributed to the points total. Uncertainty was 
incorporated in two ways: the exact future income was not known and the subjects did not 
know how long the first stage of the experiment would last. They knew that their income 
would be one of three values and they knew the probability of each value occurring. 18 A 
discrete income distribution was used in contrast to the continuous distribution in Hey & 
Dardanoni. This was because subjects who were not familiar with statistical theory would 
not understand the properties of a continuous distribution and most subjects would not 
bother to discover the details of a continuous distribution. Hey & Dardanoni found that very 
few of their subjects looked at more than the mean and the range of the income distribution. 
17 The conversion function from tokens to points was a CARA function Points = A(1-e B'"') 
A= 30 for subjects 1-20; A= 15 for subjects 21-40. This was designed to give an expected payoff of 
approximately £15. B=0.03 for all subjects. This value was chosen to give a reasonably curved function 
and thus significantly decreasing returns to reduce the likelihood that subjects would adopt boundary 
solutions. 
19 The income distribution was: income 20 with probability 10%, income 10 with probability 
80%, income 2 with probability 10%. A low income of 0 would give a symmetric and therefore simpler 
distribution, but it was considered that there should be a non-zero value for the low income so that the 
subjects still had a decision to make about income as well as previously accumulated wealth. A non-zero 
value would also generate more information for the econometric analysis. 
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The subjects were also informed that there was a chance of the experiment ending of 10% 
at the end of each period. 
In fact, the number of periods and the income stream were read in from input files that had 
previously been generated at random. The range of lengths of life was restricted to between 
8 and 12 periods, so that all subjects had the chance to play a reasonable number of periods 
and generate a useful amount of data, but did not have to think for so long that their 
concentration waned19. The slowest subject took 1 1/2 hours to complete the experiment. 
The income streams were also restricted so that there were no streams with a long series of 
low income, as this would greatly reduce the possibilities for different strategies, given that 
the low income was only 2 and that subjects could not borrow. The subjects knew with 
certainty the rate of interest on wealth. 
A liquidity constraint was imposed - subjects could not borrow - to avoid the trivial solution 
that in the absence of a liquidity constraint the optimal strategy is to borrow an infinite 
amount, convert it all and die in debt. This would happen if borrowing were costless to the 
subjects. Within the experiment borrowing without any enforcement of repayment upon the 
savings problem ending would mean that people would be able to borrow without having 
to repay the loan. Enforcement of repayment at the completion of the savings problem 
would greatly complicate the problem and would require further controls. For example, 
subtracting borrowing from the points accumulated in the experiment would require a 
further control mechanism to ensure that people did not accidentally die in debt which they 
could not repay. Not allowing borrowing removed the need for these extra complications 
in what was already a complicated problem. 
5.2.3 The Payoff Mechanism 
Hey & Dardanoni (1988b) assumed that subjects had a CARA utility function and used two 
methods to find the parameter of a subject's utility function. However, neither method used 
was satisfactory. One relied on a question at the end of the experiment, before the payoff, 
19 Hence the actual probability of the savings problem finishing was 0% for periods 1-7,10% for 
periods 8-11 and 100% for period 12. However, some subjects may have guessed the true probability of 
the first stage finishing. See section 5.3 for further discussion. 
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in which the subjects valued a lottery between their winnings and another gamble between 
£(2*winnings-2) and £2 (see Hey & Dardanoni (1988b) for details). This could give rise to 
possible regret and framing effects, since subjects already knew their payoff and were then 
faced with the possibility of losing their gains. Subjects might think about their regret at 
losing their gains if they lost and their frame of reference at the end would include their gains 
in the experiment which might now be lost, as opposed to the beginning of the experiment 
when they had no gains and would increase their wealth with certainty. These effects might 
change the subjects' attitude to risk, compared with their preferences in the savings problem 
itself and the elicited attitude to risk would then be incorrect for the savings decisions. Also, 
for the subjects to behave consistently with their preferences they would have to understand 
the theory of optimisation. Most subjects would not have this understanding. The second 
was a questionnaire filled in at the end of the experiment which did not affect payment which 
included a question about risk attitude (see Hey & Dardanoni (1988b) for details). The 
problem with a questionnaire is that some people say what they think the experimenter 
wants to hear and subjects may modify their strategy to be consistent with what they say (if 
they know that there will be a questionnaire) or will modify what they say to be consistent 
with what they did. This ex-post justification of actions is a commonly observed 
psychological phenomenon. Of course, many economists would argue that some people will 
lie without a (financial) incentive to tell the truth. 
In order to avoid the need to measure utility functions so that people's optimal strategies 
can be calculated, the binary lottery mechanism was used to control the form of the utility 
function in this experiment. Subjects' incomes were denominated in tokens. It was necessary 
to have a utility function with decreasing returns to scale because a linear function means 
that the optimal strategy is to save everything or convert everything. To simulate risk averse 
consumption, tokens were converted into points according to a CARA function. Points 
were calculated in each period and at the end the points from all the periods were added up 
to make a total. Subjects then played a lottery, dependent in a linear way on their points 
total. They threw a dice and if the dice score was lower than their points total they won a 
large prize; if it was higher they won a small prize. Roth and Malouf (1979) shows that 
(assuming that subjects are von Neumann - Morgenstern utility maximisers over monetary 
payoffs) this procedure makes utility linear and monotonically increasing in points i. e. 
whatever their utility function, the subject should optimally try to get as many points as 
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possible. The idea that people will try and do as well as they can by trying to get as many 
points as possible is also realistic since it is a goal that people will understand. 
5.3 Problems with the Experimental Design 
In the first two groups of subjects, it was found that the trials facility was not used by the 
majority of the subjects; only 9 out of 20 subjects performed trials. Since the main aim of 
the experiment was to gather information about the subjects' trials strategies, it was 
necessary to ensure that all subjects performed a trial. This was achieved by modifying the 
software so that after their current financial situation was presented to the subjects, they 
were given the instruction 'press T to perform a trial' instead of being given a choice 
between performing a trial and choosing an amount to convert. Thus they had to enter the 
trial facility to proceed further in the experiment. Even though the subjects could still quit 
out of the trial without performing any calculations, all but one of the subsequent subjects 
did perform at least one trial, compared to less than half the subjects when the trial was 
obviously optional. 
Subjects were not told how long the experiment would take as this would give them 
information about how many periods there would be. However, imposing a restricted 
stopping probability with a limited number of periods caused problems, because the results 
indicated that people assumed that the experiment would last at least a few periods with 
probability 1 and would not go on for'too long' i. e. they actually guessed something close 
to the true stopping probability. Although they were told that the stopping probability was 
constant, they guessed correctly or assumed that the number of periods would fall within 
a limited range that they considered reasonable. Such a range would be of limited length and 
would have a minimum of at least a few periods before the savings problem finished, as it 
would not be useful to have an experiment about life-cycle saving behaviour just over one 
or two periods. This could have been reinforced by seeing other people play the game for 
some time and then leave, as the subjects started the experiment together in groups of 10 
subjects. If this is true, the optimal strategy is changed and the ex-ante optimal strategy for 
a constant stopping probability is no longer the best that subjects can do (on average). This 
effect could be reduced by starting subjects in small groups and having examples with only 
1 or 2 periods. This complicates the analysis of subjects' performance, because it is now 
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unclear what information they were using in the decision process. For this reason, subjects 
performance was assessed against the ex-ante optimal strategy (given the information in the 
instructions) and against the ex-post optimal strategy (assuming the subject knew the actual 
income stream and stopping period). 
The fact that subjects appeared to ignore what they were told about the stopping probability 
raises the question of how such information should be presented. The successful guessing 
of the stopping probability by the subjects can be regarded as a common framing effect, as 
in Schelling (1960). Both the experimenter and the subjects had the same opinion about 
what was a reasonable length for the experiment, independent of the theoretical distribution. 
People also find it difficult to accept the implication of a constant stopping probability; that 
in each period the expected number of periods still to be played is always the same. Their 
understanding of a discrete income distribution is better, possibly because there are only 
three distinct states of the world to consider. 
The parameters of the experiment (apart from the income levels) were chosen to provide 
realistic numbers so that people would find it easier to make 'realistic' decisions based on 
their experience of saving and consuming in: a 2% (real) rate of interest, a moderate chance 
of the savings problem ending each period and a CARA function with significant curvature 
for wealth levels of 30+. This resulted in the payoff function being quite flat and so there 
was no great penalty for being away from the optimal path. The strategy of spending all 
income as soon as it was received resulted in a points total virtually the same as the ex-ante 
optimal strategy and only 2% worse than the ex-post optimal strategy (see section 5.4.2.1 
for definitions of ex-ante and ex-post optimal strategies). Another problem is that people 
often think in nominal terms, so a rate of 2% would appear small. Trials would show wealth 
only increasing by very small numbers for typical values of wealth (a wealth of less than 20 
was assumed in the majority of cases, giving an increase of less than 1.0 token). Although 
this is a realistic interest rate, the numbers involved in real life decisions are usually of at 
least two orders of magnitude greater, making the return seem more significant. Also, an 
interest rate of 2% was small enough that a large proportion of subjects (10 out of 36) 
acted as if they set it equal to zero as an approximation and did not save at all. However, 
there was still a wide variation in subjects' performance (see fig. 9) and it is considered that 
even with a limited penalty for small deviations from the optimum, most people will want 
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to do as well as they can and are prepared to think hard about the problem 
It was found that with the first two groups, a large proportion of subjects seemed to 
accumulate a lot of points without thinking for a long time about the problem, thus giving 
them a good chance of winning the high prize - subsequent analysis showed that many 
subjects came close to or performed better than the ex-ante optimum - (see discussion in the 
results section), so for the second two groups, the CARA conversion function was halved. 
A calibration of the experiment was performed by using these parameters to calculate the 
ex-ante optimal strategy; it was found that the number of points gained using the optimal 
strategy for the initial parameters was 93, but this was only correctly calculated after the 
experiment had been completed. 
5.4 Results 
This section describes and analyses the results of the experiment. Section 5.4.1 looks at the 
trials results, identifying the different trials strategies used and considering the evidence for 
the presence of backward induction calculations and Pemberton type calculations. The 
patterns of conversion in the trials are also examined. Section 5.4.2 analyses the actual 
savings/conversion choices made, comparing subjects performance relative to the ex-ante 
and ex-post optimal strategies, describing the actual strategies employed and finally 
reporting the results of a panel regression analysis. 
5.4.1 Trials Strategies2° 
There are two sets of results from the experiment; the trials data and the actual 
conversion/savings choices. The trials data were analysed first, so that subjects could be 
grouped by the different trials strategies that they used. Given the large difference between 
trials carried out by subjects 1-20 (who had to choose to enter the trials facility) and those 
who were automatically put in the trials facility (subjects 21-40), it is necessary to 
distinguish between the two sets of trials results. It is also important to consider learning 
20 Tables of the ranges of trials performed are at appendix 4 and descriptions summarising the 
trials behaviour and actual savings decisions are at appendix 5. 
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effects in trials. The trials behaviour of most subjects had an element of getting a feel for 
the magnitudes involved, as well as seeing the effects of different strategies, so it is to be 
expected that there will often be more trials early on in the experiment. Trials performed 
by subjects 21-40 included a large number of one-period trials. These subjects had a 
different conversion function to subjects 1-20, but were accidentally given the conversion 
schedule for the original conversion function. This mistake was noticed quite quickly by a 
subject who was performing trials to check the graph and the rest of the subjects in that 
group and the last group of 10 subjects were informed of the error. Therefore, they did not 
have a graph or table of the correct conversion function and had to use the trial function to 
calculate the amount of points for a given amount of tokens converted. Hence these one 
period trials were not trials of a savings strategy since they involve no consideration of the 
future, but were mainly performed because the subject was already in the trials facility and 
wanted to know how many points they would get for a given amount converted. 
Consequently, these single period trials are discounted in the trials analysis. 
Of the 28 meaningful trials output files (other files had either all zeros or only one-period 
trials) 24 subjects started all their trials at the current (21 subjects) or the next period (1 
subjects) or used a combination of these (2 subjects) i. e. a large majority of subjects looked 
ahead from the present period continuously into the future and did not project themselves 
forward to making a decision at some future time. Subjects automatically put into the trial 
option had a mean range of trial periods 3.49 with standard deviation 2.30. Those subjects 
who were not automatically put in trial option (1-20) had a mean range 5.54 with standard 
deviation 2.72. The difference in means is to be expected, as people who deliberately choose 
to perform a trial are probably more forward looking than the average subject, while people 
who don't bother to perform any trials will be less forward looking but do not show up in 
the data. Thus the mean for subjects 1-20 is biased upwards relative to the mean for the 
whole of this sample. The most important implication of these statistics is that subjects 
looked forward over a limited length of time, compared to the expected length of 10 
periods. 
5.4.1.1 Taxonomy of Trials Strategies 
Perhaps the most effective trials strategy, given patience on the part of the subject, would 
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be to perform trials over a range of 15 to 20 periods, putting in the distribution of income 
i. e. including a few 2 and 20 incomes and trying a series of different savings patterns and 
choosing the pattern that gave the best expected payoff, allowing for the payoff for various 
finishing periods. No subjects did this. It is possible to identify 3 types of strategy with 
regard to the ranges of trials performed and the periods in which trials are performed; a 
learning strategy, a rolling strategy and a fixed end point strategy. See table 2 for the 
distribution of the various strategies. 
Table 2. Distribution of trials strategies in experiment at EXEC 
The distribution of trials strategies was as follows: 
Of subjects 1-20: 5 learning, 1 learning and rolling, 1 fixed endpoint, 2 of 1 trial carried out 
in first period 
Of subjects 21-40: 4 learning, 1 rolling, 10 learning and rolling, 1 fixed endpoint, 1 learning 
with fixed endpoint, 2 fixed endpoint and rolling 
Overall proportions: 39% rolling and learning, 32% learning, 7% fixed end point, 7% fixed 
end point and rolling, 3.5% rolling, 3.5% learning with a fixed end point, 7% other. 
The 'learning' trials strategy is a strategy in which several trials were performed in one or 
two consecutive periods. The subject was trying out different patterns of saving/conversion 
to get a feel for the numbers involved and to identify the results of various different 
strategies. Both static and dynamic aspects were considered; the tokens converted in a 
particular period were varied and patterns of conversion/saving over a number of periods 
were varied. Defining a learning trials strategy as a pattern of trials in which there were at 
least two trials performed in one of the first two periods of the experiment, 5 of subjects 1- 
20 and 4 of subjects 21-40 displayed learning trials strategies. The vast majority of these 
trials have ranges between 4 and 10 periods; with a mean range of 5.06 and standard 
deviation 3.07 periods for pure learning strategies. Two examples of this strategy are 
subjects 03 and 30. Subject 03 performed four trials in the first period, all looking forwards 
as far as period 8 and no trials subsequently. Subject 30 performed 11 trials in the first 
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period, 4 looking as far forwards as period 6 and 7 looking as far as period 10, also with no 
trials subsequently. 
This learning behaviour usually took place in periods 1 and 2 of the experiment, with a few 
subjects learning in period 3 as well. Thereafter there were very few trials; the subject had 
decided on their strategy. It should be noted that these subjects, who took a definitive look 
forward at the beginning of the experiment, did not look that far ahead (5.06 periods on 
average), given that the expected length of the experiment at each period is 10 periods. 
In contrast to the first strategy, some subjects employed a'rolling' or continuous replanning 
strategy. They performed trials all the way through the experiment, usually with a relatively 
small number of trials in any one period, looking only a few periods ahead. The pattern of 
trials might be intermittent or continuous; e. g. subject 23 used a combination of rolling and 
learning, with trials in periods 1,2,4,6,9,10,12 and subject 34 performed three trials in 
every period. There was a mean range of 2.79 and standard deviation of 1.36 periods for 
the pure rolling strategy. Only subject 35 used a pure rolling strategy but among subjects 
21-40 a combination of a rolling strategy with learning was the most common strategy, 
being used by 10 of these subjects. Subject 4 also used this combination of strategies and 
subjects 21 and 36 used a combination of a fixed end point for part of the experiment with 
a rolling strategy. 
Why might people use such a strategy? The advantage of this strategy is that it dramatically 
simplifies the problem. The number of periods to be considered at any one time is greatly 
reduced, while allowing for an indefinite number of periods. If only a few periods ahead are 
considered, it is a reasonable approximation to assume that the experiment will not end over 
the periods being considered (given the stopping probability of 0.1) and hence it is possible 
to remove one source of uncertainty. The implications of this type of strategy are considered 
in chapter 3 and its performance compared to the optimum explored in the simulation of 
chapter 5, where it can be seen that this strategy does not involve a great penalty compared 
to the ex-ante optimal strategy. 
It could be argued that the common use of the rolling strategy was an artefact of the 
experimental arrangement. This argument is supported by the behaviour of the first 20 
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subjects, who mostly only performed a few trials at the beginning, as they had to choose to 
perform a trial. Subjects 21-40 were automatically put into the trial option and had to take 
a positive decision to quit out of the trial to avoid performing any trials. Therefore, the 
'default' action would be to perform a trial and then proceed to choose the amount to be 
converted. This would appear to be a rolling strategy as subjects would perform a single trial 
in each period. This is only true for subject 35, however. All other subjects that exhibited 
the characteristics of a rolling strategy performed more than one trial in a single period, or 
showed a fixed end point strategy as well. The implication of the common use of these 
combinations of strategies is that even if people were performing trials because this was the 
most obvious thing to do, they were taking these trials seriously, thinking about how they 
performed the trials and what range of periods they should consider. They were not simply 
performing a single trial, just because they were automatically put into the trial screens and 
had to get through the trial option in the course of going on to make their conversion 
choices. 
Some subjects employed a 'fixed end point' strategy, where the subject chose a single period 
in the future as the end point for a series of trials that they performed over several periods. 
This would be one way of enabling a limited backward induction calculation to be performed 
(since only one endpoint is ever used a single length of the experiment is being assumed), 
as the endpoint of the experiment is assumed fixed for the purposes of the trials. Subjects 
12 and 29 that had such a strategy chose the end periods 5&6 respectively. Subjects 21 
and 36, who combined a fixed end point early in the experiment with a rolling strategy later 
on, had period 4 as the end point and subject 28 combined a fixed endpoint with a learning 
strategy with an end point at period 10. However, the use of this type of strategy was 
relatively uncommon; it was used only by 5 of the 28 subjects for which there is trials data. 
Many subjects (half of those who performed meaningful trials) combined two of the above 
strategies. By far the most common combination and the most common strategy overall was 
combined rolling and learning, used by 11 subjects. These trials had a mean range of 3.31 
periods with a standard deviation of 1.52. This would enable subjects to perform simple 
trials, while trying out the implications of the latest situation. It is possible that the 
combination of a rolling strategy combined with a fixed end point strategy would reflect 
someone who performed a series of trials early on over a limited time span and then realised 
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that the experiment would last longer than they had assumed. 
5.4.1.2 Backward Induction and the Pemberton Strategy 
The patterns of conversion in the trials can be examined for evidence of backward induction 
as a method of solving the savings problem. There are only three subjects who performed 
fixed end point trials without combining this with a rolling strategy. Of these, subject 12 
performed trials in which all income was spent in all periods, subjects 28 performed trials 
in which all income was spent in most periods and subject 29 performed trials over three 
periods, of which the last trial over 2 periods converted all income in both periods. The large 
number of periods in which all income was spent indicates that these subjects were not 
following an optimal strategy for a fixed end point. Another possible strategy is that of 
Pemberton (1993). This would be characterised by a conversion strategy in which there was 
a constant conversion in all future periods being considered in the trial. There were no trials 
for which this was true, except for trials in which all income was converted which would not 
be true for a Pemberton-type strategy with a non-zero interest rate and a stopping 
probability of 0.1. 
Hence it can be seen that there were no subjects that used the backward induction method 
of calculation or the Pemberton calculation to solve the savings problem. 
5.4.1.3 Conversion Patterns in the Trials 
When analysing the patterns of conversion tried in the trials, it is important to remember that 
many trials had at least an element of learning in them. Consequently, there is a lot of noise 
in these data; there will be many trials performed which do not reflect the subject's final 
decision and the way in which they reach that decision will be both obscure and variable 
between subjects given the limited nature of the data available about subjects' trials 
processes. However, the trials can shed light on the range of conversion patterns that were 
considered and the relationship between trials and actual strategies. 16 of the 28 subjects 
performed trials in which at least one was obviously similar to their actual conversion for 
that period. 
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Many subjects simplified the problem. Besides restricting the range of periods considered, 
11 subjects assumed for most or all of their trials that the income would be constant at 10. 
11 subjects21 tried a strategy of converting 0 for several periods than converting all or most 
of y+w, possibly because this strategy was illustrated in one of the examples. Subjects 21, 
31 and 32 actually demonstrated this pattern over 3 or 4 periods during the experiment, but 
of these three subjects only subjects 31 had performed such a trial; subjects 21 and 32 were 
probably thinking in a different way. Trials by most of the subjects included a pattern of 
building up a stock of wealth over a number of periods and then reducing the wealth stock 
to 0 in the last period of the trial. The need to define an end point changes the structure of 
the problem, giving rise to this end point effect. However, it is possible that subjects used 
the trials to work out a strategy and then used the first period of their trials as their actual 
conversion. For people who were performing trials throughout the experiment, this implies 
constant replanning which would be consistent with the rolling strategy discussed above. 
5.4.2 Analysis of Savings and Conversion Choices 
5.4.2.1 Performance relative to Optimal Strategies 
There are two approaches to the calculation of the optimal strategy: the first is the ex-ante 
approach, where the optimum conversion for a given level of current wealth (wealth at 
beginning of period + income) maximises the expected value function, given the CARA 
conversion function, the stopping probability, the interest rate and the income distribution. 
The ex-post optimum is the optimal conversion strategy knowing the actual income path 
(and hence the length of the experiment). A graph of subjects' performance is shown at fig. 9. 
It can be seen that some subjects performed better than the ex-ante optimum, although it 
should be remembered that the ex-ante optimum is only the best strategy on average. In 
fact, subjects did very nearly as well as the ex-ante optimum overall. The low interest rate 
of 2% per period in combination with the other parameters leads to a very flat distribution 22, 
but given the wide variety of conversion strategies used, this is not a sufficient explanation. 
Another part of the explanation for this surprisingly good performance can be found by 
21 subjects 3,18,23,24,27,30,31,34,36,38,40 
22 See ch. 7 for an analysis of the performance of different savings strategies given the income 
streams used in this experiment. 
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considering the fact that subjects were not told the true stopping probability (i. e. 0 up to 
period 8,0.1 period 8-12,1 period 13). It is possible that the subjects subconsciously 
assumed that the experiment would continue for several periods with certainty but would 
not last too long i. e. that it would stop with certainty after 10-15 periods. This view is 
supported by the trials data, where trials had a mean range of 5.54 for subjects 1-20 and 
3.49 for subjects 21-40. Thus the subjects were actually assuming a distribution quite close 
to the actual distribution, rather than the constant stopping probability that was part of the 
instructions. Given this assumption, it is then possible to outperform the ex-ante optimum 
which is based on an inaccurate stopping distribution. If the true distribution is guessed, 
savings can be greater than the ex-ante optimum in periods 1-7 (if income is such as to 
generate a high enough wealth for the optimal strategy to contain some saving), as it is 
believed that the experiment will not finish and wealth can be run down gradually over 
periods 8-12 to 0 at the end of period 12 since it is believed that the experiment will finish 
at the end of period 12. Thus less wealth will be left when the experiment finishes on 
average than with the ex-ante optimal strategy and interest from saving in the earlier periods 
will be higher. 
5.4.2.2 Conversion Strategies 
There was a wide variation in the actual savings patterns employed, from spending all 
income (10 subjects) to saving a large proportion of income and building up a large stock 
of wealth (e. g. subject 40 built up a stock of 35 by the end of the experiment; this was 
possibly someone who felt that having a stock of savings was good in itself and thought that 
the chance of stopping was small or failed to realise that having a large stock of wealth when 
the experiment finished was wasteful. There were also conversion patterns in which wealth 
cycles. Overall, it can be said that the amount of saving was much higher than the optimal 
strategy, given the interest rate of only 2% and the liquidity constraint. The optimal pattern 
(see fig. 17 for a plot of optimal consumption for a given level of accumulated wealth + 
income for similar parameter values) would be to convert most or all of the income in most 
circumstances faced by the subjects since an income of 2 or 10 is not big enough to build 
up a large stock of wealth that is worth keeping. One general conclusion is that it is not 
helpful to try and approximate people's decision rules by one single rule because the wide 
variation in behaviour would mean that any single rule would be very inaccurate. It is more 
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sensible to try and define a few different rules, which will improve the accuracy of 
predictions of behaviour while also greatly reducing the different strategies that have to be 
allowed for when analysing peoples' behaviour. 
5.4.2.3 Quantitative Analysis 
The object of the quantitative analysis is to identify which conversion rules subjects actually 
used. It takes the form of a panel regression using LIMDEP. Firstly, however, there is one 
strategy which can easily be identified by inspection of the data: where the subject spends 
all income as soon as it is received. This strategy was used by 10 of the 36 subjects for 
which there is savings data. These subjects were not included in the analysis. The 
methodology used for this analysis was the general to specific method. All possible relevant 
variables were initially included, using plots of the data to look for breaks or other general 
patterns in the data to suggest relevant functional forms etc. Then insignificant variables 
were successively eliminated until the significant variables could be identified and the 
reduced number of variables gave stronger tests. This methodology has the advantage that 
it does not leave out variables that may be significant, thus reducing the possibility of 
misspecification and biased estimators. 
The analysis checked for the possibility that subjects followed something close to the 
optimal ex-ante strategy. The optimal ex-ante strategy for similar parameter values is plotted 
in fig. 17. Given that the rate of saving increases with wealth, the shape of the curve can be 
reasonably approximated by a log function so the log combined income and wealth should 
be considered. This is only approximate, as the optimal strategy is c=w+y for w+y up to 18. 
It is also possible that conversion is a linear function of wealth and income. Another 
possibility is that people build up a stock of wealth, implying that the rate of conversion 
increases once a certain level of wealth (considered adequate) has been reached. This can 
be captured by a wealth slope dummy (which would also allow for the change in the slope 
of the optimal consumption at y+w=18) but since people started out with zero wealth, there 
may also be a correlation of saving with time, particularly in the first few periods of the 
experiment. This implies that time may be a significant determinant of conversion and that 
23 4 results files were accidentally lost 
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there should be a time dummy. However, scattergrams of consumption against wealth, 
income + wealth and consumption against did not show any significant breaks in the data, 
so these dummies are not included in the regression (to reduce the number of variables, 
hence increasing the power of the tests). Lagged consumption should also be included, 
which would indicate habitual behaviour. Dummies for the different trials strategies can be 
tried and as a check, a dummy for subjects 1-20. These are alternatives to individual subject 
dummies. It is also possible that responses to a large income or wealth could be delayed, so 
lagged wealth and income should also be included. 
Alternatively, there could be a rule of thumb based on income so that an income dummy 
might be incorporated (e. g. if y=2 spend all income and if y=20 save a large proportion of 
income) However, since a scattergram of conversion against income shows considerable 
variation in conversion for each of the three incomes, an income dummy would not appear 
to yield useful information. 
The regression could be run with wealth as the dependent variable. This would be useful 
assuming that subjects calculate the wealth that they want, given their current situation. they 
would then be thinking in terms of 'what wealth stock do I want? ' rather than 'how much of 
my resources do I want to convert?. However, this calculated wealth has a direct negative 
relationship with consumption, so subjects probably switch between the two and think of 
both variables simultaneously. The idea of subjects choosing consumption is a more direct 
approach to the causal relationships (and is easier to present in a meaningful way). 
So, the initial regression is: 
ct = Kc, _1 + 
K21t + K31y + K41wt +K Iln(Y, +w, +l) + K61y. 1 + Knw,, + 
subject dummies + e, 
where et is the usual (normal i. i. d) error term and there is a dummy for each subject 
provided automatically in LIMDEP. 
yy+wc+1 was used instead of w, to ensure that the log function started at 0 for y+w=0. 
This was compared with: 
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c, = K12ct-1 + K22t + K32yy + K42wt + KSZIn(y, +w, +l) + K62Yt-, + Knwt-I 
+ K82dumr + K92dum20+ c 
dumr is a dummy indicating the use of a rolling strategy in trials and dum20 is a dummy for 
the first 20 subjects. A much greater part of the variation can be explained by including 
individual dummies for each subject, but this is not very informative: it only shows that each 
individual subject had a different strategy (remembering that people who converted all 
income are excluded). However, excluding these dummies that are significant could 
introduce misspecification. An F-test of the set of restrictions of the final regression 
compared to the same regression with individual subject dummies was significant at the I% 
level, showing that it is necessary to include the subject dummies. 
It was found that K11, the coefficient of ct_1 and K51 , the coefficient of ln(y, +w, +1) were 
insignificant. Dropping these, lny, is still insignificant. 
Thus the final regression was: 
ct = 0.249t + 0.755yt + 0.393wt + 
R2 (2.55) (10.39) (7.40) 
prob. that 
coefficient =01.1 %ý0ý0 
0.200yß_1 - 0.0566w, _t 
+ subject dummies + Et 
(2.68) (-1.066) 
0.7% 28.7% 
The coefficients of yy and w, are different, showing that subjects do not base their decisions 
simply on their total current available resources even though the information screen told the 
subjects that they could convert up to the total wealth y+w. This is in accordance with 
results from previous empirical studies showing that consumption is more responsive to 
income innovations than to permanent income (see e. g. Deaton (1992), Bosworth, Burtless 
& Sabelhaus (1991) p226). Overall, a high proportion of income is converted, as would be 
expected with a rate of interest of 2%. The lower coefficient for wealth compared with 
income indicates that in general a stock of wealth is being maintained, although the 
coefficient is still positive as a higher level of wealth increases the feasible set of 
savings/conversion pairs. Remember, however, that this excludes the 10 subjects who did 
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not save at all. The coefficient of wt_1 is so small as to be indistinguishable from 0, but that 
of yt_1 is significant. This can be seen in the savings choices, where the response to a high 
income of 20 is often to increase conversion over 2 periods, the increase in the next period 
giving rise to a lagged effect of the high income. Conversion also increases as time elapses 
in the experiment. In the first few periods there is an increase in wealth as the initial wealth 
is 0 and most people save in order to build up a wealth stock which restricts conversion in 
these periods. In fact, some subjects increase their wealth stock throughout the experiment, 
steadily increasing the feasible set of savings and conversion. This could also account for 
the dependence on t, but it should be noted that if this were the only reason, there would be 
multicollinearity between t and w. This is not evident; both variables are significant. There 
is some evidence of end effects. The pattern of reducing wealth to 0 in the final period was 
very common in the trials that were performed and some subjects also reduced wealth at 
the end of the experiment. Subjects 02,03,16,21,23,31,32 all reduced their wealth 
markedly and maintained the lower level for between 1 and 3 periods to the end of the 
experiment. This implies an increased rate of conversion in the last few periods which will 
also lead to a positive dependence on t. 
Two rules seem to be common: 
1. Saving is considered to be good, whatever the rates of interest and the effective rate of 
discount. 
2. Smoothing income is considered to be good: the small income of 2 is not important, but 
an income of 20 makes a significant difference and the increased wealth is often converted 
over two periods e. g. subjects 06 and 11 who both converted all income otherwise, spread 
the extra conversion from an income of 20 over the current period and the next. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The subjects performed trials that could be categorised into three types: a learning strategy 
where there were several trials to find out about the relative performance of different 
strategies, a rolling strategy where there were a few trials in each period of the experiment 
looking between 2 and 4 periods ahead and a fixed end point strategy where a single end 
point was used for trials in several consecutive periods of the experiment. 
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Analysis of the trials strategies shows that there were no trials conducted which were 
consistent with the use of backward induction or the simplified strategy proposed by 
Pemberton (1993). 
There was a wide variation in subjects' performance compared to the optimal strategy, with 
some subjects performing better than the theoretical optimum ex-ante strategy on average. 
This can be explained by the fact that the subjects guessed or assumed that the stopping 
probability was not constant and made assumptions that were closer to the actual probability 
(the experiment lasted between 8 and 12 periods) than a constant 10% chance of finishing. 
Regression analysis of the actual conversion strategies shows that there is a strong 
dependence of conversion on wealth and income, but the coefficients are significantly 
different implying that subjects do not simply add up their wealth and income to determine 
their current resources. The coefficient for income is significantly higher than that of wealth, 
suggesting that subjects condition their conversion fairly strongly on the income they 
receive. This finding agrees with the econometric evidence that consumption is more 
sensitive to current income than to wealth. 
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6 The Savings Experiment in Holland 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes a savings experiment carried out in September 1995 at CentER, 
University of Tilburg, Holland. The experiment in Holland was a development with minor 
changes of the savings experiment at the University of York. The same experimental 
program was used with subjects having to use the trial facility, but there were several 
different treatments, enabling different aspects of the savings decision to be emphasised and 
some comparative statics analysis to be undertaken. The method of analysis was also 
similar, being divided again into the (qualitative) analysis of the decision processes used by 
the subjects and the (quantitative) econometric analysis of the savings decisions. In 
addition, scatter plots of average values against time provided some useful insights. Section 
2 describes the experiment, section 3 contains the analysis of the trials data, section 4 the 
analysis of the savings and consumption data and section 5 draws conclusions and 
compares the results of the analyses to the experiment in York. 
6.2 Experimental method 
6.2.1 Organisation and changes from the experiment at EXEC 
The experiment was undertaken at the University of Tilburg. While the structure of the 
experiment was the same as the experiment at EXEC (c. f. section 5.2 for a description of 
the experiment), some minor changes were made to the running and design of the 
experiment. There were several organisational issues to be addressed. Firstly, the subjects 
would be Dutch and the interfaces were in English. It was decided not to translate the 
instructions and presentation into Dutch, because this would have required rather more 
time and the experimenter did not speak Dutch. Also, Dutch students and academics speak 
excellent English. However, this did mean that the subjects would be receiving instructions 
in a foreign language. Hence it was important to make the explanation of the experiment as 
clear as possible. It was therefore decided to present the instructions in the form of a video, 
as well as retaining the 2 practice periods. 
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A further organisational change was that the subjects were divided into groups of around 
five. If subjects are members of a large group they can easily get information about other 
participants' problems, in particular how long they can expect the savings game to last. To 
avoid this problem, Hey & Dardanoni (1988a, 1988b) had individual starting times for each 
subject. However since each subject had to watch a video for 15 minutes this was not 
practical for a large number of subjects. Another complication was that Tilburg does not 
have a dedicated laboratory; it was necessary to use the terminal rooms of the computer 
department. This meant that it was not possible to run the experiment continuously. The 
time was limited to 3-5 hours per day and each subject required at least 1 hour to complete 
the experiment, so it was necessary to process subjects in groups to reduce the time 
required to perform the experiment. Since the computing centre's computer network was 
used, detailed knowledge of the operation of the network was not available. Therefore, it 
was necessary to treat each terminal as an individual PC, which required that the program 
had to be individually loaded and the results files individually stored onto floppy discs. Just 
before the experiment started, it was decided that it would be useful to store the results of 
the trials in the practice sessions, which meant that each practice results file had to 
individually saved onto floppy disc, as well as the main session. Thus for each group of 
subjects, the experimenter had to start and stop the video, start the practice run, start the 
main run, play the lottery with each subject when they had finished and answer any 
questions. Given a group size of 5, a group each half hour was the highest frequency that 
the experimenter could deal with. 
The experiment was run over 6 days and there were 124 participants. Subjects were 
recruited mainly from the student population, both from economics courses and by talking 
to students in the cafeteria at lunchtime. Some of the administrative and academic staff of 
CentER also took part. 
6.2.2 Treatments 
At CentER, the experiment was run with many more subjects than at EXEC (124 vs. 40). 
This enabled some of the parameters of the problem to be varied and some different 
situations to be examined. In order to effectively perform an econometric analysis, it was 
judged necessary to have groups of about 20 subjects for each parameter variation or 
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treatment. This number allowed for a wide variation in the income streams and length of 
the savings problem, while still providing enough data points for the econometric tests to 
have reasonable power. The actual number in each group was determined by the number of 
subjects in the different sessions, as the subjects in a group had to be given the same 
instructions. Since there was a wide variation in the different treatments, a control 
treatment was used as a baseline for comparison. This control had more subjects and a 
wider range of income streams to improve the chance of the control group being 
representative. On the advice of CREED, Amsterdam, the payments were calculated so 
that the subjects received 20 DFL per hour (their normal expected rate of pay for students 
performing experiments). The high prize was fixed at 25 DFL and the low prize at 4 DFL 
( the same numbers as at EXEC). However, a subject in the first group pointed out that 4 
DFL for an hour's thinking was very mean, so after the first 10 subjects the low prize was 
increased to 10 DFL. This maintained a significant differential between the high and the low 
prizes, so that the incentive mechanism still functioned correctly i. e. there was a perceived 
advantage in getting as many points as possible to maximise the chance of getting the high 
prize. Since the incentive mechanism was designed to induce risk neutral behaviour, the 
change in payments would not change the optimal behaviour and would probably not affect 
the actual behaviour. The treatments were as follows: 
Treatment 1. 
The control treatment. There were 34 subjects with a random income stream (10% chance 
of an income of 2,80% chance of an income of 10,10% chance of an income of 20) and 
the number of periods was taken at random from a distribution between 3 and 25 periods 
with a 10% stopping probability each period. The interest rate was 10% per period. 
For the rest of the treatments, the range of the number of periods was restricted to 5 to 15, 
to ensure that each subject generated a reasonable amount of data, but did not take too 
long to complete the experiment (which would have led to organisational problems, given 
the limited availability of the computer rooms). Also, income streams with more than 50% 
low income were not used, to ensure that all subjects had sufficient income to have to make 
significant savings/consumption choices. 
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Treatment 2. 
The `Backward Induction' treatment. This treatment had 1724 subjects, who knew that the 
experiment would last for 15 periods for sure. The aim of this treatment was to investigate 
whether subjects would perform trials over the 15 periods and thus perform something 
similar to a backward induction calculation. 
Treatment 3. 
The `Pension' treatment. This treatment had 18 subjects, who knew that from period 10 
onwards, their income would be 2 for sure. The length of the experiment was still randomly 
varied between 5 and 15 periods. The idea behind this treatment was to see if the 
knowledge that they would face a low income stream in the future would affect savings 
behaviour. 
The rest of the treatments were variations for the purpose of comparative statics analysis. 
Treatment 4. 
Subjects were endowed with an initial wealth of 10. There were 19 subjects in this 
treatment. 
Treatment 5. 
Subjects were endowed with an initial wealth of 20. There were 18 subjects in this 
treatment. 
Treatment 6. 
24 The numbers in the groups varied because the individual sessions were not all fully booked and it was 
not practicable to have different subjects doing different treatments in the same session, because of the changes 
in the instructions. 
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The interest rate was increased to 20% per period. There were 18 subjects in this 
treatment. 
6.3 Qualitative Analysis of the Trials Data 
The objective of the qualitative analysis was to examine the trials that subjects performed 
and to draw conclusions about some basic characteristics of the cognitive processes being 
employed, in particular with regards to the timing in the decision process. The method of 
analysis used the results of the EXEC experiment; various possible strategies were defined, 
based on the strategies identified by inspection of the trials data in the EXEC experiment. 
Due to the greater number of subjects, it was not practicable to manually examine each 
subjects' trials. The incidence of these strategies was determined by a computerised search 
of the data and descriptive statistics calculated for the number of periods over which trials 
were performed (the `range' of a trial). The trials performed are summarised in table 3. 
As in the EXEC experiment, trials which only last for a single period are ignored. In the 
EXEC experiment, the reason for this was that the graph of points gained against tokens 
converted was wrong, so the subjects had to use the trial facility to find the true 
relationship. However, even in the experiment in Holland, some subjects performed series 
of trials that only lasted for a single period. These trials do not reflect the intertemporal 
nature of the decision being taken i. e. the subjects would not get a useful solution from 
such trials. Since virtually all subjects understood that there was a high probability of the 
experiment lasting for more than one period, they were probably doing something other 
than trying out a strategy. The obvious explanation is that they were finding out the 
numbers generated by the program or familiarising themselves with the program. If this is 
the case, the inclusion of these one-period trials in the analysis would bias the results for 
the trial ranges downwards. Since the object of the experiment is to show that people 
perform calculations over a shorter range of time periods than is commonly assumed, it is 
better to be conservative in the analysis and remove the possible downward bias; the results 
are then robust to this possibility. 
The trials data from all groups was amalgamated, as all groups apart from the backward 
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induction group faced an uncertain length of experiment. The results for the `backward 
induction' treatment are analysed independently, as well as being included in the analysis of 
all subjects because the introduction of a known end point gives an obvious target for the 
range of the trials and so the incentives to perform trials are different to the other groups. 
6.3.1 Numbers of trials performed 
As discussed in section 6.2.3, many subjects had difficulty in distinguishing between the 
practice run and the run for real. Hence many subjects performed trials in the practice 
periods in which they developed a strategy (i. e. performed the learning function). Some 
subjects did this deliberately; the trial facility was the same in both the practice run and the 
run for real for all groups apart from group 6 which had a higher rate of interest (the trial 
facility allowed the initial wealth to be adjusted, except in period 1, which made trials for 
the groups with an initial endowment more difficult: they had to choose a later start 
period). This means that there was a large proportion of trials performed in the practice 
period and it is therefore informative to look at the ranges and number of trials performed 
in the practice periods. This can be seen in table 3. There were 559 trials in the practice 
periods and 1066 trials in the run for real. Also, the average number of trials per subject 
was 3.07 in the first period of the practice run, compared to 2.30 in the first period of the 
run for real. Given that a large proportion of subjects performed trials all the way through 
the experiment, this demonstrates that some subjects performed most or all of their trials 
during the practice run. 
A plot of the average number of trials performed per subject in each period and the number 
of subjects in each period is shown at figure 10 (note that after period 15, only a few 
members of the control group were still in the experiment, so these values cannot really be 
regarded as an average over the whole population of subjects). There is a strong downward 
trend, both in the practice run and the run for real, suggesting that there is a strong element 
of learning about the experiment and possible strategies. As subjects became more used to 
the experiment or developed their strategies, they often stopped performing trials. 
However, there was a large proportion of subjects who performed trials all the way 
through the experiment in connection with a rolling trials strategy, discussed in section 
6.3.2 below. 
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Figure 10 Average trials/subject in expt. at CentER 
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6.3.2 Trials strategies 
6.3.2.1 Definitions of strategies 
Since it was not practicable to look through all the results for such a large number of trials 
and subjects, it was necessary to precisely define each trials strategy and automatically 
check the output files for these strategies. This implies that certain possible patterns of 
trials behaviour must be assumed. These patterns were taken from the results of the EXEC 
experiment, in which every trial output file was inspected in order to see patterns of trials. 
The three trials strategies that were identified in the EXEC experiment were: 
i) a learning strategy in which several trials were performed in one or two periods, 
ii) a rolling strategy where there were trials all the way through the experiment, usually 
with a relatively small number of trials in any one period looking only a few periods ahead 
and 
iii) a fixed end point strategy where the subject chose a single period in the future as the 
end point for a series of trials that they performed over several periods. 
The adaptations of these definitions for the automated search were deliberately made quite 
broad, to allow for the fact that there was a very large individual variation of patterns in the 
trials performed within the above classifications. However these adapted definitions 
maintain the essential features of the three strategies with regard to the pattern of trials 
through the `lifetime' of the experiment. The broadness of the definitions is due to the 
requirements for numbers and lengths of trials. From the results of the EXEC experiment, 
it can be observed that within a particular pattern of trials over time, there may be a wide 
variation in the number and length of trials in any one period. In many cases, trials of 
different lengths were performed in the same period as part of a single trials strategy and 
the number of trials performed varied from period to period. Thus it was not possible to 
develop a clear definition of the number and length of trials associated with a particular 
strategy. Instead, a low requirement for numbers of trials was set and statistics calculated 
for the lengths of trials associated with each strategy. The three strategies were defined as 
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follows: 
i) Learning strategy 
The subject performed more than 1 trial in period 1 and/or period 2. 
This definition reflects the fact that most subjects who wanted to learn about the results of 
different savings patterns would do their learning at the beginning of the experiment; there 
is no point in learning when the decisions have already been taken! 
ii) Rolling strategy 
The subject performed at least one trial in at least every other period all the way through 
the experiment i. e. if trials were not performed in 2 consecutive periods, then there was no 
rolling strategy. 
Although this definition is very loose with respect to the range of trials performed, there is 
a requirement that the subject perform trials all the way through the experiment. In the 
sense of the timing of trials through the experiment, the definition is rigorous. 
iii) Fixed end strategy 
At some point in the experiment, the subject performed trials in three consecutive periods, 
all with the same end point. 
Some subjects concentrated trials in the practice rounds. It is not possible to identify 
through-life trials strategies in the practice run, as there were only 2 rounds. The effect on 
trials in the run for real is to reduce the number of trials in the run for real and hence the 
number of subjects who employed identifiable strategies. This effect cannot be quantified, 
but it means that the strategy count in the run for real is an underestimate of the frequency 
with which people use the strategies. However, many of the trials in the practice run will 
have served the function of giving the subjects a feel for the numbers involved, which was 
indeed part of the purpose of including a practice run. This means that the learning 
behaviour in the run for real may be underestimated, but the underestimate for the other 
strategies will be less significant. It should also be pointed out that the presence of learning 
does not tell us very much about the savings decision process. It is mainly a function of the 
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inexperience of the subjects in the experiment. 
Learning was very common: 63% of all subjects who performed 96% of all trials had 
identifiable strategies with some element of learning. Rolling was also very common: 51 % 
of subjects who performed 88% of all trials had identifiable strategies with some element of 
rolling. By far the most common strategy was a combination of learning and rolling: 40% 
of all subjects used this combination of trials strategies and performed 72% of all trials. 
This strategy was also the most common strategy in the backward induction group. The 
only other trials strategy that was at all frequent was a simple learning strategy, used by 
19% of all subjects to perform 16% of all trials. 
Trials with a fixed end point were only frequent in the backward induction group and even 
then more subjects performed trials without a fixed end strategy than with. Of the (107) 
subjects apart from the backward induction group, only 4 were identified as employing a 
fixed end strategy. This is not surprising, as when facing an uncertain length of life, the only 
anchor point is the expectation of 10 periods. Given the average range of 4.1 periods, 10 
is too far ahead for almost everybody. Thus the choice of a fixed end point will appear 
almost random. People who perform trials were thinking logically in that they were using 
the facilities of the program to help them achieve the goal of getting as high a number of 
points as reasonably possible and therefore a random trials strategy would be inconsistent 
with their decision process. 
Much more common was a spread of ranges for a subject, some short trials and some long. 
In combination with the low average range, this suggests that there is considerable 
cognitive cost in performing long trials. 
6.3.3 Ranges of trials (see table 3) 
In the practice runs, over all groups there were 559 trials with an average range of 4.38 
periods. The backward induction group performed 95 trials with an average range of 5.19 
periods, so the groups other than the backward induction group performed 464 trials with 
an average range of 3.85 periods. 
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In the runs for real, over all groups there were 1066 trials with an average range of 4.10 
periods. The backward induction group performed 270 trials with an average range of 5.84 
Table 3 Trials statistics 
Trials no. of subjects average standard no. of 
using this range deviation trials" 
strategy of trials performed 
All Subjects: practice runs 
all trials 4.38 3.64 559 
All Subjects: runs for real 
all trials 4.10 3.74 1066 
learning 23 3.88 4.07 169 
rolling 7 4.63 3.30 59 
fixed end 0 
learning+rolling 50 3.96 3.66 772 
learning+fixed end 5 6.13 4.75 83 
rolling+fixed end 6 6.67 6.67 107 
Subjects with known length of experiment (backward induction trial): practice runs 
all trials 5.19 5.25 95 
Subjects with known length of experiment (backward induction trial): runs for real 
all trials 5.84 4.55 270 
learning 1 11.00 3.68 13 
rolling 1 2.50 1.05 14 
fixed end 0 
learning+rolling 7 5.68 4.65 191 
learning+fixed end 3 7.14 5.05 59 
rolling+fixed end 4 7.64 6.84 87 
25 The number of trials is the sum over all subjects of the number of trials made by each 
subject for each category of strategy. 
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periods, so the groups other than the backward induction group performed 796 trials with 
an average range of 3.51 periods. 
The trials performed during the practice run and the run for real had similar ranges (4.38 
periods for practice trials, 4.10 periods in trials during the run for real). The decrease in the 
average range between the practice run and the run for real may be due to the cognitive 
costs of performing long trials. Another possibility is that the subjects were bored, but there 
was no sign of this among the subjects; just some signs of impatience for a few of the 
subjects who had large numbers of periods. The 10% chance of ending gives an expectation 
of 10 for the number of periods (apart from the backward induction group). Thus the trials 
performed during both the practice and the run for real are short compared to the expected 
length of the experiment: overall, the 1066 trials had an average range of 4.10 periods, of 
which the backward induction group performed 270 trials with an average range of 5.84 
periods. (Thus the backward induction group exercises a disproportionate influence on the 
overall figures: their 25% of trials is rather more than the proportion 17/124 =14% of 
subjects in this group). 
On average, the trials performed by the backward induction group were longer and the 
trials with a fixed end point in the backward induction group were significantly longer. 
However, only 7 subjects (4,5,7,8,11,13,14) of 17 in the backward induction group 
performed trials with a fixed end point at 15 in the practice session; a further 4 subjects 
performed trials either finishing at period 15 or with a range of 15 periods. 
The backward induction group performed proportionally more trials in the run for real and 
longer trials in both the practice periods and the run for real. Even then, the overall average 
range for all groups is only 4.10 periods in the run for real and 4.38 in the practice rounds. 
The overall result is that when subjects knew the length of life, 65% of subjects performed 
at least some trials over the whole length of life. For all subjects, trials only looked a 
relatively short period into the future. Thus the assumption about how far people look 
forward for general savings in the theory of chapter 2 is confirmed. 
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6.3.4 Jumping into the future (see table 4) 
Using the trials data, it is also possible to see if people look forward from the present time 
when performing trials, or whether they jump ahead to some period in the future. Table 4 
shows that the majority - 80% - of all trials start from the current period; only in the first 
two periods of the experiment is there a large proportion of trials that jump ahead - 35% in 
the first period and 26% in the second period. When trials do start from some point in the 
Table 4 Starting Period of Trials 
time difference counts total number proportion of 
period 0123 or 4 5+ of trials trials starting 
performed from the 
current period 
(difference 
count = 0) 
1 184 22 23 28 28 285 0.65 
2 101 7 8 13 7 136 0.74 
3 72 9 2 3 3 89 0.81 
4 84 8 5 2 2 101 0.83 
5 75 2 1 3 2 83 0.90 
6 61 1 1 1 0 64 0.95 
7 54 3 0 2 0 59 0.92 
8 50 1 2 1 1 55 0.91 
9 33 2 3 1 0 39 0.85 
10 28 0 0 0 1 29 0.97 
11 25 0 4 0 0 29 0.86 
12 27 5 0 0 1 33 0.82 
13 13 0 0 0 0 13 1.00 
14 18 2 0 1 2 23 0.78 
15 14 0 0 0 1 15 0.93 
16 1 0 0 0 0 1 1.00 
17 1 0 0 0 0 1 1.00 
18 7 0 0 0 0 7 1.00 
19 1 3 0 0 0 4 0.25 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
no trials after period 20 
totals 848 65 49 55 49 1066 
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future, there is a spread of periods from which the trials start. Note that some subjects 
performed both trials that started from the current period and trials that started from some 
period in the future. Although it could be suggested that subjects were learning how to use 
the trials facility in the first two periods, this is unlikely to have a strong effect given that 
subjects had two practice periods. 
The difference counts are the numbers of trials starting from a given number of periods in 
the future, compared to the actual period in the experiment (run for real). Thus a difference 
count of 0 means that the trial started from the current period, a count of 1 means that the 
trial started 1 period in the future compared to the current period etc. 
6.4 Quantitative analysis of savings/conversion data 
The quantitative analysis of the savings and conversion data was also performed in a similar 
way to the EXEC experiment: by means of a panel data analysis using LIMDEP. The same 
variables were used as in the EXEC experiment (see section 5.4.2.3 for discussion). Since 
there were several different treatments, Chow tests were conducted to test the hypothesis 
that the different treatments gave different values of the coefficients of the regressors. The 
Chow tests showed that for all groups except group 05, the hypothesis that the coefficients 
have the same values across different groups was not supported by the data. These results 
justified the running of a separate regression for each group of subjects. An analysis of all 
subjects together was also performed, so that the results could be compared to the 
individual group regressions. 
In contrast to the EXEC experiment, only 1 subject converted all income in every period, 
therefore the issue of excluding such subjects does not arise. 
6.4.1 Chow tests for the significance of group regressions 
As in the analysis of the savings decisions in the EXEC analysis, it was not possible to use 
group dummies to distinguish between the different groups of subjects in the panel analysis. 
This was because the panel analysis provides dummies for each subject. As in the EXEC 
experiment, these individual dummies were (usually) found to be significant at the 1% level. 
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This means that these dummies had to be included, otherwise the model would be 
misspecified. This then implies that dummies for groups of subjects would be perfectly 
correlated with the individual dummies and the model cannot then be estimated. Hence an 
alternative method for testing for group effects was required. 
The adapted Chow test (Kennedy (1992)) was used to test for the similarity of parameter 
coefficients between the individual groups and all subjects together. A separate test was run 
for each group of subjects. The constrained SSE was generated by running a regression on 
all subjects. This constrained the parameter coefficients to be the same across all groups. 
The unconstrained SSE was generated by allowing the parameter values for the group 
being tested to be different to those of other groups. Two regressions were run, one for the 
group and a separate regression for the rest of the subjects. The sum of the SSEs from 
these two regressions was then the unconstrained SSE. To ensure compatibility of the 
regressions, all regressions were run with the same explanatory variables, using the random 
coefficients model available in LIMDEP version 6.0 (see section 6.4.2 for details of this 
specification). The tests were conducted as follows: 
HO: all parameter coefficients in an individual group are the same as for all other subjects 
(not including individual subject dummies). 
Hl: parameter coefficients vary between the group and all other subjects. 
Under HO, the test statistic 
[SSE(constrained) - SSE(unconstrained)]/K 
SSE(unconstrained)/(T 1+T2-2K) 
is distributed as F(K, T1+T2-2K), where 
SSE(unconstrained) = SSE(group) + SSE(rest of the subjects) 
SSE(constrained) = SSE(all subjects) 
K (number of variables) =7 (lagged consumption, income, lagged income, wealth, lagged 
wealth, log(income+wealth), time) 
Ti = number of observations in the group 
T2 = number of observations for the rest of the subjects 
so T1+T2 = total number of observations over all subjects = 1409 
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The results are shown in table 5. The values of the test statistic are higher than the 1% 
values for all groups except group 05, so HO is not accepted and the values of the 
parameter coefficients must be treated as having different values for each group. 
Table 5 Results of the Chow tests to test for common parameter coefficients across 
groups in the experiment at CentER 
Regressions are panel regressions with GLS estimation of a random coefficients model 
(individual subject error terms) 
Group SSE SSE F value 
Unconstrained Constrained 
all F(7,1409) 
subjects under HO 
*10-1 *10-1 
01 0.537453 0.975144 89.45 
02 0.947882  5.571 
03 0.647504  61.44 
04 0.942095  6.754 
05 0.971509  0.7429 
06 0.940625 7.055 
At 5% level of significance, upper F value (7,1409) taken from F(7, -) = 2.01 
At I% level of significance, upper F value (7,1409) taken from F(7, -) = 2.64 
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6.4.2 Results of the Panel analysis 
The savings decisions were analysed using panel regression methods, as available in 
LIMDEP version 6 (Greene (1992)). LIMDEP provides test statistics to indicate whether 
the subject dummies are significant in an OLS regression. If they are, a panel regression is 
performed and a Hausman statistic calculated to indicate whether a random effects model 
is significantly different to a fixed effects model (the fixed effects model is an OLS 
regression with a dummy for each group of subjects and a normal iid error term. In the 
random effects model, an individual specific error is added to the overall error. A GLS 
estimator is then used). A general to specific methodology was used for the analysis of each 
group/treatment. All possible variables of interest were initially included and variables that 
were obviously insignificant (i. e. insignificant at a generous level of significance of 15%) 
were removed and the regression performed again. The variable that was then least 
significant was excluded and the regression repeated. This procedure was continued until 
all variables that were not significant at the 5% level of significance were excluded. 
The results are shown at table 6. 
For the control group 01, there was a probability of only 0.185 that subject effects were 
different from 0; there were no large differences between the fixed and random coefficient 
regressions. For group 02 (backward induction) there was a 0.60 probability that subject 
effects were not different from 0 and an OLS regression was used. With group 03 (a known 
income (pension) of 2 from period 10 onwards) there is a structural split in the data at 
period 10. It is therefore not reasonable to fit a linear relationship of consumption vs. time 
for all periods. An alternative way to allow for effects over time would be to include a time 
dummy, but then there is possible multicollinearity with income, as income undergoes the 
structural change at period 10. A further disadvantage is that there may be a structural 
relationship between consumption and time. Therefore, a regression over the first 10 
periods was performed to see if there was a significant relationship with t. If not, a time 
dummy would be included. 
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Regression over first 10 periods 
ct = 0.609yt + 
(10.9) 
e! o 
0.506wt + 0.140t 
(8.65) (1.16) 
e0 0.245 
+ v(i, t) 
Random effects model. Figures in brackets are t-statistics. Figures below the t-statistics are 
the probability that the coefficient is different to 0. 
So, there is no significant relationship (at a 10% level of significance) with tin periods 1 to 
10 and a time dummy was incorporated in the regression over all periods. 
Groups 04 and 05 had an initial endowment of wealth, but otherwise the same parameters 
as the control group. However, the distribution of the length of the experiment was altered: 
the number of periods was taken from a distribution with bounds 5 and 15 periods (with a 
10% probability of stopping at the end of each period), compared to a distribution with 
bounds 3 and 25 periods (with a 10% probability of stopping at the end of each period) for 
the control group. Note that the subjects were told that there was a 10% probability of 
stopping in all periods i. e. the distribution was unbounded. Unfortunately, it is not possible 
to include initial wealth as variable if subject dummy variables are significant, as there 
would then be perfect multicollinearity between the initial wealth variable (which changes 
only between subjects) and subject dummies. Chow tests showed that the coefficients were 
significantly different between the groups. Therefore, it was necessary to perform two 
separate regressions. When these regressions are compared to the control group, the results 
can be seen to be similar; there is no obvious distinguishable effect of a wealth endowment 
(see the next section for a discussion of the paths over time, however). The regression for 
group 06 (interest rate of 20% per period) is characterised by a unusually strong positive 
correlation of conversion with time i. e. conversion increased over the course of the 
experiment. This is probably due to the high interest rate, which makes it possible to 
maintain a level of conversion similar to the other groups while building up a large wealth 
stock. This stock was then run down to increase conversion later on in the experiment. 
Considering the results shown in table 6, yt and w, were by far the most significant 
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Table 6 
Panel analysis of subjects' savings decisions: coefficients significant at the 5% level 
Group variables 
(treatment) ct_1 y1 yt_i wt Wt-1 log(yt + w, + 1) t 
All subjects . 16 . 55 - . 38 . 085 - - (4.52) (7.53) (8.19) (-1.64) 
Random effects model RZ = 0.226 Hausman statistic = 70.69 
Control (01) . 13 . 44 - . 21 - 2.8 - (1.93) (4.65) (2.96) (2.50) 
Random effects model RZ = 0.443 Hausman statistic = 11.83 
Backward . 44 . 75 -. 31 . 22 -- . 41 induction (02) 
(4.98) (5.52) (-5.87) (3.36) (3.48) 
OLS R2 = 0.414 
Pension (03) - . 74 - . 58 - 1.5(dummy) (10.5) (12.0) (1.82) 
Random effects model R2 = 0.583 Hausman statistic = 25.22 
Endowment of 10 (04) . 15 . 68 - . 22 -. 16 - - (2.20) (8.13) (4.85) (-2.33) 
Random effects model RZ = 0.176 Hausman statistic = 53.03 
Endowment of 20 (05) . 17 . 59 -. 16 . 39 -- - ((2.58) (4.75) (-2.36) (8.35) 
Random effects model R2 = 0.142 Hausman statistic = 11.35 
Interest rate of 0.2 (06) - . 47 - . 34 -- - (3.97) (8.74) 
Random effects model R2 = 0.301 Hausman statistic = 23.30 
The type of regression model used is stated for each group regression. Figures in brackets 
are t statistics. 
The time dummy for group 03 is a pension dummy: dum =0 fort < 10, dum =1 fort z 10. 
variables. As in other studies, the coefficient of yt was larger than that of wt. Consumption 
in the previous period had a significant positive correlation in 5 of these 7 regressions, 
giving some evidence that subjects maintained a smooth conversion strategy through time 
or had a constant strategy over several periods. Most regressions gave no evidence of 
strong effects over time (but see the discussion of the scatter plots in the next section). In 
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the combined regression, t was significant at the 10% level, but the coefficient is small 
(0.09) compared to the magnitude of the other significant coefficients and it cannot be 
claimed that this is weak evidence of a strong trend. Time was significant in the backward 
induction group, showing some tendency for subjects to concentrate their consumption 
towards the end of the known length of 15 periods. The strong effect of lagged 
consumption in this regression also provides evidence for increasing conversion through 
time. The time dummy (=1 for t -e- 10) was also significant for the pensions group (03), but 
this is probably due to the fact that the income process changed at the same time as the 
dummy. 
To summarise, the regressions do not really tell us much that is new about savings 
behaviour. yt and w, were the most significant explanatory variables of conversion and there 
is weak evidence of an increasing trend of conversion over time. There is evidence against 
the hypothesis that people take optimal savings decisions, since this would require that 
people treated wealth and current income equally, which they obviously do not in this 
experiment. The approximation of the form of an optimal strategy (y, + w, + 1) was only 
significant in the control group and in this group the coefficients of y, and w, were different 
also. 
6.4.3 Scatter plots 
Scatter plots of average values display some interesting features. In particular, the plot for 
all subjects of average wealth against time at fig. 11 shows a strong non-linear trend over 
time, approximately a negative quadratic. There is a clear single peak at period 11. 
Thereafter, wealth decreases to 0 at around period 23. The pattern of consumption over 
time is less clear, but there is an increase in the first few periods and a step decrease to low 
levels of wealth after period 23 (note that for these periods there is data from 2 subjects 
only and these `averages' should therefore not be regarded as a general trend). 
Scatter plots for the control group (01) have similar features. The pattern of consumption 
over time is very similar to the pattern for all subjects. The plot of wealth against time is 
much less clear, but a significant increase in wealth over the first 4 periods and a step 
decrease after period 19 can be seen. The `backward induction' group (02) displays 
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average patterns of consumption and wealth over time that are similar to the optimal paths. 
There is no discount rate over time, so the benefit of saving with a positive interest rate 
would be optimally traded off against the decreasing returns to scale in the conversion 
`utility' function. In comparison to the other groups, there is more saving early on in the 
experiment with a building up a wealth stocks and a lot of dissaving in the last few periods 
of the experiment. 
The `pension' group (03) can be divided into two time ranges: up to period 10 before the 
`pension' and thereafter with the certain low income. In the first range, a stock of wealth is 
built up and consumption lies above wealth. By period 10, wealth is approximately equal to 
consumption. Thereafter, wealth, income and consumption are roughly constant, all at a 
value of around 2 tokens. Given that average wealth is only 2, there is not much possibility 
to increase consumption above income by running down a wealth stock i. e. dissaving, so 
consumption would be expected to follow income closely in these periods given the savings 
behaviour before period 10. 
The endowment effect on wealth holdings can be seen by comparing the average wealth of 
groups 01(no endowment), 04 (endowment of 10) and 05 (endowment of 20). There is no 
obvious linear progression as endowment increases. In groups 01 and 04, there is an initial 
increase in wealth and thereafter wealth is held constant in group 01. In group 04, wealth 
is variable, but at a much higher average than group 01 (16 for group 04 vs. 6 for group 
01). The difference in levels is the initial endowment. After period 10, wealth then increases 
dramatically in group 04. Group 05 displays different behaviour. Wealth decreases in the 
first few periods to the same level as for group 04, but declines over periods 12-15 to 
approximately the same level as group 01. 
This could be interpreted as evidence for a hierarchical decision process as follows: 
the holding of a stock of wealth is important and the size of the holding depends on overall 
combined income and wealth. There is also an aspiration level for the wealth stock of 16 
(say). Thus in the early periods, a wealth stock of maximum 16 is created; if the initial 
endowment is greater than 16, then the wealth stock is reduced. If the initial endowment is 
less than 16, wealth stock is traded off against consumption. After periods 10-12, people's 
beliefs about the end point begin to affect their strategy. The expectations diverge, people 
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either believe that the experiment must finish soon and so run down their wealth stock or 
they believe that the game could last for much longer (because it has gone on for so long 
already) and build up their wealth stock. 
The patterns in consumption are again much less clear than those in wealth. All 3 groups 
have very variable average consumption over time and there is no clear pattern of 
consumption smoothing over time. However, when consumption is compared to income 
over time, it can be seen that in all 3 groups, consumption roughly tracks income over time, 
apart from the first 2 periods when a stock of wealth is built up. This is similar to the results 
obtained in the simulation. This effect in the simulations was obtained by including an 
inherent utility of wealth so that people obtain utility from having a stock of wealth, 
independent of the altered pattern of consumption. Therefore, this empirical observation 
gives some support to the idea that people have a utility associated with holding wealth 
independent of the increase in future consumption possibilities. The tracking of income by 
consumption is in accordance with empirical results and the modern versions of the life- 
cycle theory with uncertain future income and either precautionary saving or liquidity 
constraints. 
The results for a change in interest rate are less clear. All that can be definitely said is that 
consumption increases in the first 5 periods, with almost exactly the same (average) values 
as the control group. Thereafter, consumption is extremely variable, even when averages 
are taken. There is also no obvious conclusion about the relative statics over time to be 
drawn. The one reasonably clear pattern in the results is that the wealth holdings in group 
06 follow a similar path over time to the overall averages, with a single peak somewhere 
around period 8. This discussion illustrates the difficulties associated with regression 
equations. In order to perform the regressions it is necessary to guess the functional form 
of the relationship between the variables. This makes it very difficult to allow for non-linear 
and discontinuous functions. 
6.4.3.1 Conversion compared to the optimal strategy 
The scatter plot of conversion against income + wealth (i. e. total assets) shows no 
particular pattern that could be regarded as close to the optimal strategy. Even allowing for 
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the variation in parameters among the groups, there is only a general upward trend as 
identified in the regression analysis. There is no obvious sign of tailing off at higher values 
of total assets, as would be seen if the subjects were following the optimal strategy. 
6.5 Performance of the subjects 
The performance of the subjects relative to two baseline strategies, the optimal strategy and 
the simple rule of consuming all income as soon as it is received, is shown in fig. 1226. This 
is for the baseline group 1, with the largest variation in income streams. It can be seen that 
the subjects' performance was often very close to the optimum. Of the 34 subjects for 
which there is data, only 4- 23,29,31 and 35 - are more than 5% below the optimal 
strategy. However, this is not surprising as the strategy of consuming all income as soon as 
it is received is also very close to the optimal strategy (remember that only one subject used 
this strategy in this experiment). So there is a wide variation of strategies which produce 
very similar results. Fig. 13 compares the subjects' performance to 3 period and 5 period 
rolling strategies. It can be seen that the rolling strategies are very similar to the subjects' 
choices. Given the similar performance'of different strategies in fig. 12, this is not strong 
evidence that subjects made choices consistent with a rolling strategy. It can be seen that 
the 5 period rolling strategy is noticeably further away from the subjects' choices than the 
3 period rolling strategy. 
6.7 Conclusions and comparison of the results with the experiment at EXEC 
The trials data for the EXEC experiment and the main experiment are similar; in the EXEC 
experiment there is an average range of trials performed of 3.49 periods for subjects put 
automatically into the trial option in the run for real, compared with an average range of 
3.85 in the run for real in the Dutch experiment (excluding those trials performed by 
subjects in the backward induction group 2). On average, the Dutch subjects performed 
trials that were a little bit longer. The EXEC subjects performed more trials than the Dutch 
subjects (average 14.7 vs. 8.6 trials performed by each subject over the whole experiment). 
26 There is no data for subjects 15 and 21. 
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Figure 12 Performance of subjects in experiment at CentER 
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The results of the regression analysis are also similar in that consumption depends most 
strongly on current income and current wealth. In comparison with the control group the 
EXEC subjects consumed a higher proportion of both income (coefficients . 76 EXEC, . 55 
Dutch control) and wealth (coefficients . 39 EXEC, . 21 Dutch control). This is to be 
expected given the much higher interest rate (2% per period in the EXEC experiment, 10% 
per period for the Dutch control group) which gave a greater incentive to save for the 
Dutch group. 
The other coefficients bear little resemblance to each other. Given the non-linearities 
associated with the behaviour over time and the high variance of the data i. e. the very 
different patterns of behaviour in different subjects, it is misleading to try and draw firm 
conclusions about lags from the regression analysis. 
The subjects made choices that gave them almost as many points as the optimal ex-ante 
strategy. However, this is true for a wide range of strategies, including that of consuming 
all income as soon as it is received, so this is not a strong result. 
There was one obvious difference between the EXEC subjects and the Dutch subjects. In 
the EXEC experiment, 10 of 36 subjects simply converted all their income every period. 
This only happened with 1 of the 124 Dutch subjects. In this sense, the increase in the 
interest rate from 2% to 10% may have made a significant difference. Or the Dutch 
population may be more disposed towards trying to work out an optimal strategy, rather 
than taking a simple heuristic. 
Overall, the results of this experiment confirmed the results of the EXEC experiment. The 
subjects performed many trials and these trials had an average range much below the 
expected length of the experiment. In addition to the expected learning pattern, a rolling 
trials strategy was very common, being used by 51 % of all subjects. This limited range of 
trials and the use of a rolling decision strategy confirms the assumption about timing 
in savings decisions of the theory of chapter 3. The regression analysis showed a strong 
dependence of consumption upon current income and wealth, with a higher coefficient for 
income. This is evidence that, under the conditions of uncertain future income and a 
liquidity constraint, consumption tracks income. 
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In addition, scatter plots of wealth over time show a strong non-linear trend over time; 
approximately a negative quadratic w= f(t, -t2) with a single peak around period 10. 
Finally, the scatter plots of wealth against time for different initial endowments show a 
building up of wealth in the early periods of the experiment, giving some support to the 
idea that people have a utility associated with holding wealth independent of the increase in 
future consumption possibilities. 
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7 Rolling Strategy Simulation 
7.1 Introduction 
The experiment described in chs. 5 and 6 demonstrated the use of a rolling decision 
strategy. To recap, in a 'rolling' strategy the person performs trials all the way through the 
experiment, usually with a relatively small number of trials in any one period, looking only a 
few periods ahead. This justifies one of the main assumptions of the theory of ch. 3, that 
people look ahead for a limited length of time, but may reconsider their saving decision quite 
often throughout their life. An obvious question is then: given that these people are not 
optimising, how much do they lose? 
This chapter answers this question by performing simulations to compare a rolling strategy 
against the optimal strategy for the income distribution used in the experiment. It is found that 
over all parameter values a rolling strategy occasionally performs quite badly, but with the 
short income streams and the parameter values of the experiment, the rolling strategy is very 
close to the optimum. 
Section 7.2 discusses the rolling strategy in more detail and suggests an explanation for this 
behaviour. Section 7.3 describes the simulation method and section 7.4 the results. Section 
7.5 concludes. 
7.2 The Rolling Strategy and why people use it 
The rolling savings decision strategy is a form of continuous replanning for 
saving/consumption decisions under income uncertainty and an unknown length of life. In this 
strategy, decision makers deliberately ignore some of the information that is available to 
them. Instead of considering the whole of their possible life span (i. e. all possible future 
periods in the experiment) they restrict their attention to a few periods into the future (the 
number of periods ahead that are considered is a constant in all periods). Therefore, when 
savings are considered, there is a `gap' in the decision maker's thinking - the distant future is 
ignored. They then reconsider their decision in each period, to check their assumptions and 
that their consumption choice is still their preferred level given the income that they receive in 
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the current period. All periods in the lifetime are eventually considered as the range or number 
of periods into the future that are considered is constant. Therefore, in each successive period 
another period forward in the future is included in the decision process. This idea of a rolling 
strategy was modelled in the theory of ch. 3 by having the decision maker assume a constant 
income and then choosing a constant level of savings/consumption for a fixed length of time 
(5 periods in the simulation of ch. 4). Utility in the current period was traded off against the 
utility in the period at the end of this fixed length of time. In this chapter, there is a smaller 
departure from the assumptions of conventional life-cycle theory: within the timing 
restrictions of the rolling strategy, the decision maker is assumed to optimise. 
The reason why such a decision strategy should be considered is that it simplifies the decision 
process. The justifications for such a simplification are discussed in Pemberton 1993 and in 
ch. 2 section 3, where the consequences for the decision process are detailed following 
Simon's idea of bounded rationality. The idea is that the calculation of the optimal path under 
income uncertainty is a very complex calculation, requiring a computer simulation to be 
performed. Most people are not capable of performing such a calculation and even if they 
could, the investment in cognitive effort and time is not worthwhile given the large range of 
possible situations and parameter changes e. g. What positions and therefore incomes will the 
decision maker have in the future? Will they marry, have children? What might the future path 
of interest rates be? etc. etc. The adoption of a rolling strategy has the significant advantage 
that the area of largest uncertainty - the `distant' future is eliminated from the calculation. 
Decision makers therefore find it easier to make a reasonable estimate of their utility, their 
future income and future interest rates. In turn, this enables the calculation to be made more 
specific, giving a guide for action instead of the feeling that there are so many different 
circumstances to be taken into account that it is not worth the cognitive effort of going 
through them all. This procedure is also in accordance with the emphasis of Simon on the fact 
that the attention of people is concentrated on immediate problems, while distant problems 
tend to be left until they become more immediate (Simon 1983). 
7.3 Simulation Method 
The performance of the rolling strategy against the optimal strategy was calculated for the 
income streams actually used in the experiment and the distribution that the students were 
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informed was being used (the `theoretical distribution). The theoretical distribution was: 
y (income)=2 probability = 0.1, y= 10 probability = 0.8, y=2 probability = 0.1, 
Stopping probability at the end of each period = 0.1. 
The actual distributions used did not include income streams with a sequence of income with 
a income level of 2 in a high proportion of periods. The stopping probability used was such 
that at EXEC, the experiment lasted between 8 and 12 periods, for the CentER control group 
between 3 and 35 periods and for CentER groups 3-6 between 5 and 15 periods (see ch. 5 
section 2.2 and ch. 6 section 2.2 for the discussion). 
7.3.1 Calculation of the optimal consumption strategy by dynamic programming 
The subjects maximises the discounted expected value of utility over the whole of the life, 
subject to the liquidity constraint that wealth i 0. Given the constant discount rate, this is an 
infinite sum 
E(U) =E, ss-1u(cs) 7.1 
S=t 
In the experiment, u(. ) was given by a CARA function and 8 is the stopping probability 
described above. This problem can then be solved using a dynamic programming method. 
This is adapted to the simulation by the following steps27: 
i) for the final period of the life f, all wealth is spent. Therefore the expected maximum 
value function, of is the CARA utility function for the sum of accumulated savings in the last 
period and income in the last period. Since the accumulated savings are not known, it is 
necessary to calculate the value function for all possible levels of savings + income. Given the 
nature of the computer as a digital machine, the function must be stored in discrete steps of 
wealth. The range of wealth considered was 0 to 100 in steps of 0.1 (since income is received 
at the beginning of the period, this wealth includes the income for the period). 
27 See Appendix 6 for a listing of the simulation program 
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ii) then the expected value function in the next to last period is calculated. This is 
E(vf-1) = uf-1(c f-1) + 
E(vf (wf-1)) 7.2 
wf 1 and of are connected by the level of cf -I 
through the liquidity constraint and the income 
distribution is used to calculate the expected utility in the next period. vf is known for all 
levels of assets at f so if the level of assets at f-1 is known the problem can be solved. 
However, this level is dependent on previous periods which have not yet been calculated, so it 
is necessary to calculate the whole value function vf -I 
for all possible levels of wealth 
(including income for the period). For each level, the maximising value of c is found and 
maxc(v f-1) calculated (in the experiment, only whole numbers for c were allowed, so only 
whole numbers for c were used in the simulation). The values of vf that have been stored are 
used in the calculation. A linear interpolation routine is used to interpolate between adjacent 
values of the v function28. 
iii) The values of maxc , 
(v f-1) for the (1000) different levels of initial wealth and the associated 
consumption are stored. Thus the maximum value and optimal consumption function are 
known as functions of initial wealth + income. 
iv) this procedure is repeated for the previous period (f-2), using vf -I 
for the expected value 
function. 
In this way, the maximum value functions as a function of wealth for all periods can be 
calculated. To solve for a specific wealth and income in the current period, this asset level 
would be input as the value of wealth at the start of the current period. In order to calculate 
the expected total value over a lifetime with no restriction on the number of periods (thus 
giving the infinite sum), a 2-stage numerical approximation is used: 
i) Starting from a notional fmal period of a life, with each period backward in time, the 
difference between the in-period value functions v, +l and vv becomes smaller and approaches a 
28 Since the v function is concave, a linear interpolation routine will consistently underestimate the 
value of the function. However, because of its simplicity linear interpolation is very robust for any 
function, even if it is highly non-linear. The number of values of the v function stored (1000 for steps in 
wealth of 0.1) was chosen to be sufficiently large that the interpolation errors are very small. Some runs 
were executed with 10000 steps of 0.01, but this made no discernable difference to the results. For the 
highest value of curvature in the CARA function (0.9) the difference in values between consecutive points 
at the point of highest curvature is 0.08, so the difference between the exact curve and the linear estimate 
is of the order of 0.01 at the value of 198 or 0.005%. Note also that since the same routine was used for 
all strategies, which are all concave, the difference in bias between the different strategies will be even 
smaller. 
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limiting form This is because, given the constant stopping probability or discount rate and the 
constant income distribution, in the new (previous) period the process of calculation replaces 
vom, by vv so that the v function for any period a long time before the end of the life is found by 
recursion. For a long expected length of life, the expected value function changes 
insignificantly and in the limit is constant. Therefore, the difference between functions v,., 1 and 
vv is found and the calculation repeated until this difference is sufficiently small29. The 
expected value for any initial wealth can then be read off from the value function v. 
ii) For a specific income stream the optimal consumption from the c function for the first 
period is read off, the resulting wealth at the beginning of the next period calculated and 
the procedure repeated going forward through all periods. 
The lifetime value is the calculated as the sum of the CARA utilities from the 
consumption values. 
7.3.2 Calculation of the rolling consumption strategy 
The calculation of the rolling strategy is based on the method of calculating the optimal 
strategy for a specific income stream over a known number of periods using backward 
induction. A specific (constant) number of periods ahead is assumed and the max v and 
optimal c functions for each period are found as a function of wealth at the beginning of 
the period, working backwards from the last period being considered. The initial wealth 
and income in the current period is then used to find the consumption for the first period, 
the wealth for the next period is then calculated and the consumption for the next period 
found and the procedure repeated until the final period being considered. The rolling 
strategy always assumes that the experiment (or life) will last until the end of the final 
period being considered, so there is no discounting over these periods. The optimal 
consumption for a given wealth + income is found from the optimum consumption 
function for the first of the periods being considered. 
29 This difference was found as the sum of all differences for each level of wealth between functions v, +, and 
v1. 'Ihe calculation was stopped when the difference sum was less than 10 `. 
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7.4 Results 
Two sets of simulations were performed: the first with the actual income stream and 
parameter values that were used in the experiment for the EXEC groups and the CentER 
control group and the second with the theoretical distribution and a wide range of 
different parameter values. 
7.4.1 Results with the actual income streams used in the experiment 
(see Figures 14 to 16) 
These results are a comparison of what subjects in the experiment would have obtained 
by following various strategies, given the actual income streams they faced. In these 
figures, the values ('points' in the experiment) of four strategies are shown: the ex-ante 
optimal strategy, rolling strategies covering 3 and 5 periods (and thus looking forward 2 
and 4 periods into the future respectively) and the optimal `ex-post' strategy i. e. the 
optimal consumption (conversion) when the actual income stream is known and there is 
no uncertainty. 
For the EXEC groups it can be seen that the rolling strategies perform worse than the 
ex-ante optimal strategy, but the difference in value is small showing that there is not 
much difference between the two strategies for these parameters and income streams. 
The rolling strategy over 5 periods performs slightly worse than the rolling strategy over 
3 periods. This is because, given the convexity of the CARA points function, there is 
more incentive to save with the 5 period rolling strategy3° and the 5 period strategy 
builds up a larger wealth stock and so loses more when the experiment ends. The same 
pattern is repeated for the CentER control group; there is not much difference in 
performance between the optimal and the rolling strategies. There is, however, a slight 
variation in that for income streams that last a large number of periods and have 
30 The CARA function is A(1-e '). A, the multiplier, was 30 in EXEC group 1,15 in EXEC group 2 and 
20 in the CentER group. This determines the limiting number of points that can be obtained in any one 
period. The average income was 10.2 per period, so saving all income could generate a wealth stock of 
100+. However, the marginal utility of conversion, given these values of A, is small when a large stock is 
converted in one period. Hence conversion is more efficiently spread over several periods and the more 
periods that are considered, the larger the wealth stock that can be built up and still be efficiently converted. 
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relatively high incomes (in particular CentER subject numbers 6,25,35,37,40) the 
rolling strategies actually perform better than the ex-ante optimal strategy. This is 
because for high levels of income over many periods, relatively high levels of saving are 
generated. However, the assumption of the rolling strategy that the experiment will only 
last a few periods, in contrast to the optimal strategy which allows for the possibility that 
the experiment will continue for a long time, becomes more realistic towards the end of 
the experiment. Thus when the experiment actually ends, the rolling strategy loses less 
wealth stock than the optimum. 
7.4.2 Results with the theoretical distribution 
These results generalise the simulation in three ways. Firstly, the expectation of the value 
of the strategies, rather than the outcome for specific income streams, was calculated and 
the income distribution without restrictions on the number of periods or the frequency of 
low incomes (the theoretical distribution) was used. Secondly, different parameter values 
were examined. Thirdly, a wider range of rolling strategies - over 3 periods, 5 periods 
and 10 periods - was examined. For these simulations, the expected value of the (ex- 
ante) optimal strategy was calculated as described above 31. The expected value of the 
rolling strategy was found by randomly generating an income stream, finding the value of 
the rolling strategy for the income stream and repeating the process until the average 
value changed by less than 10-4. The multiplier in the CARA function was set at 20 (as in 
the CentER experiment). From these parameters and the fixed income distribution, a 
wide range of interest and discount rates32 per period (R, D) and curvature or risk 
aversion of the CARA function (B) was examined. 
31 The conversion/consumption values were still restricted to whole numbers and the liquidity constraint 
still applied. 
' The discount rate is the probability of the income stream finishing at the end of the current period. 
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The values used were: 
R=0.5, D=0.01, RID=50.0 
R=0.1, D=0.01, R/D = 10.0 
R=0.1, D=0.1, R/D = 1.0 (value in the experiment) 
R=0.01, D=0.1, R/D = 0.1 
R=0.01, D=0.5, R/D=0.02 
R=0.001, D=0.5, R/D = 0.002 
B=0.001,0.03 (value in the experiment), 0.1,0.9 
In figure 17, the optimal consumption levels for levels of wealth + income up to 50 are 
plotted for R/D=1 and B=0.03. The two functions for the first period (TI) and the 
second period (T2) of a rolling strategy covering 3 periods (in the final period, all wealth 
+ income is consumed) are contrasted with the optimal strategy. The interesting aspect 
of these results is that the optimal consumption crosses the rolling consumption in the 
first (current) period. This is particularly important because it is the consumption level 
for the current period (Ti) that is actually enacted. The second period of the calculation 
(T2) always lies in the future. The optimal strategy spends everything over a larger range 
of low levels of assets, but saves more at high levels of assets. This is because, at low 
levels of assets all the assets can be spent over a few periods with high marginal utility. 
The rolling strategy saves more, because there is no discounting over the first three 
periods and assets can be built up to take advantage of the positive rate of interest and 
the resulting higher level of wealth can then be spent in the last period. For high levels of 
assets, the assessment of the expected length of life takes effect. The rolling strategy 
assumes that life ends at the end of the third period, and the decreasing returns to scale 
of the utility function means that for high levels of wealth it is better to spread the 
consumption over the three periods. The optimal strategy takes into account the actual 
stopping probability (with an expected life of 10 periods) and so there are more periods 
in which assets can be spent and so a higher level of assets can be consumed at the best 
marginal utility. 
The overall influence of these effects can be seen in Table 7. The table gives the expected 
utility of the optimal strategy (for an uncertain income and length of life) and three 
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different rolling strategies. These rolling strategies are the optimal strategies under 
income uncertainty, assuming the individual will live for 3,5 and 10 periods. Two 
summary statistics are given; the average % difference for all simulations over a central 
(relatively realistic) range of parameter values and a weighted average % difference over 
all parameter values with the differences over the central range weighted at 1.0 and the 
differences outside the central range weighted at 0.1. The startling aspect of this table is 
that for most parameter values, the expected utility of the two strategies is practically the 
same. The average difference over the central range of parameters is 3.73% and a 
weighted average difference over all parameters is 2.48%. Only at high levels of interest 
and an expected life of 100 periods (R/D=50 and 10) does the optimal strategy perform 
markedly better, due to the higher saving associated with this strategy when high levels 
of wealth can be usefully built up. Not only that, but the difference in range considered 
for the rolling strategy does not make much difference either. The difference in 
performance between the 10 period and the 3 period rolling strategies is only large for 
R/D=50 and 10. This is emphasised in figures 18 and 19 where the variation in expected 
utility is plotted for the fixed values of B (fig. 18) and R/D (fig. 19) used in the 
experiment. The utility from the simple rule of consuming all income as soon as it is 
received is also plotted. It can be seen that the expected utility is insensitive to changes in 
saving strategy, to such an extent that for values of R/D of 0.002,0.02,0.10 and 1.0 
there is no significant difference between the optimum and consuming everything 
immediately. This is true for all values of B. This is, however, not surprising given the 
parameter values used in the experiment. In particular, if a subject starts out with 0 
wealth and the expected income per period is 10.2, it can be seen from fig. 17 that for 
both the optimal and rolling strategies the best thing to do is to save little. Note that the 
consumption used in the rolling strategy is Ti, the function for the current period. For 
the most common income of 10 and low levels of wealth, the difference in consumption 
is only 1 unit. Not only that, but for an income of 20 generating a possible asset level of 
25 to 30, the consumption curves cross and there is no difference in saving at all. 
Therefore consumption is similar for both strategies and therefore the expected utility is 
about the same. The differences will only appear when the level of saving becomes high. 
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Figure 18 Expected Utility of Strategies as R/D varies 
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For R/D = 10 and 50 (fig. 19) it can be seen that the performances of the rolling 
strategies are spread out between the upper bound formed by the optimal strategy and 
the lower bound formed by consuming everything immediately. Of the three ranges, the 
10 period rolling strategy performed the best for high R/D values. At these values, there 
is a high benefit from saving, as can be seen in fig. 19 from the large difference in values 
between the optimum and consuming everything immediately. Fig. 17 shows that for 
large values of wealth, as would happen with these R/D values and their low discount 
rate of 0.01, the 3 period rolling strategy undersaves compared to the optimum. This 
effect is reduced as the range of the rolling strategy increases; a 10 period strategy 
spreading consumption over 10 periods will save more than a3 period strategy which 
assumes that consumption must be spread over 3 periods. The same effect makes the 10 
period strategy perform worse than the 3 period strategy when the discount rate is high 
(0.5 for R/D = 0.002 and 0.02), since then the expected length of life is only 2 periods 
and spreading consumption over 10 periods means that a lot of wealth will be lost. This 
only has a slight effect on the relative values because there is very little difference 
between any of the strategies at these values of R/D. 
One aspect of the results is that the expected value increases as curvature B increases for 
both strategies and all values of R/D. It might be expected that the risk neutral (linear) 
points function (which is close to B=0.001) has the highest value as the subject does not 
save to avoid risk. However, this is in terms of points gained (or consumption) and not 
utility. When the CARA utility function is considered, as the curvature parameter 
increases the whole CARA function is raised giving a higher utility for a given 
consumption, so the expected utility must increase. 
7.5 Conclusions 
The performance of a rolling strategy was compared to the optimum for the income 
streams used in the experiment and, a little more generally, for a constant stopping 
probability or discount rate and a range of parameter values and rolling strategy ranges. 
It was found that for the relatively realistic parameter values used in the experiment, the 
rolling strategy was almost as effective as the optimal strategy - for the central range of 
parameters close to those used in the experiment, the rolling strategy was only 3.73% 
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worse than the optimum. If the subject was lucky and had a long and high income 
stream, the rolling strategy could actually outperform the optimum. The more general 
simulation showed that for parameter values apart from high values of R/D, the rolling 
strategy was virtually as effective as the optimum for the low levels of accumulated 
assets which are typical for the experiment. These results demonstrate that people can 
use a rolling decision strategy to simplify savings problems - indeed it enables them to 
perform some form of logical calculation - while losing hardly any utility (as long as they 
are not rich! ). 
The rolling strategies examined here are specific to the particular situation of the savings 
experiments of chs. 5 and 6. However, the concept can easily be applied to other 
intertemporal decision situations. As was shown in the theory of ch. 3, in the context of a 
general savings decision, people can be assumed to apply the idea of a rolling strategy to 
a life cycle savings decision. It could also be used for investment decisions by firms, 
indeed the idea of a fixed payback time which is sometimes used in investment analysis is 
an application of a rolling strategy - the firm. decides to look ahead for a fixed length of 
time and ignore the distant future. The idea could also be used to generate strategies for 
investment in financial or commodity markets, in fact the existence of a limited number 
of futures instruments only can be seen as a rolling strategy with some possible futures 
being ignored e. g. there are no futures for the price of oil in 1000 years time, to take an 
extreme example. 
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8 Summary and Conclusions 
This final chapter draws together the different elements of this work and takes a general 
view of what this thesis has achieved. In the introduction, the objective of the thesis was 
described as the improvement of the psychological specification of people's decision making 
behaviour in economic decisions taken under conditions of uncertainty. 
The area of individual (or household) savings behaviour was identified as having 
characteristics that are particularly suitable for this investigation. Savings is regarded as 
being an important economic decision which suggests that people will try to behave 
`rationally'. This does not imply rational behaviour in the sense of constrained optimisation 
normally used in conventional economic analysis, but more generally the idea that people 
determine goals and have some decision rules which they apply consistently in order to try 
and achieve these goals. This definition of rationality is taken from Harsanyi (1986). The 
other aspect of saving decisions that suggests their usefulness for this analysis is the large 
degree of uncertainty associated with them. To make a fully optimal decision, predictions 
of tastes and parameters have to be made over the whole of a lifetime and their distributions 
used in the analysis. For a realistic specification of these distributions, this is extremely 
difficult and essentially impracticable for most people. In spite of the difficulties involved, 
the importance of these decisions means that they must be taken somehow, even though 
people are in general incapable of identifying the optimal strategy. This suggests that they 
simplify their decisions in some way (or even, perhaps do not even decide). 
The literature survey in ch. 2 identified the inadequacies of life cycle savings theory in its 
current state of development. This theory has been developed from the intertemporal 
analysis with quadratic utility functions used by Modigliani in his development of the Life 
Cycle Model. The achievements of the life cycle model are that utility functions with positive 
3rd derivatives and liquidity constraints have enabled the theory to explain precautionary 
saving and the empirical evidence that consumption tracks current income. The inclusion of 
a bequest motive has allowed saving in retirement to be modelled. However, there are 
several features of savings behaviour that are still not explained. The fall in savings rates in 
the 1980s, the results of Carroll & Summers (1991) that the young save more than the old 
in countries with higher growth rates, the phenomenon of committed saving from Katona 
158 
(1975) and Lea, Tarpy and Webley (1987)'s evidence that saving increases in periods of 
high inflation (with lower real rates of return) are either not considered or generate savings 
patterns that are not predicted by life cycle theory. 
Cochrane (1989) demonstrates the importance of a correct behavioural specification. He 
finds that deviations from fully optimising behaviour have only 2nd order effects on utility 
i. e. the penalties for not perfectly optimising are small. This implies that people may well 
save in ways that are considerably different from the optimum and it is therefore necessary 
to find out what rules they do use, as these may generate widely differing savings patterns 
from the optimum. Consequently, a more sophisticated specification of people's decision 
processes and their utilities in comparison with the extremely simple assumptions of the life 
cycle model - that agents optimise fully and derive utility solely from their personal in-period 
consumption (with the addition of utility from bequests) - may generate results that explain 
some of the behaviour noted above. 
Simon's concept of bounded rationality (e. g. Simon (1987)) has several suggestions for 
improvements in the psychological specification of decision rules which have proved fruitful. 
His emphasis is on the concentration of attention on one problem at a time in isolation from 
other decisions and the simplification of the decision by concentrating attention on a few 
possibilities instead of working with the complete distributions of variables. 
Chapter 3 developed a theory of savings behaviour along the lines suggested by Simon and 
chapter 4 describes the results of a computer simulation of the theory. The theory 
incorporates a more comprehensive specification of the benefits that people gain from saving 
by allowing for utility from wealth stocks themselves and from the act of saving as well as 
from consumption and bequests. The idea of commitment in saving was applied by including 
a pension instrument as well as a `general' savings instrument. The decision process was 
drastically simplified by reducing the periods considered to the present period and a single 
representative period in the future (5 periods in the future for general saving and the first 
period of retirement for pensions), in contrast to the conventional theory in which all periods 
in the projected lifetime are taken into account. 
These features generated results in the simulation which showed some new patterns of 
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behaviour compared with the conventional life-cycle model. There was a high level of saving 
early on in the lifetime in order to generate a stock of wealth and a bulge in saving as 
retirement approached. The early saving suggests an explanation for the evidence reported 
by Lea, Tarpy & Webley that people save more with higher inflation: they may be trying to 
maintain the value of a wealth stock that they have accumulated. This early saving is also 
an alternative explantation for Carroll & Summers (1991) result. Committed saving played 
an important part in behaviour; it was used to generate a significant retirement income in 
addition to a state pension and income from accumulated wealth. In common with the 
modern life cycle model, consumption was found to track behaviour and there was a 
considerable level of bequests. Habit formation and concentration of attention on only one 
of the instruments at a time, together with a matching trade-off procedure instead of a 
maximising trade-off were also included. Overall, the theory has succeeded in explaining 
some of the stylised facts that are not in accordance with or are not considered by the 
conventional model in addition to including the stylised facts that have already been 
explained. 
The rest of the thesis is more narrowly directed. It concentrates attention on the 
simplification of the savings decision process; in particular on the timing involved. The 
postulate of the theory of ch. 2 that people only look a few periods into the future when they 
are taking general savings decisions was tested experimentally. This was done by having 
subjects take savings decisions, while a calculation facility was provided so that they could 
try out different savings paths and see how well these paths performed. 
The experiments included some significant innovations in experimental method. Given the 
difficulty of the experiment for the subjects, considerable effort was devoted to giving them 
plenty of opportunity to learn about the problem and the computer interface, while making 
sure that all subjects received the same information. The subjects were given a presentation 
on the experiment, including instructions on how to use the calculation facility and examples 
showing the variability in performance of different strategies, in order to emphasise the 
uncertain end point. The presentation was recorded and played back from an audio cassette, 
coordinated with a display of the relevant screens from the experimental program and for 
the experiment at CentER, this presentation was shown as a video. This ensured that all 
subjects received exactly the same initial information even though the instructions and 
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examples were quite complex. These instructions and examples were repeated, both in 
written form and in the experimental program itself. The calculation facility provided a 
visual display of the problem through time by the incorporation of a range screen, where the 
subject could scroll through all possible time periods and see up to 13 periods displayed at 
once. The trials performed by the subjects using this calculator provided indirect information 
on the subjects' thought processes since the trials that they performed would have been a 
reflection of the decision process that they were using. 
The first experiment at EXEC, University of York demonstrated the existence of three types 
of trials strategy: 
i) a learning strategy in which several trials were performed in the first one or two periods 
of the main experiment. The subject was trying out different patterns of saving/conversion to 
get a feel for the numbers involved and to identify the results of various different patterns. 
ii) a rolling strategy where there were trials all the way through the experiment, usually 
with a relatively small number of trials in any one period looking only a few periods ahead. 
The advantage of this strategy is that it dramatically simplifies the problem. The number of 
periods to be considered at any one time is greatly reduced, while allowing for a large and 
indefinite number of periods over the whole length of the experiment. If only a few periods ahead 
are considered, it is a reasonable approximation to assume that the experiment will not end over 
the periods being considered (given the stopping probability of 0.1) and hence it is possible to 
ignore one source of uncertainty. 
iii) a fasted end point strategy where the subject chose a single period in the future as 
the end point for a series of trials that they performed over several periods. 
These strategies were then identified in the experiment at CentER, University of Tilburg, in 
which the experiment was developed to examine the effect of variations in the interest rate, 
initial endowment and a greater variation in the income stream. The effects of a pension and 
a known length of life were also examined, the latter being a test for backward induction 
behaviour. The trials data for the EXEC experiment and the experiment at CentER were 
similar; in the EXEC experiment there was an average range of trials performed of 3.49 
periods and the average range of trials was 3.85 in the experiment at CentER (excluding 
those trials performed by subjects in the backward induction treatment). This can be 
compared with the expected length of the experiment of 10 periods. There was no large 
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difference between the two sets of subjects. A combination of rolling and learning was by 
far the most common trials strategy (39% of subjects in the EXEC experiment and 40% of 
subjects in the experiment at CentER). The results of the regression analysis were also 
similar for the two experiments in that consumption depended most strongly on current 
income and current wealth. This is evidence that, under the conditions of uncertain future 
income and a liquidity constraint, consumption tracks income. In addition, scatter plots of 
wealth over time showed a strong non-linear trend over time; subjects built up wealth early 
on in the experiment when they had little wealth and dissaved later on when they believed 
that the experiment would soon finish. This reinforces the results of the theoretical model 
reported in ch. 4 and is in contrast to the results of the conventional life cycle models. 
The subjects performed a large number of trials and these trials had an average range much 
below the expected length of the experiment. By far the most common trials strategy was 
a rolling strategy in which the subject performed trials throughout the experiment, looking 
only a few periods ahead. This is strong evidence that people simplify savings decisions by 
restricting the amount of information that they take into account: they only look ahead for 
a short span of time, rather than the whole of a lifetime. 
The last chapter contains a simulation of the performance of the rolling strategy in 
comparison with the optimal strategy. The rolling strategy was compared to the optimum 
for the income streams used in the experiment and, more generally, for a constant stopping 
probability or discount rate and a range of parameter values and rolling strategy ranges. It 
was found that for the relatively realistic parameter values used in the experiment, the rolling 
strategy was almost as effective as the optimal strategy. The more general simulation 
showed that for parameter values apart from high ratios of the interest to discount rate, the 
rolling strategy was virtually as effective as the optimum for the low levels of accumulated 
assets which are typical for the experiment. These results demonstrate that people can use 
a rolling decision strategy to simplify savings problems - indeed it enables them to perform 
some form of logical calculation - with virtually no loss of utility if there is no great incentive 
to building up a large wealth stock, which is a confirmation of Cochrane (1989)'s results. 
To conclude, this thesis has been successful in developing a theory of savings at the 
microeconomic level which incorporates a more realistic specification of individual 
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behaviour than the conventional life cycle models. Together with a better institutional 
specification, allowing for pensions, this has generated results which demonstrate 
phenomena which have been observed, but which the conventional models cannot explain. 
The model has results which may be econometrically tested, if sufficient data is available. 
The age structure of saving is notably different from conventional models. A considerable 
rate of saving is predicted in the early part of people's working lives, very approximately 
between the ages of 20 and 30 years. After this, consumption increases at a greater rate than 
income until shortly before retirement, when there is again a high rate of saving until 
retirement. If data about savings and consumption, together with income and wealth of a 
cohort at different ages are available, they could be used to investigate whether these 
phenomena actually occur. The wider implications of this model are that overall saving is 
dependent on the age structure of the population; if the population has a high proportion of 
young working adults, or has a lot of people close to retirement, savings rates will be higher. 
Also, if people are more worried about the future, they will increase saving to try and 
compensate for their belief that a low income in the future is more likely. 
The experimental work has demonstrated the existence of a rolling strategy which confirms 
one of the main assumptions of the theory, that only a limited period into the future is 
considered. This is in strong contrast to the conventional life cycle models, whose 
assumptions about the ranges of time considered by people are shown to be false. 
This work is capable of considerable further development. The performance of the rolling 
strategy should be examined under a more general specification, especially for the income 
distribution. A simulation of the savings/consumption behaviour over the whole of the life 
cycle should be performed, to investigate whether the rolling strategy itself generates 
econometrically testable implications, without the various additional effects incorporated in 
the model of chs. 3&4. A theory which explains the motivation for committed saving needs 
to be written, incorporating the idea that preferences may change cyclically over time. This 
would give people an incentive to precommit to ensure that the decisions that they take 
would not be overturned in the future if their preferences change. Finally, the simulation of 
the experiments showed that the strategy used was more or less irrelevant in determining 
subjects' performance because the parameters were such that the optimal strategy was to 
consume most of income as soon as it was received. It would therefore be useful to conduct 
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a savings experiment in which subjects had a genuine incentive to build up a large wealth 
stock and to examine the patterns of trials and expenditure which would then result. This 
could be achieved by giving subjects a high expected income or a high rate of interest, 
together with a conversion function that had only slightly decreasing returns to scale. 
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Appendix 1 FORTRAN 77 program SIMUL7 
Flow chart for monitoring subroutine 
SUBROUTINE MONITOR 
READ DATA 
HAS PENSION BEEN CHECKED->---NO---TAKE PENSION 
IN LAST 5 YEARS? DECISION 
YES 
-------------------<------------------- 
HAVE GENERAL SAVINGS BEEN->-NO---TAKE GENERAL 
CHECKED IN LAST 5 YEARS? SAVINGS DECISION 
YES 
--------------------<-------------------- 
IN RETIREMENT? ----->--- YES ---------------------------- 
NO 
CHECK PENSION 
HAS WAGE INCOME INCREASED WHILE---->--YES-- 
PENSIONS SAVING IS A SMALL I 
PROPORTION OF GENERAL SAVING? 
NO 
HAS WAGE INCOME DECREASED WHILE-->-YES--I 
PENSIONS SAVING IS A LARGE I 
PROPORTION OF GENERAL SAVING? TAKE PENSIONI 
I DECISION 
NO 
---------------------------------------------- I-------------I 
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CHECK GENERAL/ 
PRECAUTIONARY SAVING 
IS LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT---->-----YES-------I 
VIOLATED? I 
NO I 
HAS THE RATE OF SAVINGS--->---- YES------- I 
CHANGED? 
NO 
HAVE PREFERENCES----------->-------YES------- 
CHANGED? 
I TAKE GENERAL 
I SAVINGS DECISION 
NO I 
I 
DO NOT REEXAMINE 
EITHER DECISION I 
WRITE DECISION RESULT 
--------------------------<------------------- 
END 
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Appendix 1 FORTRAN 77 program SIMUL7. FOR 
PROGRAM SIMUL7 
IMPLICIT INTEGER(T) 
C SET NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 
PARAMETER (NAV= 1000) 
C SET NO OF TIME PERIODS 
PARAMETER (tlife=70, texPECT=5, TRET=45, Tstart=1) 
C LIFE STARTS AT 20!!! 
C NON DIMENSIONALISE BY HAVING Y1=1.0 
C OBJ, SUBJ AND PATH 
PARAMETER (NSUBJ=6, NOBJ=4, NP=6) 
COMMON /ALPHA/ SUBJ(NSUBJ, tlife), OBJ(NOBJ, tlife) 
REAL PATH(NP, TLIFE), PATHAV(NP, TLIFE), X, G05CAF 
REAL H(TLIFE), HAV(TLIFE) 
EXTERNAL G05CAF, G05CCF 
CHARACTER*4 DEC, DECA(tlife) 
C SUBJ IS AL: C BE: V GA: TH RLA: BEQ DP 
C CRRAS UV TH B DISC (<1 FOR MATCHING) DEATH 
C LOW VALUES OF AL BE GA RLA INCREASE VALUES 
C OBJ IS DW H RW RPUP 
CH IS INCOME DW IS WEALTH INNOVATION 
C PATH IS S SP CW SIGPEN RETI 
C GENSAV; W(T+1)-W(T) RETSAV CONS WEALTH 
C SUBJECTIVE CONSTANTS TFG TIME PERIOD OF S UP D IS TIME 
DISCOUNT RATE 
C READ MONITORED VARIABLES INTO ARRAYS 
open(11, file='subj70. dat', status='old') 
open(12, file='obj70. dat', status='old') 
19 FORMAT(4F8.3) 
20 FORMAT(6F8.5) 
DO 25 K=1, TLIFE 
READ(11,20) (SUBJ(I, K), I=1, NSUBJ) 
READ(12,19) (OBJ(J, K), J=1, NOBJ) 
25 CONTINUE 
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C SET SEED FOR RANDOM NO. GENERATOR 
CALL G05CCF 
C TAKE AVERAGE OF LOTS OF RUNS WITH RANDOM H 
DO 210 IAV = 1, NAV 
print*, 'IAV=', IAV 
C MAIN ROUTINE TO CALC PATH OVER LIFE 
DO 200 T= TSTART, TLIFE 
C PRINT*, 'T=', T 
C SET DEFAULT UNCHANGED VALUES IN PATH 
DO 50 J=1,4 
PATH(J, T)=PATH(J, T-1) 
50 CONTINUE 
PATH(6, T) = PATH(6, T-1) 
C GENERATE RANDOM H 
IF (T. LE. TRET) THEN 
P= G05CAF(X) 
IF (P. LT. 0.3) THEN 
WH=0.1 
ELSE IF (P. GT. 0.9) THEN 
WH=1.5 
ELSE 
WH=1.0 
END IF 
H(T) = OBJ(2, T)*WH 
ELSE 
H(T) = OBJ(2, T) 
END IF 
C STOP PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS AND CALC RETI AT TRET 
IF (T. EQ. TRET+1) THEN 
PATH(6, T) = PATH(6, T-1) + 1/OBJ(4, T)*PATH(5, T-1) 
PATH(2, T) = 0.0 
END IF 
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C SEE IF DECISION IS TO BE TAKEN 
CALL MONITOR(DEC, DECA, T, PATH, NP, WH) 
c PRINT *, 'DEC', DEC 
DECA(T) = DEC 
C PERFORM TRADE OFF 
IF (DEC. EQ. 'GENP') THEN 
CALL GENPRE(T, C, S, PATH, NP, WH) 
PATH(3, T)=C 
PATH(1, T)=S 
ELSE IF (DEC. EQ. 'RETR') THEN 
CALL RETIRE(T, C, SP, PATH, NP, WH) 
PATH(3, T)=C 
PATH(2, T)=SP 
END IF 
C CALCULATE WEALTH WT+1 
PATH(4, T) = PATH(4, T-1) + PATH(1, T) 
C CALCULATE TOT PEN CONT. & SET RETI 
C PRINT*, 'SPT SPT-1 TOTSP', PATH(2, T), PATH(2, T-1), PATH(5, T) 
IF ((PATH(2, T). LT. PATH(2, T-1)). AND. (T. LE. TRET)) THEN 
PATH(6, T) = PATH(6, T-1) + 1/(OBJ(4, T)+8.0)*PATH(5, T-1) 
PATH(5, T) = PATH(2, T) 
C PRINT*, 'IF180 P5 P6', PATH(5, T), PATH(6, T) 
ELSE 
PATH(5, T) = PATH(5, T-1) + PATH(2, T) 
C PRINT*; ELSE 180 P5 P6', PATH(5, T), PATH(6, T) 
END IF 
DO 95 KL = 1, NP 
c PRINT*, 'PATH', PATH(KL, T) 
PATHAV(KL, T) = PATHAV(KL, T) + PATH(KL, T)/NAV 
95 CONTINUE 
C UPDATE AV H(T) 
HAV(T) = HAV(T) + H(T)/NAV 
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200 CONTINUE 
210 CONTINUE 
C OUTPUT RESULTS TO FILE 
300 OPEN(10, FILE='path. res', status='old') 
OPEN(13, FII. E='dec. res') 
OPEN(15, FILE='H. RES', STATUS='OLD') 
305 FORMAT(6F10.5) 
DO 310 IJ=1, tlife 
WRITE(10,305) (PATHAV(IK, IJ), IK=1, NP) 
C WRITE(13, *) (DECA(IJ)) 
WRITE(15, *) (HAV(IJ)) 
310 CONTINUE 
CLOSE(10) 
CLOSE(11) 
CLOSE(12) 
CLOSE(13) 
CLOSE(15) 
END 
SUBROUTINE MONITOR(DECI, DECAM, TT, PATHM, NPM, WHM) 
IMPLICIT INTEGER(T) 
REAL RJUDGE 
EXTERNAL RJUDGE 
C SET NO OF MONITORED ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
PARAMETER (NSUBJ=6, NOBJ=4, TLIFE=70, TRET=45) 
C BEHAVIOURAL MONITORING PARAMETERS 
PARAMETER (DTHRESH=0.500) 
COMMON /ALPHAI SUBJ(NSUBJ, tlife), OBJ(NOBJ, tlife) 
REAL PATHM(NPM, TLIFE) 
CHARACTER*4 DECI, DECAM(TLIFE), DECC, DECG 
C print*, 'IN MONITOR' 
C IF PEN NOT CHECKED FOR LAST 10 YEARS 
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IF ((TT. GT. 10). AND. (TT. LT. TRET)) THEN 
DECC = 'ZERO' 
DO 400 MI = 1,10 
IF (DECAM(TT-MI). EQ. 'RETR') DECC = 'RETR' 
400 CONTINUE 
IF (DECC. NE. 'RETR') THEN 
DECI = 'RETR' 
GO TO 550 
END IF 
END IF 
C IF SAV NOT CHECKED FOR LAST 5 YEARS 
IF (TT. GT. 5) THEN 
DECG = 'ZERO' 
DO 405MJ= 1,5 
IF (DECAM(TT-MJ). EQ. 'GENP') DECG = 'GENP' 
405 CONTINUE 
IF (DECG. NE. 'GENF) THEN 
DECI = 'GENF 
GO TO 550 
END IF 
END IF 
H= OBJ(2, TT)*WHM 
C SET SP =0 IF IN RETIREMENT 
IF (TT. GT. TRET) THEN 
PATHM(2, TT) = 0.0 
H= PATHM(6, TT)+OBJ(2, TT) 
GO TO 475 
END IF 
C CHECK PENSION 
DIFF1 = (OBJ(4, TT) - OBJ(4, TT-1))/OBJ(4, TT-1) 
D= RJUDGE(DIFF1) 
IF (D. GT. DTHRESH) THEN 
C PRINT*, 'DIFF1', DIFF1, 'D', D 
DECI = 'RETR' 
GO TO 550 
END IF 
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DIFF2 = (H - OBJ(2, TT-1))/OBJ(2, TT-1) 
CHUPSPSMALL 
IF ((RJUDGE(DIFF2). GT. DTHRESH). AND. 
+ (H. GT. OBJ(2, TT-1)) . AND. (PATHM(2, TT). LT. SAV*0.2)) THEN C PRINT*, 'H UP SP SMALL' 
DECI = 'RETR' 
GO TO 550 
END IF 
CH DOWN SP LARGE 
IF. ((RJUDGE(DIFF2). GT. DTHRESH). AND. 
+ (H. LT. OBJ(2, TT-1)) . AND. (PATHM(2, TT). GT. SAV*O. 1)) THEN 
C PRINT*, 'H DOWN SP LARGE' 
DECI = 'RETR' 
GO TO 550 
END IF 
C CHECK WEALTH PATH 
475 SAV = (PATHM(4, TT) + OBJ(1, TT) +H- PATHM(3, TT) 
+- PATHM(2, TT))*(1. O+OBJ(3, TT)) - PATHM(4, TT) 
C PRINT*, 'P4O1HP3', PATHM(4, TT), OBJ(1, TT), H, PATHM(3, TT) 
C PRINT*, 'P2O3SAV', PATHM(2, TT), OBJ(3, TT), SAV 
C CHECK LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT W>O 
IF (PATHM(4, TT)+SAV. LT. 0.0) THEN 
DECI = 'GENP' 
C PRINT*, 'W CONST' 
GO TO 550 
END IF 
C CHECK BUDGET IDENTITY 
C IF (PATHM(1, TT-1). NE. 0.0) THEN 
C DIFF3 = (SAV - PATHM(1, TT-1))/PATHM(1, TT-1) 
C ELSE 
DIFF3 = SAV - PATHM(1, TT-1) 
C END IF 
IF (RJUDGE(DIFF3). GT. DTHRESH) THEN 
C PRINT*, 'SAV CHANGE', 'DIFF3', DIFF3 
DECI = 'GENP' 
GO TO 550 
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END IF 
C CHECK SUBJECTIVE PARAMETERS 
DO 500 IM=I, NSUBJ 
IF (SUBJ(IM, TT-1). EQ. 0.0) THEN 
DIFF4 = SUBJ(IM, TT) - SUBJ(IM, TT-1) 
ELSE 
DIFF4 = (SUBJ(IM, TT) - SUBJ(IM, TT-1))/SUBJ(IM, TT-1) 
END IF 
IF (RJUDGE(DIFF4). GT. DTHRESH) THEN 
DECI ='GENP' 
C PRINT*, SUBJ', IM; CHANGE 
GO TO 550 
END IF 
DECI =ZERO' 
500 CONTINUE 
550 END 
FUNCTION RJUDGE(DIF) 
REAL G05DDF 
" EXTERNAL G05DDF 
C USE SD OF 0.05 AS THRESH SO DIFF OF 0.165 > DEC 95% OF THE TIME 
PARAMETER (SIG=0.03) 
X=G05DDF(DIF, SIG) 
RJUDGE=ABS(X) 
OPEN(14, FIL E='judge. res) 
C WRITE(14, *) RJUDGE 
END 
FUNCTION GPl(T1, R1) 
C FUNCTION TO CALC CONST OF GP SUM 1 TO N 
INTEGER TI 
REAL RI, A 
A=1. O+Rl 
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GP1 = A*(1. O-(A**T1))/(1.0-A) 
END 
REAL FUNCTION CRRA(A, B) 
C CRRA UTILITY FN. 
REAL A, B 
IF (B. GE. 0.0) THEN 
CRRA = 1.0/(1.0-A)*B**(1.0-A) 
ELSE IF (B LT. 0.0) THEN 
CRRA = -1.0/(1.0-A)*(-1.0*B)**(1.0-A) 
END IF 
END 
REAL FUNCTION UMATCH(CIU, C2U, C3U, C4U, GPU, VBU, CU, TU) 
C TRANSCENDENTAL MATCHING EQN. 
IMPLICIT INTEGER(T) 
REAL C1U, C2U, C3U, C4U, GPU, VBU, CU, CRRA 
EXTERNAL CRRA 
C SET NO OF MONITORED ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
PARAMETER (NSUBJ=6, NOBJ=4, TLIFE=70, TRET=45, TF=S) 
C EXPECTATIONS PARAMETERS 
PARAMETER (DHFH=1S, PH=0.1, DHFL-0.1, PL=0.3) 
COMMON /ALPHA/ SUBJ(NSUBJ, tlife), OBJ(NOBJ, tlife) 
R= OBJ(3, TU) 
AL = SUBJ(I, TU) 
BE = SUBJ(2, TU) 
RLAM = SUBJ(4, TU) 
P= SUBJ(6, TU) 
C FUTURE VALUES 
ALF = AL*0.5 
BEF = BE 
RLAMF = RLAM'I 
WF = C3U - CU*GPU 
CF = C2U + R/(1. O+R)*WF 
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IF (TU. LE. TRET-TF) THEN 
CFH = C2U*DHFH + R/(1. O+R)*WF 
CFL = C2U*DHFL + R/(1. O+R)*WF 
UCF = (1.0-PH-PL)*CRRA(ALF, CF) + PH*CRRA(ALF, CFH) 
++ PL*CRRA(ALF, CFL) 
ELSE 
UCF = CRRA(ALF, CF) 
END IF 
C PRINT*, VFCFCTC4VB', WF, CF, CU, C4U, VBU, P', P 
C PRR TT*, ALFBEFRLAMF, ALF, BEF, RLAMF 
UNLATCH = CRRA(AL, CU) + VBU - 
+ C4U*(UCF + CRRA(BEFWF) + PI(1.0-P)*CRRA(RLAMF, WF)) 
C PRINT*; CRRA(AL, CU) , 
CRRA(ALCLD, ALFCFCRRA(ALFCF) 
C PRINT*; CR(WF)CR(BEQ), CRRA(BEF, WF), P/(I. 0-P)*CRRA(RLAMF, WF) 
S=C1U-CU*(1. (+R) 
IF (S. GT. 0.0) UMATCH = UMATCH + CRRA(GAM, S) 
C PRINT*, 'CU: U', CU, UMATCH 
END 
subroutinE GENpre(tg, CTG, STG, PATHG, NPG, WHG) 
IMPLICIT INTEGER(T) 
REAL GP1, CRRA, UMATCH 
EXTERNAL GP1, CRRA, UMATCH 
C SET NO OF TIME PERIODS 
PARAMETER (TRET=45, TLIFE=70) 
REAL CTG, STG, PATHG(NPG, TLIFE) 
C SET NO OF MONITORED ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
PARAMETER (NSUBJ=6, NOBJ=4, TFG=5) 
COMMON /ALPHA/ SUBJ(NSUBJ, tlife), OBJ(NOBJ, tlife) 
C EXPECTATIONS PARAMETERS 
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PARAMETER (EINCH=0.05) 
C ITERATION TOLERANCE 
PARAMETER (ACC=0.01) 
C PRINT*; IN GEN 
C INCOME BEFORE OR IN RETIREMENT 
IF (TG. LE. TRET) THEN 
H= OBJ(2, TG)*W'VHG 
ELSE 
C INCLUDE STATE PENSION 
H= PATHG(6, TG)+OBJ(2, TG) 
END IF 
C GENERATE FUTURE VARIABLES 
C IF (TG. LE. TFG) THEN 
C HF = OBJ(2, TG)*(1. O+EINCH)*TFG 
C SPF = PATHG(2, TG) 
C ELSE IF ((TG. GT. TFG). AND. (TG . LE. TRET-TFG)) THEN C DH=O 
C 
C DO 590 JJ=ITFG 
C DH = DH + OBJ(2, TG+1-JJ) - OBJ(2, TG+1-JJ) 
C 590 CONTINUE 
C 
C A=TFG 
C DH=DH/A 
C HF = OBJ(2, TG)+DH*TFG 
C SPF = PATHG(2, TG) 
C 
C ELSE IF ((TG GT. TRET TFG) . AND. (TG. LE. TRET)) THEN C HF = PATHG(6, TG) + 1/OBJ(4, TG)*(PATHG(5, TG-1) 
C++ PATHG(2, TG)*(TRET-TG)) 
C SPF = 0.0 
C 
C ELSE 
C HF = PATHG(6, TG) 
C SPF=0.0 
C 
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C END IF 
C GENERATE FUTURE VARIABLES 
IF (TG. LE. 3) THEN 
HF = OBJ(2, TG)*(1. O+EINCH)*TFG 
SPF = PATHG(2, TG) 
ELSE IF ((TG. GT. 3). AND. (TG . LE. TRET-TFG)) 
THEN 
DH = 0.5*(OBJ(2, T-1) - OBJ(2, T-2)) 
HF = OBJ(2, TG) + TFG*DH 
SPF = PATHG(2, TG) 
ELSE IF ((TG. GT. TRET-TFG). AND. (TG. LE. TRET)) THEN 
HF = PATHG(6, TG) + 1/OBJ(4, TG)*(PATHG(5, TG-1) 
++ PATHG(2, TG)*(TRET-TG)) 
SPF = 0.0 
ELSE 
HF = PATHG(6, TG) 
SPF = 0.0 
END IF 
C GENERATE FUTURE VARIABLES 
C 
C 
C IF (TG. LE. TRET-TFG) THEN 
C HF = OBJ(2, TG) 
C SPF = PATHG(2, TG) 
C ELSE IF ((TG. GT. TRET TFG) . AND. (TG. LE. 
TRET)) THEN 
C HF = PATHG(6, TG) + 1/OBJ(4, TG)*(PATHG(5, TG-1) 
C++ PATHG(2, TG)*(TRET TG)) 
C SPF = 0.0 
C ELSE 
C HF = PATHG(6, TG) 
C SPF = 0.0 
C END IF 
R= OBJ(3, TG) 
C TRANSCENDENTAL EQN FOR CT FROM MATCHING AND BUD IDENTITY 
C ASSUMING WF CONSTANT I. E. SF =0 FOR CF PF=PT GF=0 SPF=SPT 
C PRINT*; HHFRW'V', H, HF, R, PATHG(4, TG-1); SP', PATHG(2, TG) 
C PRINT*; CR(S(2, TG)P(4, TG-1))', CRRA(SUBJ(2, TG), PATHG(4, TG-1)) 
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GP = GP 1(TFG, R) 
VB = CRRA(SUBJ(2, TG), PATHG(4, TG-1)) 
++ SUBJ(6, TG)/(1. O+SUBJ(6, TG))*CRRA(SUBJ(4, TG), PATHG(4, TG-1)) 
C1= (OBJ(1TG) +H- PATHG(2, TG))*(1. O+R) 
++ R*PATHG(4, TG-1) 
C CF ASSUMING WF = WF+1 
C2=HF-SPF 
C3 = (PATHG(4, TG-1) + OBJ(1, TG))*(1. O+R)**TFG 
++ (H - PATHG(2, TG))*GP1(TFG, R) 
C DISCOUNT= 2- EXP(-(1-D)TFG SO D REP DECREASEIYEAR DISC=O FOR 
T=O 
C4 = 2.0 - EXP(-1.0*(1.0-SUBJ(5, TG))*TFG) 
C PRINT*, 'VB', VB, GP', GP 
C PRINT*; C 1', C 1; C2', C2; C3', C3; C4', C4 
C SOLVE TRANSCENDENTAL EQN BY MODIFIED LINEAR INTERP APPLIED 
NUM ANAL 
CBY CF GERALD POWHEATLEYPII 
C START VALUES C=0 BOTTOM C SO WF =0 OR WT+1=0 WHICHEVER IS 
C SMALLER TOP (LQUIDITY CONSTRAINT) 
CWIZERO = PATHG(4, TG-1) + OBJ(1, TG) +H- PATHG(2, TG) 
CWFZERO = C3/GP 
C PRINT*; CW 10 CW'VFO', CW 1ZERO, CWFZERO 
CL = MIN(CW 1ZERO, CWFZERO) 
C PRINT*; CL', CL 
C CHECK BDY SOLN. 
IF (UMATCH(C1, C2, C3, C4, GP, VB, CL, TG)* 
+ UMMATCH(C1, C2, C3, C4, GP, VB, O. O, TG). GT. 0.0) THEN 
C PRINT*, PCWFO', UMATCH(C1, C2, C3, C4, GP, VB, CFWO, TG) 
C PRINT*, 'FO', UMATCH(C 1, C2, C3, C4, GP, VB, 0.0, TG) 
C PRINT*, BDY SOLN 
CTG = CL 
GO TO 650 
END IF 
C INTERP ROUTINE 
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C PRINT*, CL', CL 
XI =0.0 
X2 = CL 
SAV = UMMATCH(CI, C2, C3, C4, GP, VB, X1, TG) 
Fl = UM'IATCH(C 1, C2, C3, C4, GP, VB, X 1, TG) 
F2 = UNMATCH(C 1, C2, C3, C4, GP, VB, X2, TG) 
C PRINT*, CF=X2F 1 F2', X2, F 1, F2 
ICOUNT =0 
600 X3 = X2 - F2* (X2-X 1)/(F2-F 1) 
ICOUNT = ICOUNT+1 
IF (ICOUNT. GT. 50) GO TO 640 
IF ((ABS(X3-X2). LT. 0.00001). AND. 
+ (ABS(X2-X1). LT. 0.00001)) GO TO 640 
C PR1N F*, X 123', X 1, X2, X3 
F3 = UMATCH(C1, C2, C3, C4, GP, VB, X3, TG) 
C PRINT*, 'F 123', F 1, F2, F3 
IF (F3*F1 LT. 0.0) THEN 
X2 X3 
F2 F3 
IF (F3*SAV. GE. 0.0) THEN 
F1=F1/2.0 
END IF 
ELSE 
X1 =X3 
Fl =F3 
IF (F3*SAV. GE. 0.0) THEN 
F2=F212.0 
END IF 
END IF 
SAV = F3 
IF (ABS(SAV). GT. ACC) THEN 
C PRINT*; SAV, SAV 
GO TO 600 
ELSE 
640 CTG = X3 
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END IF 
650 WT1 = (PATHG(4, TG-1) + OBJ(1, TG) +H- CTG 
+- PATHG(2, TG))*(1. O+R) 
C PRINT*, 'WT1 WT G', WTI, PATHG(4, TG-1), OBJ(1, TG) 
C PRINT*, 'H SP R', H, PATHG(2, TG), R 
STG = WTI'- PATHG(4, TG-1) 
C PRINT*, 'STG', STG, 'CTG', CTG 
655 END 
subroutine RETIRE(TR, CTR, SPT, PATHR, NPR, WHR) 
IMPLICIT INTEGER(T) 
REAL GP 1 
EXTERNAL GP 1 
C SET NO OF TIME PERIODS 
PARAMETER (tlife=70, TEXPECT=5, TRET=45) 
REAL CTR, SPT, PENR, PATHR(NPR, TLIFE) 
C EXPECTATIONS PARAMETERS DELD = LONG TERM/SHORT TERM DISC 
PARAMETER (EINCH=0.05, EXW=1.0, DELD=1.05) 
C SET NO OF MONITORED ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
PARAMETER (NSUBJ=6, NOBJ=4) 
COMMON /ALPHA/ SUBJ(NSUBJ, tlife), OBJ(NOBJ, tlife) 
C PRINT*, 'IN RET 
C TRADE OFF ROUTINE: MATCHING WITH UCT=UCR*DISCOUNT 
C CALC FUTURE VARIABLES HR = INC. AT RET 
YNP = TRET-TR+ 1.0 
HR = OBJ(2, TR)*(1.0+EINCH*YNP) 
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WR = PATHR(4, TR-1)*EXW 
SR=O 
RR=O 
DO 675 II=O, TEXPECT-1 
RR = OBJ(3, TR-II)/(TEXPECT-1) + RR 
675 CONTINUE 
C PENSION RETURN PARAMETER = PROPORTION OF FINAL H 
RECEIVED/UNIT CONT/YEAR 
RP = OBJ(4, TR) 
RPDOWN = RP + 8.0 
c initialise j 
J=0 
C EQN FOR CT FROM MATCHING AND CR GIVEN FUTURE VARIABLES & 
DISCOUNTING 
685 CIO= HR/RP/OBJ(2, TR) 
C Cl 1=SPT+CT FROM BUD ID WITH ST=ST-1 
Cl 1= PATHR(4, TR-1) + OBJ(2, TR) * WHR 
+- (PATHR(4, TR-1) + PATHR(1, TR))/(1. O+OBJ(3, TR)) 
C print*, 'w', pathr(4, tr-1), 'h', obj(2, tr)*whr, s', pathr(l, tr) 
C12 = (2.0 - EXP((SUBJ(5, TR)*DELD-1.0)*YNP)) 
+ **(1.0/(1.0-SUBJ(1, TR))) 
C PRINT*, 'S5DEL YNP S3', SUBJ(5, TR)*DELD, YNP, SUBJ(1, TR) 
C CRET = -CTC 1 OYNP + Cl IC 1 OYNP + PREV PENS + RWRET - SRET C <----------------C 13-----------------------------> 
C13= C11*YNP*C10 + PATHR(6, TR) + PATHR(5, TR-1)*C10 +RR*WR-SR 
C PRINT*, 'C 10 11 1213J', C 10, C11, C12, C13, J 
CTR = C13*C12/(1. O+YNP*C10*C12) 
SPT=C11 -CTR 
C PRINT*, 'SP CT', SPT, CTR 
C USE LOW RP IF SP IS DECREASED 
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IF ((SPT. LT. PATHR(2, TR-1)). AND. (J. NE. 1)) THEN 
RP = RPDOWN 
J=1 
GO TO 685 
END IF 
C IF SP DECREASED BUT UP WITH LOW SP SP = SPT-1 
IF ((SPT. GE. PATHR(2, TR-1)). AND. (J. EQ. 1)) THEN 
SPT = PATHR(2, TR-1) 
CTR=C11 -SPT 
END IF 
C CAN'T BORROW IN PENSION FUND 
IF (SPT. LT. 0.0) THEN 
SPT = 0.0 
CTR =C 11 
END IF 
C PRINT*, 'SP CT', SPT, CTR 
END 
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Appendix 2 Simulation Results for figure 2 
Parameter values 
Threshold difference for taking a decision 0.5 
Standard deviation of subjective difference distribution 0.03 
Discount rate 0.05 in period 1, increasing linearly 
to 0.5 in period 70 
Interest rate on general savings 0.05 
Return parameter for pension savings 4.0 
Income Process: Discrete random process with 3 possible income levels 
Central value 1.0 in period 1 increasing to 1.4 in period 45 
Low income = 0.1 *central value with probability of 0.3 
high income = 1.5*central value with probability of 0.1 
Preference parameters in CRRA utility functions U(s) = (1/(1-a))s'-" see equation 4.2 
Consumption U(c) a=0.8 
Utility of thrift TH(s) a=0.05 
Utility of a stock of wealth V(w) a=0.05 
Utility of bequests B(w) a=0.05 
General Pension Consu- Wealth Pension Retirement Period 
Saving Saving mption Contrib- Income 
utions 
0.00000 0.02104 
0.02752 0.01621 
0.03657 0.01421 
0.13003 0.01308 
0.17290 0.01224 
0.21578 0.01218 
0.23458 0.01108 
0.23555 0.01118 
0.23619 0.01098 
0.22749 0.01113 
0.22497 0.01084 
0.21936 0.01178 
0.20690 0.01210 
0.19992 0.01376 
0.19091 0.01516 
0.18099 0.01626 
0.17189 0.01565 
0.16409 0.01663 
0.14998 0.01737 
0.14689 0.01850 
0.13796 0.01866 
0.13154 0.02173 
0.12193 0.02323 
0.11082 0.02321 
0.10272 0.02440 
0.76924 
0.74414 
0.75510 
0.68941 
0.64489 
0.61139 
0.61809 
0.63114 
0.64048 
0.68059 
0.69741 
0.71711 
0.74361 
0.78868 
0.80661 
0.81191 
0.83368 
0.86683 
0.87273 
0.92612 
0.91381 
0.98062 
0.99157 
0.98011 
0.99952 
0.00000 
0.02752 
0.06409 
0.19411 
0.36702 
0.58280 
0.81738 
1.05293 
1.28912 
1.51662 
1.74159 
1.96095 
2.16785 
2.36777 
2.55867 
2.73967 
2.91156 
3.07565 
3.22563 
3.37252 
3.51048 
3.64201 
3.76394 
3.87476 
3.97748 
0.02104 0.00000 1 
0.03075 0.00054 
0.03832 0.00109 
0.04346 0.00176 
0.04698 0.00248 
0.05341 0.00296 
0.05323 0.00390 
0.05694 0.00452 
0.06065 0.00513 
0.06353 0.00582 10 
0.06359 0.00671 
0.05842 0.00813 
0.06169 0.00886 
0.06496 0.00974 
0.06590 0.01092 
0.07105 0.01185 
0.07362 0.01294 
0.07496 0.01421 
0.07658 0.01552 
0.08333 0.01650 20 
0.08114 0.01824 
0.08875 0.01942 
0.09379 0.02093 
0.09649 0.02264 
0.10136 0.02427 
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General Pension Consu- Wealth Pension Retirement Period 
Saving Saving mption Contrib- Income 
utions 
0.09624 0.02522 1.02505 4.07373 0.09959 0.02652 
0.08775 0.02679 1.03888 4.16148 0.10354 0.02842 
0.07547 0.02854 1.05639 4.23695 0.10903 0.03034 
0.06757 0.03108 1.06692 4.30452 0.11529 0.03241 
0.05990 0.03564 1.08934 4.36442 0.12593 0.03449 30 
0.05490 0.03573 1.11821 4.41932 0.13108 0.03704 
0.04760 0.03881 1.13530 4.46692 0.13965 0.03956 
0.04160 0.04404 1.14590 4.50852 0.15051 0.04233 
0.03623 0.04884 1.16223 4.54475 0.16283 0.04537 
0.02980 0.05396 1.19396 4.57454 0.16696 0.04952 
0.01894 0.06030 1.17504 4.59349 0.19200 0.05246 
0.01626 0.06815 1.19187 4.60974 0.19944 0.05752 
0.00368 0.06960 1.14941 4.61343 0.21065 0.06239 
-0.00207 0.07861 1.19910 4.61135 0.24385 0.06617 
-0.00680 0.08495 1.20348 4.60456 0.25592 0.07224 40 
0.06889 0.10033 1.11476 4.67345 0.30208 0.07676 
0.10419 0.10553 1.07367 4.77764 0.33851 0.08252 
0.12175 0.12549 1.08663 4.89939 0.37843 0.08965 
0.12356 0.13410 1.06582 5.02295 0.39325 0.09959 
0.12331 0.13202 1.07651 5.14626 0.38973 0.11088 45 retirement 
0.03004 0.00000 0.49067 5.17629 0.38973 0.20832 
0.02587 0.00000 0.49732 5.20217 0.38973 0.20832 
0.02035 0.00000 0.50740 5.22253 0.38973 0.20832 
0.01396 0.00000 0.51922 5.23648 0.38973 0.20832 
0.00384 0.00000 0.53962 5.24033 0.38973 0.20832 50 
-0.00249 0.00000 0.55909 5.23784 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.02992 0.00000 0.58706 5.20792 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.03099 0.00000 0.58799 5.17694 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.03247 0.00000 0.58923 5.14446 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.03418 0.00000 0.59051 5.11028 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.03790 0.00000 0.59321 5.07238 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.04329 0.00000 0.59724 5.02910 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.06209 0.00000 0.60914 4.96701 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.06278 0.00000 0.60941 4.90423 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.06373 0.00000 0.60972 4.84050 0.38973 0.20832 60 
-0.06478 0.00000 0.60988 4.77571 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.06707 0.00000 0.61017 4.70864 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.07044 0.00000 0.61073 4.63820 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.08165 0.00000 0.61003 4.55655 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.08201 0.00000 0.60979 4.47454 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.08250 0.00000 0.60939 4.39204 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.08300 0.00000 0.60872 4.30905 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.08404 0.00000 0.60716 4.22500 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.08560 0.00000 0.60504 4.13941 0.38973 0.20832 
-0.09035 0.00000 0.59499 4.04906 0.38973 0.20832 70 
191 
APPENDIX 3 
Instructions for the Savings Experiment 
This experiment is an attempt to find out about how people take savings 
decisions. It simulates a life in which people receive income and then spend 
and/or save it. There is a savings experiment and then a payoff mechanism. 
In the savings experiment, you take savings decisions over a number of periods 
and try out different strategies. In each period, you receive an income in tokens. 
These tokens can be either converted into points, or they can be saved for 
conversion in a later period. Tokens that are saved have interest paid on 
them. The aim is to get the maximum possible number of points. 
To find your payoff , the points that you have earned are used in a lottery 
between a high prize and a low prize. The more points you have, the greater 
your chance of winning the high prize. 
The Saving Experiment 
You use a PC to take saving decisions. At the beginning of each period your 
income is randomly chosen and shown on the screen. Then your current situation 
is displayed and you can try out different savings strategies on the computer before 
you choose how many tokens to convert to points. You can explore as many 
different possibilities as you wish. The current information screen and 
instructions for the trials are shown in the handout. 
Tokens are converted into points as shown in the graphs in the handout. You 
may convert as many tokens as you wish up to the total of your income plus 
your wealth. Wealth is tokens that you have saved in previous periods plus 
interest. After the last period, the points that you have converted in all 
the periods are added up. 
There are two elements of uncertainty in this experiment: 
1. You do not know how many periods there will be. At the end of each period, 
there is a chance that the savings experiment will finish. Any tokens that 
you have saved up and not converted will not be worth anything. 
2. You do not know exactly what your income is going to be in the future. In 
each period, the income will be one of 3 possible numbers. 
The chance of the savings experiment ending at the end of a period and the 
possible incomes are shown in the table at the end of the handout. 
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The Payoff Mechanism 
To get your payoff, you play a lottery. The points that you have accumulated 
will be a number between 1 and 100. You throw a pair of percentage dice 
(1 to 100). If the number on the dice is lower than your points total, you 
receive £25. If the number on the dice is higher than your points total, you 
receive £4. 
At the end of the payoff instructions, press C to start the experiment. 
USING THE TRIAL FACILITY TO TRY OUT DIFFERENT SAVINGS STRATEGIES 
Spending all income as it is received. 
period 3 4 5 6 7 
income 10 10 2 20 10 
convert 10 10 2 20 10 
wealth 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
total points at period 5= 39 
You could choose to save all income and convert all your wealth in one period. 
Total points at the end if the savings experiment finishes at period 5 is changed to 
24 points for the same run of incomes and starting wealth. 
Saving all income and converting all wealth in one period. 
period 11 12 13 14 15 
income 10 10 2 20 10 
convert 0000 56 
wealth 10.5 21.5 24.7 46.9 1.0 
total points at period 5= 24 
But, remember that there is a 10% chance that the experiment may stop at the end of 
any period, so it may last for a large number of periods or a small number of periods. 
Over a longer number of periods, you could have the following result, earning 88 points: 
period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
income 10 10 2 20 10 2 10 10 10 20 2 10 
convert 5 7 4 15 8 5 17 12 9 20 4 14 
wealth 5.3 8.7 7.0 12.6 15.3 12.9 6.2 4.5 5.7 6.0 6.3 2.4 
total points at period 12 = 88 
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Over a shorter number of periods, the same income stream and savings strategy will give 
you a different number of points. Here, the total at the end is 35 points. 
period 123456 
income 10 10 2 20 10 2 
convert 574 15 85 
wealth 5.3 8.7 7.0 12.6 15.3 12.9 
total points at period 6= 35 
This is the information about your current situation that is displayed each turn: 
THIS IS YOUR CURRENT SITUATION 
This is period - 
Your income this turn is tokens 
Your wealth at the beginning of the period is 
You may convert up to tokens this period 
You have so far earned - 
tokens from earlier periods 
The wealth you have not converted increases by percent 
at the beginning of the next period 
There is a percent chance that there will not be a next period 
Table 
When does the saving stage finish? 
The end of the saving stage is determined by chance. At the end of each period, there is a 
10% chance of the current period being the final period, so the savings stage may last for 
a small or large number of periods. 
What income will you receive? 
In each period, your income is picked at random from 3 numbers. 
There is a 10% chance that your income will be 20 tokens 
There is a 80% chance that your income will be 10 tokens 
There is a 10% chance that your income will be 2 tokens 
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Appendix 4 Trial Ranges for Each Subject 
TABLE OF NUMBER AND RANGES OF TRIALS BY EACH SUBJECT 
SUBJECTS NOT AUTOMATICALLY PUT IN TRIAL OPTION 
range of periods considered by each subject 
(1period trials ignored) 
23456789 10 11 12 14 52 
subject no. 
2 
3 
4 2 
6 2 
11 1 
12 
16 
17 1 
18 
MEAN OF Range 5.54 
1 2 
4 
2 1 1 
11 
1 
2 
STD. DEVIATION 2.72 
1 
2 
i 
SUBJECTS AUTOMATICALLY PUT IN TRIAL OPTION: SUBJECTS HAVE 
TO USE TRIAL FACILITY TO TO FIND CONVERSION FROM TOKENS TO POINTS 
21 7 1 2 
23 9 4 6 
24 1 5 5 5 4 1 
25 7 1 2 
26 15 3 
27 14 13 1 
28 1 3 
29 1 1 1 
30 4 7 
31 8 3 4 1 
32 6 8 
33 5 6 
34 56 6 
35 5 4 
36 4 3 1 
37 4 
38 13 11 2 
39 2 2 
40 2 5 4 2 
MEAN OF Range 3.49 STD. DEVIATION 2.30 
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TABLE OF TRIALS IN EACH PERIOD BY EACH SUBJECT 
trials with a range of only one period are ignored 
the numbers in the table are the ranges of each trial carried out in that period 
- means that the experiment had finished 
0 means that no trials were carried out 
SUBJECTS NOT AUTOMATICALLY PUT IN TRIAL OPTION 
subject 
no. 
1 2 
02 1-5; 1-5; 1-9 1-4 
03 1-8; 1-8; 1-8; 1-8 0 
04 1-9; 1-5; 1-9; 1-4 2-4; 2-4 
06 5-6; 5-6; 0 
2-4 0 
12 0 2-6 
16 5-12; 1-12 2-6 
17 5-6 0 
18 0 2-5; 2-5 
period of experiment 
3 4 5 6 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
3-6 4-9 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
3-6 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
7 8 9 10 11 12 
0 0 - - - - 
0 0 0 0 0 - o 0 0 0 0 - 
o 0 0 - - ll- 
o o - - - - o 0 0 0 0 - o 0 0 0 0 - o 0 _ - - _ 0 0 0 0 0 
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SUBJECTS AUTOMATICALLY PUT IN TRIAL OPTION SUBJECTS HAVE 
TO USE TRIAL FACILITY TO TO FIND CONVERSION FROM TOKENS TO POINTS 
trials with a range of only one period are ignored 
the numbers in the tab le are the ranges o f each trial carried out in that period 
- means that the experiment had finished 
0 means that no trials were c arried out 
subject period of experiment 
no. 
1 2 34 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
21 1-4; 1-4 2-4 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 0 8-9 9-10 10-11 -- 22 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 --- 23 1-4; 1-4; 1-4 2-3; 0 4-6 0 6-7 0 0 9-10 10-11 0 12-14 
1-4; 1-4 2-3 9-10; 10-11 
9-12 
24 1-6; 1-6; 1-5; 1-5 2-8; 3-11; 4-10 5-10 6-12 7-10 8-12 9-14 --- 2-8; 3-6 4-8 5-10 6-8 7-10 8-12 
2-5 3-6 
25 1-5 2-7; 0 4-5 0 6-7 0 0 0 00- 
2-7 4-5 6-7 
4-5 6-7 
4-5 
26 1-3; 1-3; 1-3; 1-2; 2-3; 00 5-6 0 0 0 0 00- 
1-2; 1-2; 1-2; 10 
trials 
27 1-4; 1-4; 1-4; 1-4 2-4; 3-5; 4-6 5-8 6-8 7-10 0 0 10-12 0- 
1-4; 1-4; 1-4; 1-6 4 3-5 4-6 5-8 6-8 7-10 10-12 
trials 4-6 5-8 10-12 
5-8 
28 2-15; 2-10; 2-10 2-10 3-10 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 
29 1-25 2-5 3-5 4-5 0 0 0 0 0 00- 
30 1-6; 1-6; 1-6; 1-6 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00- 
1-10; 1-10; 1-10 
1-10; 1-10; 1-10 
1-10 
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subject period of experiment 
no. 
123456789 10 11 12 
31 1-5 2-4; 3-6; 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 0 10-11 -- 2-4 3-6 7-8 
2-4 3-6 7-8 
3-6 
3-6 
32 3-5; 2-4; 2-4 3-5; 3-4 4-7 5-7 7-8 7-8 8-9 9-10 10-11 -- 3-5 
3-5 
33 1-5; 1-5; 1-5; 1-5 2-5; 0 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 ---- 
2-6 
34 1-3; 1-3; 1-3 2-3; 3-4; 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 10-11 11-12- 
1-3; 1-3; 1-3 2-3 3-4; 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 10-11 11-12 
2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 10-1111-12 
3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 10-11 11-12 
4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 9-10 10-11 11-12 
4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 10-11 
5-6 7-8 10-11 
5-6 7-8 
35 1-3 2-4 3-5 5-6 5-7 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 0-- 
36 1-4 2-4 3-4 00 6-7 7-9 0 9-10 10-11 00 
7-9 
37 1-4; 1-4; 1-4; 1-4 0000000---- 
38 1-5; 1-5; 1-5; 1-5 2-11 00 5-10 6-10 0 8-10 9-11 10-120 - 
1-5; 1-5; 1-5; 1-5 6-10 8-10 9-11 
1-5 8-10 9-11 
8-10 9-11 
8-10 9-11 
9-11 
9-11 
39 1-8; 1-8; 1-2; 1-2 000000000-- 
40 2-5; 1-5 2-5 3-6 4-8 5-8 6-7 7-9 8-10 9-11 10-12- 
6-7 9-11 
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Appendix 5 Summaries of Individual Trials and Comparison with Actual 
Strategies Used 
STRATEGIES 
learning: more than 1 trial in one of the first two periods 
rolling: trials all the way through the experiment, looking forwards the same or a similar 
number of periods 
02 learning, 03 learning, 04 learning + rolling, 06 learning, 
12 learning+ fixed endpoint, 16 learning, 18 learning 
21 early fixed end point + rolling, 23 rolling + learning, 24 rolling + learning, 25 rolling + 
learning, 
26 learning, 27 learning + rolling, 28 learning+ fixed endpoint, 29 learning+ fixed endpoint, 
30 learning, 
31 learning + rolling, 32 learning + rolling, 33 rolling + learning, 34 learning + rolling, 35 
rolling, 
36 early fixed end point + rolling , 37 learning, 38 learning + rolling, 39 learning, 40 
learning + rolling 
income = y, wealth =w 
SUBJECTS NOT AUTOMATICALLY PUT IN TRIAL OPTION 
Subject 02 
Trials in periods 1 and 2, range 5 and 9. 
Trial strategy: Period 1: chooses reasonable distance into the future (range 5), with 
variations in income (y) and variable levels of wealth (w). Does definitve trial range 9, 
keeping wealth within a fairly narrow band (2.5-8.4) apart from final period. Quick check 
in period 2 range 4, similar trial. Strategy is to keep a constant wealth level or learning to 
keep wealth low (between 2 and 5 in later trials). 
Actual strategy: high saving in first period, then w varies between 1 and 9. 
Subject 03 
period 1.4 trials range 1-8 with same varying y flow in all. Different consumption patterns 
including save all y until period 8 to convert all income. 
Trial startegy: chooses reasonable distance to look ahead, then tries out different 
consumption strategies. 
Actual strategy: alternates between no saving and high saving. Trigger level of wealth, 
beyond which dissaves? 
No correlation between trials and actual strategy. 
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Subject 04 
Trials in periods 1 to 4 looking up to 8 periods ahead. 
Trial strategy: Period 1. Different strategies tried: save 50% of income unless there is high 
wealth and income, alternate between consumption of 1 or 2 and 20 as a lagged response 
to high income. Convert y-1 also tried. 
Periods 2-4, look ahead 2 to 5 periods, save early in the trial and dissave in final period 
(once in last two periods). Wealth reduced to low level in all final periods 
Actual strategy: w cycles. 
Subject 06 
Trial in period 1.2 trials range 5-6, smooths in first converts all y in second. Variable y 
assumed. 
Trials find difference between these two approaches. 
Actual strategy: convert all y. Lagged response to high y. 
Subject 11 
Trial in period 1.1 trial range 2-4, smooths and goes to wealth of 0. Variable y 
assumed. 
Actual strategy: convert all y. Lagged response to high y. 
Subject 12 
Trials in periods 1 and 2 looking up to period 6. Converts almost all y+w. Variable y 
assumed. 
Actual strategy: convert all y. Lagged response to high y. 
Subject 17 
1 trial in period 1.1 trial range 5-6, converts all y. y= 10 assumed. 
Actual strategy: convert all y 
Subject 18 
Trials in periods 2. Range 4, 'save all then high conversion in 3rd period. In 2nd trial the 
subject has learned how to reduce wealth to 0. y= 10 assumed. 
Actual strategy: alternates saving all and converting all, after period 4 converts all y. 
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SUBJECTS AUTOMATICALLY PUT IN TRIAL OPTION SUBJECTS HAVE TO USE 
TRIAL FACILITY TO TO FIND CONVERSION FROM TOKENS TO POINTS 
Subject 21 
Trials in all periods, looking one period ahead, with alternating strategies between saving 
all and converting all. Variable y assumed. 
Up to period 3 looks forward to period 4 and from period 3 has rolling trials strategy, 
looking forward 2 periods mostly. Trials have varying savings strategies, between save all 
and convert all y. 
Actual strategy: initially saves all in response to low income, then keeps w between 0 and 
5. 
Subject 22 
All 1 period trials to find conversion from tokens to points. 
Actual strategy: converts all. 
Subject 23 
5 trials in period 1 looking to period 4, all except one (when all y always converted) with 
saving until last period and then converting all. Income of 10 assumed in all but one trial. 
Periods 2-8, trials over 1 or 2 periods with low saving 
Period 93 trials looking to period 10 or 12, differing strategies. 
Period 10 and 11 1 trial of range 1 then 2. Period 12 3 trials with different strategies. 
Later trials practiced keeping w low. 
Trials strategy: serious trial in period 1, limited checks in later periods. 
Actual strategy: alternates between high and low w; smooths. Did not choose best of trials 
for actual strategy. 
Subject 24 
High and low levels of saving tried with different income streams assumed and variable 
levels of wealth. 
Trials strategy: rolling strategy: several trials in each period mostly looking ahead 4-7 
periods. Some smoothing?: build up wealth early on then dissave. 
Actual strategy: convert almost all y; keeps wealth at 1 mostly. 
Subject 25 
Trial startegy: Apart from finding conversions, limited trials performed intermittently, with 
saving early on and then wealth maintained at a moderate level. Multiple period trials mostly 
learning. y= 10 assumed. 
Lots of trials to find conversion from tokens to points. 2 trials in period 2 range 2-7,1 
finding conversions, 1 where all y converted. Some trials with range of 2 periods with low 
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saving. 
Actual strategy: convert most of y, w varies between 2 and 6. 
Subject 26 
Trials strategy: worked out in periods 1 and 2, with a single check in period 5. 
Lots of trials in each period to find conversion from tokens to points. Lots of short trials in 
periods 1 and 2 and one trial (a check? ) in period 5 range 2. Some with low saving, others 
with high saving then dissaving. Variable y assumed. 
Actual strategy: convert most of y, w varies between 1 and 3 except for period 2 where w 
set to 8 for next period. 
Subject 27 
Trials strategy: rolling 
Trials range 3 or 4 in most periods, more trials early on. High early saving at various rates 
in some 
trials with dissaving in last period of trial so that w<1.0, more variation in strangetegies 
in later trials. y= 10 assumed. 
Actual strategy: Some saving, w varies between 5 and 10 until run of low income causes w 
to decrease to 3 and all y converted. 
Subject 28 
Long trials in periods 1 to 3, starting next period in period 1 only goes up to period 10 after 
first trial, but with variable conversion strtaegies. range between 14 and 8 with low saving. 
Income of 10 assumed. 
Actual strategy: Converts 5 of 10 in first period, otherwise mostly high conversion, w kept 
between 0 and 5 apart from last 2 periods. 
Subject 29 
Trial in period 1 range 24, period 2 range 4, period 3 range 3, period 4 range 2. Conversion 
tracks wealth with low saving. i. e. One serious trial in which subject learns how to keep 
wealth low as income varies, and a few checks where wealth also kept low, by converting 
most of Y. Variable y assumed. 
Actual strategy: convert all y except for first two periods when convert 8 of 10. 
Subject 30 
11 trials in period 1, range 6 and 10, lots of different savings strategies tried, varying 
between saving all y for conversion in the last period of a trial and just converting all Y. 
Same 'typical' income stream assumed in all trials. 
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Actual strategy: convert all y. 
Subject 31 
Rolling trials strategy. 
Trials in all periods, lots in periods 2 and 3, range 5 decreasing to 2 by period 6, with 
varying strategies, often maintaining a wealth of 10. Two types of early trials: save all y for 
conversion in last period or convert all y. Later trials keep wealth low or save all y. Income 
of 10 assumed. 
Actual strategy: alternates between 0 conversion and converting all y+w. 
Subject 32 
Rolling strategy: 
Trials in all periods, range 3 early on later 2, varying income assumptions and savings 
strategies mostly with significant saving in at least the first period. Some trials have end 
effect: wealth reduced to 0 in last period, from period 8 trials have low wealth as in actual 
strategy: expecting experiment to finish? 2 period trials practice actual conversion in first 
period of trial. Income of 10 assumed. 
Actual strategy: early saving, threshold wealth of 10 triggers dissaving?. 
Subject 33 
Trials strategy: learning in period 1+ rolling strategy 
Trials of range 4 or 5 in periods 1 and 2, income assumed constant at 10, strategies all with 
higher saving early on lower later. Trials of range 1 or 2 later, with low saving then 
dissaving. 
Actual strategy: Saving in first two periods, then convert most y, w maintained between 8 
and 12. 
Subject 34 
Trials strategy: rolling + learning in each period 
Lots of trials in all peiods with range 2 assuming y= 10 always. Different savings strategies, 
but after first period pattern is moderate saving then dissaving, keeping w<1.0 or reducing 
w to w<1.0. First period of trials often keeps wealth high, as in actual conversion strategy. 
Actual strategy: Some saving throughout, w increases continuously to 30. 
Subject 35 
Trials strategy: rolling 
Trials in all periods range 3 decreasing to 2. High levels of w (10+) built up and maintained 
as go through periods. Different patterns of y assumed. 
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Actual strategy: Strategy variable, saves in most periods. 
Subject 36 
Trials strategy: rolling, variable wealth sometimes kept low, sometimes high. 
1 trial of range 4 in Ist period, range 3 in second range 2 both with high initial saving in 3rd 
range 1 with dissaving. Income of 10 assumed almost always. 
Actual strategy: Alternates between saving and dissaving as a result of short range thinking?. 
Subject 37 
Trials strategy: learning in first period, to maintain a moderate level of wealth. 
4 trials of range 4 in period 1, assuming y of 10 22 10, moderate saving strategies tried 
with one trial where y smoothed for conversion . 
Actual strategy: Low saving except a period of high income used to increase w from 1-3 
in early periods to 7- 13 in later periods. c tracks y. 
Subject 38 
Trials strategy: Period 1, learning assuming period 5 is end, all with same income flow. 
Period 2 longer trial, possibly also learning how to keep wealth to 3 approximately. After 
period 5, trials to period 10, most trials have significant saving then dissaving. Period 8 on 
rolling strategy. 
later trials assumed y= 10, mainly high early saving with conversion of w+y in last period 
of trial. 
Actual strategy: Wealth cycles. 
Subject 39 
Trails strategy: Learning in period 1. Compares early saving then converting all to 
converting all. 
Actual strategy: convert all y. 
Subject 40 
Trials strategy: rolling 
1 or 2 trials in each period range 3 or 4 mainly. High wealth in first 1 or 2 periods of trial, 
then dissaving. Variable y assumed. First period of trial similar to actual conversion, but 
trials reduce wealth more. 
Actual strategy: Cyclical from save all y to convert y to convert y+ 10. Wealth of 20 built 
up in first two periods and maintained and increased. 
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Appendix 6 FORTRAN 77 program EXSIM. F 
program exsim 
c program to generate ex ante optimal c for initial wealth at 
c beginning of period excluding in period income w= 0.1 to 100 
cy distribution and stopping prob known 
parameter n=1000 
parameter (y 1=20, y2=10, y3=2, p 1=0.1, p2=0.8, r=0. l, pd=0.9) 
c y1-3 = incomes p= income probabilities 
c pd = chance of death r= int rate 
double precision w, v(n), rhs(n), points(n) 
c w(n) is beginning of period wealth including any income 
cw form 0.1 to 100.0 in steps of 0.1 
c v(n) is maximum value function for wealth 100/n 
c rhs(n) is expected value function for the next period 
c points(n) is optimal consumption for output file: not used in calc 
double precision aaa, rhsal, rhsa2, rhsa3, ww, diff, rhsmax, ca 
c aaa is counter for v(n) initialisation 
c rhsal-3 and ww are intermediate variables for rhs 
c diff is difference between current iteration and last iteration 
c of overall calc. used to determine convergence of calculation 
c rhsmax is current maximum value of value function for the c's 
c that have been tried so far 
double precision c, maxc, copt(n), cara, vv 
cc is current value of consumption copt(n) is value of c that 
c maximises rhs for each n i. e. w 
c cara is cara utility function, vv is interpolation of v fn. 
c initialise v(n) 
do 10 i=1, n 
aaa=i* 100.0/n 
rhs(i)=cara(aaa) 
c print*, 'rhs=', rhs(i), 'cara=', cara(aaa) 
c print*, 'i ca rhs =', i, ca, rhs(l), rhs(101), rhs(1000) 
10 continue 
c conditional loop if difference large 
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15 do 30 ii= Im 
v(ii)=rhs(ii) 
30 continue 
c loop through w from 0.1 to 100.0 
do 200 jj=l, n 
c print*, (''J='ii) 
w jj/10.0 
c loop through c and find maximising value of c for current n(=w* 10) 
rhs(jj) = 0.0 
rhsmax = 0.0 
maxc = 0.0 
kk = int(w) 
do 100 is = kk, 0, -1 
c=ic 
c print*; wc= ', w, c 
ww=(w-c)*(1. O+r) 
rhsal = ww + yl 
rhsa2 = ww + y2 
rhsa3 = ww + y3 
C IS THIS CORRECT OR IS IT RHSA3=WW+Y3 - NO 1+R? 
C no 1+r ans y is for beginning of next period 
C and w includes y for this period 
C print*, 'wcww', w, c, ww 
c print*, 'rhsa', rhsal, rhsa2, rhsa3 
c rhs =u from this period consumption + expected value next period 
rhs(jj) = cara(c) + pd*(pl*vv(rhsal, v, n) + p2*vv(rhsa2, v, n) 
*+ (1.0-p1-p2)*vv(rhsa3, v, n)) 
c print*, 'ccarajj rhs', c, cara(c)jj, rhs(jj) 
c print*, 'vv', vv(rhsa l, v, n), vv(rhsa2, v, n), vv(rhsa3, v, n) 
c check for maximising c 
if (rhs(jj) gt. rhsmax) then 
rhsmax = rhs(jj) 
maxc =c 
end if 
c print*, rhsmax, maxc, w 
100 continue 
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rhs(jj) = rhsmax 
copt(jj) = maxc 
200 continue 
c check to see if current iteration significantly different 
c over all w from last iteration and repeat calc if needed 
diff=0.0 
Do 220 1=1, n 
diff = abs(v(1)-rhs(1)) + diff 
220 continue 
print*, 'diff=', diff 
if (diff gt. 0.0001) then 
goto 15 
end if 
print*, 'v 102 ', v(102) 
c write results to file 
open(10, file='copt. res') 
open(1 l, file='v. res') 
12 format(2f8.3, I3, f8.3) 
14 format(f12.8) 
16 format(f8.3) 
do 223 ic=1,1000 
write(10,16)copt(ic) 
223 continue 
c write(11, *)('r=. 01 pd=. 99 e=. 9 n=1000') 
do 225 iw=1,1000 
write(11,16)(v(iw)) 
225 continue 
c do 23011=1, n 
c aa=1U10.0 
c points(11)=cara(copt(11)) 
c write(10,12) (aa, v(11), copt(11), points(11)) 
c 230 continue 
close(10) 
c close(11) 
end 
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double precision function cara(a) 
c cara utility function 
double precision a, f 
parameter (d=20.0, e=-O. 1) 
f=e*a 
cara = d*(1.0-exp(O) 
end 
double precision function vv(a, b, m) 
c interpolate/extrapolate from v fn. 
integer m, k 
double precision b(m), a, c 
c=100.0/m 
k=int(a/c) 
c if a le m then interpolate 
if (a le. m*c) then 
vv=(a/c-k)*(b(k+1)-b(k)) + b(k) 
else 
c if a gt m then extrapolate 
vv = b(m) 
end if 
end 
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Appendix 7 FORTRAN 77 program ROLLSIM. F 
PROGRAM ROLLSIM 
C PROGRAM TO GENERATE EX ANTE OPTIMAL C FOR INITIAL WEALTH AT 
C BEGINNING OF PERIOD EXCLUDING IN PERIOD INCOME W= 0.1 TO 100 
C CALCS POINTS ON AVERAGE FROM RANDOM INCOME FLOW ASSUMES Y 
C DISTN KNOWN AND PROB OF DEATH=O FOR ROLL PERIODS INTO FUTURE 
PARAMETER (N=1000, NPMAX=200, R=0.1, PD=0.99, NROLL=10) 
PARAMETER (Y 1 =20, Y2= 1 0, Y3=2, P 1=0.1, P2=0.8) 
CY= INCOME P= PROBABILITY PD = CHANCE OF DEATH R= INT RATE 
DOUBLE PRECISION W, RESW(NPMAX), V(NROLL, N) 
DOUBLE PRECISION DIFF, POINTS, AVPOINTS, AVPOINTSN 
DOUBLE PRECISION AAA, RHS, RHSA 1, RHSA2, RHSA3, WW, RHSMAX 
double precision rhsl, rhs2 
DOUBLE PRECISION C, MAXC, COPT(NPMAX, N), RESC, Y(NPMAX), YY 
DOUBLE PRECISION CARA, VV 
INTEGER T, TT, K, KK, KA 
C NOTE ROLL INCLUDES FINAL PERIOD SO ROLL= 2 DOES CALC 
C OVER 2 PERIODS AND THEREFORE LOOKS 1 PERIOD AHEAD 
DOUBLE PRECISION X, Z, G05CAF 
EXTERNAL G05CAF, G05CBF, G05CCF 
OPEN(14, FILE='rl. res') 
C CALC MAX VAL FUNCTION AND C OPT FUNCTION 
C INITIALISE V 
DO 85 I=1, N 
AAA=I/10.0 
V(NROLL, I)=CARA(AAA) 
85 CONTINUE 
C LIMITED LIFE VS INFINITE BY PERFORMING THE ITERATION ROLL TIMES 
DO 250 T= NROLL-1,1, -1 
print*, 't', NROLL, t 
C LOOP THROUGH W 
DO 200 JJ=1, N 
W=JJ/10.0 
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C LOOP THROUGH C AND FIND MAXIMISING VALUE OF C 
V(T, JJ)=O. O 
RHSMAX=0.0 
RHS=0.0 
MAXC=0.0 
KK=INT(W) 
DO 100 IC = KK, O, -1 
C=IC 
WW=(W-C)*(1. O+R) 
RHSA1 =WW+Y1 
RHSA2 = WW + Y2 
RHSA3 = WW + Y3 
RHS = CARA(C) + P1*VV(RHSAI, V, NROLL, N, T+1) 
*+ P2*VV(RHSA2, V, NROLL, N, T+1) + 
*+ (1.0-PI-P2)*VV(RHSA3, V, NROLL, N, T+1) 
C CHECK FOR MAXIMISING C 
IF (RHS. GT. RHSMAX) THEN 
RHSMAX = RHS 
MAXC=C 
END IF 
100 CONTINUE 
V(T, JJ) = RHSMAX 
COPT(T, JJ) = MAXC 
200 CONTINUE 
C print*, 't jj copt t jj- ! ', t, jj, copt(t, jj-1) 
250 CONTINUE 
c OPEN(15, file='rdO3. res') 
255 FORMAT(2F8.3) 
c do 257 iout=l, n 
c write(15,255)copt(nroll-2, iout), copt(nroll-1, iout) 
C* copt(nroll-2, iout) 
c 257 continue 
c close(15) 
c go to 1051 
C print*; finished' 
C FIND END PERIOD AND Y 
CALL G05CBF(0) 
AVPOINTS=0.0 
KA=O 
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400 IEND=O 
540 IEND=IEND+1 
C GENERATE Y 
Y(IEND)=10.0 
X=G05CAF(X) 
C print*, 'x', x 
IF (X. LE. PI) Y(IEND)=20.0 
IF (X. GT. P1+P2) Y(IEND)=2.0 
C CHECK FOR DEATH 
Z=G05CAF(Z) 
C print*, 'z', z 
IF ((Z. LE. PD). AND. (IEND. LT. NPMAX)) GO TO 540 
IF (LEND . GE. NPMAX) GO TO 400 
KA=KA+1 
c IF (KA. GT. 2000) GO TO 1050 
C CALC PATH GIVEN INCOME STREAM 
RESW(1)=0.0 
POINTS=0.0 
DO 750 LJ=I, IEND 
LJW = INT((RESW(LJ)+Y(LJ))* 10) 
]F(LJW. GT. N)LJW=N 
RESW(LJ+1) = (RESW(LJ) - COPT(1, LJW) + Y(LJ))*(1.0+R) 
POINTS = POINTS + CARA(COPT(1, LJW)) 
750 CONTINUE 
C print*, 'iend points', iend, POINTS 
C CHECK TO SEE IF REPEAT CALC 
950 AVPOINTSN=(AVPOINTS*(KA-1)+POINTS)/KA 
WRITE(14, *)AVPOINTSN, POINTS, KA 
C PRINT*, POINTS, AVPOINTS 
DIFF=AVPOINTSN-AVPOINTS 
IF ((AVPOINTSN. LT. 0.0). AND. (KA. GT. 10)) THEN 
KA=1 
WRITE(14, *)'AV', AVPOINTS, POINTS, KA 
GO TO 400 
END IF 
IF (ABS(DIFF). GT. 0.0001) THEN 
AVPOINTS=AVPOINTSN 
GO TO 400 
END IF 
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1050 WRITE(14, *)'AV DIFF', AVPOINTS, DIFF 
WRITE(14, *)'Nroll KA RESW(LJ)', nROLL, KA, RESW(LJ) 
WRITE(14, *)'N=1000 r=. 01 pd=. 5 e=. 03' 
print*; finish', avpoints 
1051 CLOSE(14) 
END 
DOUBLE PRECISION function CARA(A) 
C CARA UTILITY FUNCTION 
DOUBLE PRECISION F, A 
PARAMETER (D=20.0, E=-0.03) 
F=E*A 
IF (F. EQ. 0.0) THEN 
CARA=0.0 
ELSE 
CARA = D*(1.0-EXP(F)) 
END IF 
END 
DOUBLE PRECISION FUNCTION VV(A, B, NP, M, NT) 
C INTERPOLATE/EXTRAPOLATE FROM V FN. 
INTEGER NP, M, NT, K 
DOUBLE PRECISION A, B(NP, M), C, F, G 
C=100.0/M 
K=INT(A/C) 
C IF A LE M THEN INTERPOLATE 
IF (A. LE. M*C) THEN 
VV=(A/C-K)*(B(NT, K+1) - B(NT, K)) + B(NT, K) 
ELSE 
C IF A GT M THEN EXTRAPOLATE 
VV = B(NT, M) 
END IF 
END 
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